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PREFACE
This is a case study of a university based educational change
v project which sought to radically alter a junior high school in the
New York Public School System. The primary objective of the study is
to illumine the process of change in schools. As well, the study
represents an effort to determine the extent to which the concepts of
"organizational behavior" and "organizational change" are useful in
explaining the success or failure of educational change projects.
The project under investigation occurred at a critical point
in the history of urban, "inner city," schools — after the major
thrust for "compensatory education" had been spent and before "com-
munity control" was raised as the new banner of educational reform.
In one sense, it was caught in the middle: the project sought to
.
avoid the agonizing failure of many compensatory programs, but it
had to proceed without the fully articulated vision of proponents of
y community control. In another sense, one which takes note of the
complexities of educational change and the dangers of oversimplifica-
tion, it provides a microcosm of the dynamic interplay of conflicting
reform impulses and clashing interests that besets urban education in
the 1970’ s.
A number of people assisted me in this study and I should like
to publicly thank them. Horace Reed, Professor of Education at the
University of Massachusetts School of Education, played a very impor-
\ v «
i
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tant supportive role not only in the researching and writing of this
thesis but in all my activities at UMass. His wise words have played
a vital part in many of the formulations and conclusions that fill the
f following pages. Ken Blanchard, Associate Professor at the School of
N
Education, introduced me to the value of theory and challenged me to
make sense of the Clinic for Learning by approaching it scientifically.
, Gerry Weinstein, Professor at the School of Education, helped me to
clarify my ambivalencies about white educators and black students.
Jack Hruska, Assistant Professor at the School of Education, introduced
me to John Dewey and the philosophical approach to education which has
influenced much of my thinking in this study. Also, I should like to
pay special thanks to Ann Lieberman, Assistant Professor at the School
of Education, for expressing better than anyone the proud and resolute
credo of the professional educator. Everyone who comes in contact
• with her takes away a bit of her enthusiasm and dedication.
In addition, I should like to thank all the persons listed in
the bibliography who assisted me in recreating the Clinic for Learn-
ing.
Finally, I should like to thank my wife, whom I courted and
married during the course of this research, and without whom life
would be infinitely more difficult.
*
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INTRODUCTION
The New York University "Clinic for Learning which grew out of
another NYU based program of compensatory education called Project APEX,
was centrally committed to "sharply change a junior high school in the
middle of the slum into a school of unusual merit in the education of
disadvantaged children." Supported by the Ford Foundation and the New
•.York City Board of Education, the Clinic staff arrived at Junior High
School £7 in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn in September,
1966. There had been introductory meetings with teachers and administra-
tors the previous spring, there had been a summer camp for sixty incoming
seventh graders, there had been a weekend retreat for the entire faculty,
attended by some 60-70 percent of them, and there had been countless work
sessions, planning sessions, strategy sessions between the Project Director
and his staff of from six to ten professors and graduate students. Special
teachers, paid by Clinic funds, had been recruited to relieve some of the
burden on the regular JHS £7 staff. Student teachers, other concerned
] undergraduates, even experts from other departments of the university had
been mobilized to attack the problems of education for the disadvantaged.
There were to be six "clusters," (in the first year, the Clinic for Learn-
ing focused only on the seventh grade), comprised of one Cluster Coordina-
tor from NYU, one teacher from each of the subject areas each of whom
taught the same classes, one extra ("Clinic") teacher, one community agent,
and as *manv undergraduates and postgraduate personnel as were available.
The Principal of the school, most of the lower administrators, and most
of the teachers were strongly enthusiastic about the Clinic* Expectations
1
2were uniformly high.
By January, 1967, approximately one-third of the Clinic staff
had resigned. By February, nearly half of the regular JHS 57 teachers
had eliminated themselves from the program. In April, a movie about the
,
school and the Clinic (produced independently but associated in nearly
everyone’s mind with the Clinic effort) was shown on national television
I
depicting the school as a "combat zone." By May community groups were
<
calling for the ouster of the Clinic. A compromise solution was reached
and in September, 1967, only two clusters were functioning. By this time
only eight regular teachers on the JHS 57 staff were involved (out of
about one hundred)
,
and most of the others were blaming the Clinic for
i
the almost unmanageable disciplinary problems of the school. In November,
i
a front page article appeared in the Mew York Times quoting the Project
Director as saying the NYU team had been through a "shattering" experi-
ence, and that they were abandoning efforts to change the school. The
two clusters, however, continued to function. Community groups continued
j
to apply pressure. Sometime in May or June, 1968, most of the Clinic
personnel stopped coming to J.H.S.57* A team from Hofstra was brought
in to do an evaluation of the Project; two years later they produced a
\
shallow rehash of the project's "failure." The Project Director has
produced another movie which uses scenes from the earlier film and relies
in part on his experiences with the Clinic. Except for that, and the
very few and ~ery brief references that can be found in some current edu-
cation^. books, the Clinic for Learning has been all but forgotten,
thrown on the scrapheap of "compensatory programs that failed."
I had begun teaching at JHS 57 in September, 1968. My initiation
into the life of"the school had been abrupt — flying chairs, books,
r
3occasional illiteracy, often a complete lack, of hope for anything more
than drugs and crime, fighting, threatening, disrupting. It seems tragic
now, it was maddening and frightening at the time. My second year teach-
ing was much more successful. I was an "innovator,” I gave the kids
"freedom to learn," I tried my best to "turn them on." In my classroom,
I felt things were a little different.
The next year I left JHS 57 to attend graduate school and it was
* only then that I learned about the Clinic for Learning, being shown by
a friend the reference to it in Charles Silberman's Crisis in the Class-
room . There were some obviously striking aspects to this discovery:
1) I had taught for two years in a school immediately after a $U50,000
project had left, and I had not even heard of the project; 2) far from
being a "demonstration school," JHS 57 in my experience seemed to be one
of the most dismally ineffective schools I had ever been in.
I began a preliminary investigation, speaking with the Director
‘ of the Clinic ‘for Learning, with the District Superintendent of the local
school district, with the Principal of the school, with several adminis-
) trators and teachers who had been involved, and I began pouring over the
project literature that was made available to me. Almost everyone I con-
tacted was willing to speak to me at greater length. Emotions still ran
high; what was remarkable was the extent to which people spoke of the
Clinic experience in personal terms, as"painful," or "bitter," or "infuri-
ating," or "tragic." It seemed as if only a very few had paused
to put
the Clinic experience in perspective, or struggled for deeper
understand-
ing, or searched for underlying causes. It was as if when
the Clinic
ended, most of those involved had forgotten it completely,
.and the jang-
ling resentments" and angers and fears and frustrations
had lain suppressed
fu
and dormant for five years. As nearly as I could figure, there were
three manor explanations for the "failure” of the Clinic, which different
people highlighted differently, but which everyone more or less agreed
on: 1) teachers had been resistant to change due to their '‘entrenched”
;
attitude about learning, and adminstrators had been "intransigent” in
dealing with Clinic proposals for change; 2) the Clinic staff was inexperi
enced, cloaked in "ivory towerisms," and didn't really understand how a
.
New York City public school functioned; and 3) the Clinic had failed to
consult the community before coming to JHS 57 and when the community dis-
covered this they expelled the Clinic.
These explanations seemed inadequate. There were certain assump-
tions which I held about teachers and students at JHS 57, assumptions
forged in the fires of two years' effort to introduce my own miniscule
.
change program, which did not square with these interpretations of the
Clinic’s demise. There were no teachers, it seemed to me, who were
consciously trying to fail or who would refuse to adopt practises or
.
<7
technioues which they felt would help the students achieve at higher
/levels. All. or at least most, of the teachers would have preferred to
see JHS 57 as a "school of unusual merit." And though I knew that teach-
ers as a group were complainers, self-servers, rigidly "practical,"
enmeshed in the trivial rush of daily affairs, with little of the de-
tachment that allows one to be both a participant and an observer in life
processes, and for whom teaching "rewards" had been all but supplanted
by tho^e pecuniary despite it all, I knew they were only people, as
are we all, with their own ^problems and ways of looking at the world.
It seemed petty to suggest that the failure of the Clinic was somehow
their "fault," because they "resisted change." It seemed equally unfair
-5
to "blame" an intransigent administration, which was everyday involved
in crises of all sizes and shapes, and which was responsible to parents,
to the teachers union, to the central administration, to the students,
and to themselves. Nor was it satisfactory to label the Clinic staff
f
"dilettantish," for nothing came easy in JHS £7 and it seemed to me that
to "teach" the teachers how to run a better school was no less arduous
than "teaching" seventh grade Science or ninth grade English: understand-
P
4
ing the needs of the learner, accepting the values and attitudes of the
learner, identifying the most basic, hence most powerful motivators,
using cautious guidance, cautious evaluation, structured to the situation,
gently pushing to fulfill learning goals. Not a simple task, in either
case. The facts would show that the Clinic staff was not especially
. inexperienced, and to argue that the Clinic failed because they didn’t
"understand the school situation" was satisfactory only on the most
superficial level.
Finally, I was convinced that had the Clinic for Learning result-’^
ed in significantly higher reading scores for JHS 5>7 students, the com-
J
inunity would have been overjoyed, lack of previous consultation notwith-
standing. Many people then and many people today believe that "learn-
ing disabilities" must be "compensated" for, and if the Clinic could have
done that, the community would have been satisfied. The fact that
the
Clinic became the "enemy" of most community groups, then, could
not be
explained solely by the failure of the planners of the
Clinic to involve
community groups. The story of the Clinic's confrontation
with the com-
munity, it seemed to me, would only make sense if
set within the con-
text of the city.-wide movement for community
control that occurred in
I could observe that in September, 1971,the middle and late 1 960 ’ s
.
r6
the newly empowered community school board had brought a black principal
to JHS 57, had conducted a highly successful nationwide search for black
teachers, and was beginning to apply pressure directly on the classroom
level . These events had followed. the city vide teachers’ strike over
OceanHill
-Brownsville, which had followed temporally the Clinic for
Learning. The implications of this were too strong to ignore.
I knew from experience that certain limited changes were possible
at -JHS 57* I had had mock trials, done role playings, and arranged
community interviews with my classes. Mr. Kalina had introduced "human-
istic” exercises into the guidance curriculum. Mr. Blackett was a highly
successful, in terms of students’ achievements and students' respect, if
highly traditional, Math teacher whom no "educational reformer" in his
.right mind would try to change. Miss Williams was an extremely bright
and energetic Science teacher who tried valiantly to introduce the in-
quiry approach into Science classrooms. Mr. Lefkowitz, Social Studies
department chairman, encouraged all kinds of experimentation from his
teachers. Mr. Fischer brought students to his house on many weekends,
paid to take them to Coney Island or up the Hudson River. Mr. Zorfass
knew that there was beauty in literature, and he held plays, readings,
exercises to involve his students in literature and in producing their
own li'terature . And more. I knew that if the school were staffed with
conscientious, imaginative people such as these it would be a different
place. It hadn't occurred to me that there was no conceivable way that
JHS 57, District 16, New York City Board of Education, 1970, would ever
be staffed with more than a handful of such people. But I held to the
belief that with jproper training, facilities and assistance, more teachers
could be made to function with more creativity, more skill, more enthu-
t7
siasm, and with more success than previously. I thought that the Clinic
Learning, with the sizable financial and human resources which were
available to it, should have had some positive impact on the school,
which would eventually result in increased learnings for the students.
My assumption, then, was that the Clinic could have succeeded in improv-
ing the instructional process, and that interventions of this type, or
similar type, are feasible.
In the first stages of investigation, my chief task was recreating
the reality of the Clinic for Learning. I found myself more concerned
with "what happened" than "why or how did it happen." My questions
focused on specific incidents, on personal experiences, and less on in-
terpretations. But understandably, nearly everyone was eager to express
his own version of why the Clinic "failed" (a conclusion on which most
people seemed to agree) . The various explanations only reconfirmed my
earlier skepticism about the shallowness of understanding. First, many
people had adopted a kind of "personality theory" to explain the Clinic:
Clinic staff people would say to me, there was no way to work with a
J teacher like Miss ; teachers would say certain members of the Clinic
staff were incompetent; a high administration official at New York Univer-
sity even suggested that the Clinic would have succeeded if the Project
Director had not been involved. No doubt personalities were important
in the life of the Clinic, but it seemed clear to me that a study based
on personalities would be of little use to anyone, and that I would have
to fociSs on specific policies and programs and decisions and expenditures
i.e. on observable behaviors — if the study was to be of any value.
Secondly, the issue at hand was not why did the Clinic for Learn-
ing succeed or ‘fail, but what could we learn from studying it.
To make
18
sense of the Clinic for Learning would require integrating the facts and
causes and effects of the Clinic into the body of knowledge which makes
up the disciplines of behavioral and social science.
Format of Study - Sub-Problems
As I proceeded, I came to see that a study of the Clinic could
serve the furtherance of knowledge in a quite profound way. It became
,
clear that the Clinic for Learning had been based on four hypothetical
propositions, some of which may even rightly be called "theories, " de-
rived from different branches of behavioral science. Indeed, one who
reads the initial proposal for change, with no knowledge of the outcome,
might well be optimistic about the prospects for success. I believe this
to be as true in 1972 as it was in 1966. Surely, it was on this basis
that Mario Fantini, chief urban educational officer at the Ford Founda-
tion, Bernard Donovan, Superintendent of the New York City Public School
System, and Daniel E. Griffiths, Dean of the New York University School
of Education, proffered their support to the planners of the Clinic for
Learning. I saw that in a sense a case study of the Clinic for Learning
could generate information that would tend to verify or disaffirm or
modify these propositions; the Clinic for Learning in effect could serve
as a laboratory in which what the Project Director would later call "the
collective wisdom of our profession for the past twenty years" could be
tested.
$. Two of the propositions derived from the expanding field of
"organizational behavior and change/' a branch of inquiry developed large-
ly in an industrial setting and associated with such names as
Warren 0.
Bennis, Chris Argyris, and Rensis Likert. There appeared
to be in the
9past several years a proliferation of efforts trying to make the
theorems and related learnings of this science available to education
institutions. To the extent that schools and factories were alike in
o
C
their organizational characteristics, it was felt the transfer of know-
i ledge from one field to another would be an advantageous one. Roughly,
the two propositions upon which the Clinic for Learning relied heavily
were
:
*. 1) Effective change in organizations — i.e. schools — is
facilitated by the full participation of those most directly in-
volved in the change — i.e. the teachers — in all decision mak-
ing processes which affect them.
2) The leadership style employed by outside “change agents"
should be characterized by, a.) a concern for the intellectual
and emotional, needs of the clients — i.e. administration, teach-
ers, and students; b.) allowing clients responsibility, challeng-
ing tasks, opportunities for maturity; and c.) the creation of a
non-threatening climate which will allow for personal growth (of
teachers). In theoretical terms, this means a high relationship,
and moderately low task leadership behavior.
I
A third proposition upon which the Clinic relied is drawn from
-
what might be called the field of "social foundations of urban educa-
tion," which roughly includes all the writing and research which bear on
J the problems of education in the "inner city" — specifically, the educa-
tion of blacks and Puerto Ricans and other racial minorities.
Although, as I shall demonstrate, this proposition relies less
on hard research findings than on sociological inquiry, it appears in my
experience to be widely agreed upon. It is:
3) Parents and community groups in inner cities must be
given broader opportunities to participate in the life of the
scfiool
.
The correlate upon which the Clinic rested was:
3a) The Clinic for Learning could act as a catalyst for increased
involvement by parents and community.
r
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The final proposition upon which the' Clinic was based is derived
from the broader fields of sociology and anthropology as they relate to
education. There is a tremendous amount of writing and research which <
supports this premise:
lj) If education in inner cities is to be effective, where
it is not now effective, the living conditions around the child,
his total environment, must undergo corresponding changes.
The all-important correllary of this proposition was:
l:a) The public school can be used as a lever to effect
changes in a child's total environment.
There were other assumptions that impinged on these four. For
example, that individualized instruction is better than classroom in-
j
struction; that the traditional role of the teacher is outmoded; that the
curriculum should be "relevant” to the life of the learner; that every
child is oossessed of instinctive curiosity and motivation; that "satura-
|
ting" the school environment with concerned adults will positively affect
the child's self-image. And, of course, JHS 57 is not a laboratory,
other things are never "enual," and the data which I hope to bring to
/bear on the above hypotheses will not be conclusive. However, because
they are such widely and currently held premises, it seems to me that any
attempt to determine their efficacy in an actual situation will stand as
a useful contribution to the expansion of knowledge. Additionally, not
only will this study be useful in offering evidence to bear on the pro-
positions abo*e, but I hope as well that it will be a unique forum from
which dew hypotheses can be generated.
As can be seen, the four propositions reflect a wide range of
scientific credibility: the first two can be tested in highly controlled
and definitive wavs; the latter two can be argued vociferously,
but it
f11
is not likely they will ever be proven or disproven conclusively. This
amalgam of strictly theoretical and non-theoretical points of view re-
flects both the panorama of designs that spawned the Clinic for Learn- <
ing and the various levels on which social change projects can be evalu-
ated. Specifically, this study deals with three levels of educational
change: in the classroom, in the community, and in the society. To a
!
1
'
greater or lesser degree, Clinic planners sought to use the public
schools to effect change on all three levels. Though certainly the levels
are interrelated, I have chosen to evaluate them separately, hoping this
will be instructive for future innovation: it is crucially important, I
!
believe, that educational reformers know precisely what level they are9
V
on. Similarly, the success of educational reform has to be measured in
i
terms of the goals of the reformers. For this reason, it is important
that the levels of change be kept separate in the reader's mind. For
example, a reformer who has successfully implemented a new Social Studies
curriculum can hardly be faulted for failing to alter basic economic in-
terrelationships in the society. At the same time, one who seeks to
build a "new social order" by using the schools is only partially ful-
filled if his efforts result in the formation of a Parents Advisory
j
Council
.
Briefly, I shall argue that the Clinic for Learning was ineffec-
tive in involving teachers and administrators in relevant
decision making
processes, and that they provided sterile and counterproductive
leader-
ship.
"
Had these tasks been performed skillfully, the Clinic
would have
been more successful on the classroom level. Indeed,
the Clinic for
Learning could have made JHS 57 a "better" place for
students, teachers
and administrators. I shall argue that Clinic
efforts to build a
f12
"community school," which could have resulted in greater community and
parent involvment in school affairs, failed because of poor planning,
cultural ignorance, and an untouchable school bureaucracy, as well as «
certain fundamental political and economic realities that existed out-
' i
side the school. I shall further pose the question as to the bare possi-
bility that the Clinic staff, as outside interventionists, could have
| |
.
'
succeeeded at all on this level. Finally, I shall argue that the Clinic's
intention of reaping broad social reform evidences a gross misunderstand
-
I
ing of the sociology of American public education, and a false and utopian
*
hope for educational reform in general.
From this, it can be seen that the planners of the Clinic for
Learning possessed for themselves a large vision, so large and unwieldy
that it far outstripped the means at their disposal. Their efforts were
blunted time after time, on each and every front. Yet change projects
similar to the Clinic, incorporating at least part of its design, begin
anew every day, and shall no doubt continue as long as there are men and
women who profess to be educators and who abhor social and educational
/
injustice. Though the Clinic for Learning was a near total failure, it
is my hope to illuminate the travails of the individuals involved, in
t
I
order that we all might draw some meaning from their struggle.
*
/ : *•*
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Chapter 1
THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR AND EVIDENCE THAT
THE CLINIC INTENEED TO RELY ON THE PROPOSITIONS
Proposition #1 - Participation of Teachers in Decision Making
The classic study on subordinate participation in decision
" making, which highlights most bibliographies in the field of organiza-
tional change, was conducted by Coch and French ( 1 9U8) in an American
pajama factory. They found that when employees were involved in deci-
sions as to how a new work system would be implemented, their producti-
vity increased and absenteeism and grievances decreased. Other industrial
studies have reached similar conclusions. Guest (i960) found that
successful change was a function of increased responsibility for employees
in decisions which affected them directly. Morse and Reimer (1956) found
that strict directives from superiors tended to reduce the effectiveness
of work groups. Warren Bennis, the chief architect of the concept of
J
"planned organizational change," stresses that employee participation is
crucial for heightened employee morale, which in turn facilitates adoption
!
of innovative practises. (1961; 1966.)
Educators have sought to verify these principles in an educational
setting, with less precision in research strategy but equally favorable
results. Chase (1952) in a questionnaire study involving eighteen hundred
teachers found that "teachers who report opportunity to participate
regularly and actively in decision making policies are more likely to be
enthusiastic about their school systems than those who report limited
13
r
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opportunity to participate.'* (p.l*.) Sharma. (1955) in a similar study
showed that teacher satisfaction was related directly to the extent of
participation in decision making. Bridges (196U) found that teachers
preferred principals who involved them in decision making. Goodwin
i Watson (1967), a leader in the field of planned educational change, has
.
found ttat resistance to change is less “if participants in the change
process have worked together to diagnose a situation and to agree on a
v basic problem and to feel it is important"; also "if the goals are
adopted by consensual group decision." (p.23.)
There is some disagreement as to the optimal degree of teacher
involvement. Some authors believe that participation is necessary
throughout the total change process (Oliver, 1965; Trump, 1967), while
others believed participation should be restricted to specific decisions,
for example, defining the need for change. (National Ele. Principal,
1961.) Bridges (1967) has offered two guidelines to aid administrators
in determining which decisions properly involve teacher participation:
1) the test for relevance, i.e. do the teachers have a high personal
stake and concern in the decision, and 2) the test for expertise, i.e.
does the teacher have the competence to contribute to the decision mak-
ing process. Owens (1970) has added a third test for involving teachers:
3) the test of jurisdiction, i.e. does the teacher have the requisite
authority to implement their decisions.
Advocates of industrial and education change efforts generally
agree on the value of an "outside consultant," although this has rarely
been put to rigorous testing (and is probably indicative of the fact that
"outside consultants" write the books and do the research). (Argyris,
1971; Bennis, 1966: Miles, 1959.) It is believed that an outsider can
115
effectively set up a "temporary social system," where employees are less
likely to be impeded by former role expectations, which can facilitate
the process of "unfreezing" and make subordinate participation even
more effective. (Miles, 196k.)
I r
There is, then, considerable support for involving teachers in
the decision making processes of a change project like the New York
University Clinic for Learning, although there appears to be some dis-
agreement as to the limits of that involvement.
The staff and planners of the Clinic for Learning shared the
concern that participation by teachers in decisions affecting them was
crucial for success. As the Project Director said later:
The most important breakthrough in the planning stages was
in our heads when we asked ourselves, Well, what exactly should
we do out there? Ron, Stan, Judy — you know we talked 8-10
hours a day working on the question what do you do? And it was
clear no one plan would work. . . We built a cluster system so we
could plan with teachers. Why? Because it's an intelligent
change process. Because people have to be involved in what
they’re going to do. We weren't going to plan anything for
anybody, because we think that won't work. I'm even more sure
of that than before. So we set up a system of planning for
planning.
/ 1
The first major written communication between the Clinic for
Learning and the regular JHS 57 staff in September, 1966, stressed
that:
The personnel of each cluster under the guidance of the
Coordinator of Instruction will continuously plan all aspects
of the educational program for the children including:
1 . What shall be taught
* 2. Who shall teach what and in
what context
3. How to involve the New York
University Students and in
what Educational Roles
.
2
The written statements of introduction of the six Cluster Coordinators,
who were to act essentially as "outside consultants" working with groups
16 .
of teachers, shew a similar concern for staff involvement in all major
3decision making processes. For example, "Let's work it out together on
the basis of what you think should be done, what you think you can do
best, and what we can do to make it possible and effective." Another
wrote? “The entire curriculum... will be developed by alt the members
of the Cluster, for it is they who are in the best position to make
important cluster decisions." A third: "The role of each teacher within
the cluster will be developed by the teacher himself.... the standards
devised to determine the success or failure of the cluster... will be
determined by the teachers." A fourth asked; "Can we, as a team, either
create or adapt procedures or strategies which will optimize our chances
of achieving ([success)?" Another: "The teachers will individually and
in cooperation with other teachers and specialists construct and apply
any new ideas that evolve." Another said later: "The Cluster was designed
to give teachers support, to free the environment, to give them a chance
to work on new methods." Subsequent conversations with these and other
Clinic for Learning staff members indicate that one of the central tenets
upon which the Clinic depended was that teachers should be involved in
all decisions which affected them in a direct way, i.e., all matters
having to do with curriculum, teaching style, relationships with students,
and other classroom activities.
Proposition #2 - Leadership behavior of outside consultants should be
high relationship, low task.
ft
In the area of leadership, the Clinic for Learning relied on
principles that also had their genesis in an industrial setting.
Accord-
ing to most definitions, leadership involves the process
of influencing
others to strive toward achievement of common goals.
(Terry, I960;
f17
Koontz and O'Donnell, 1959*) Most theorists of "organizational behavior"
argue that there are essentially two dimensions of leader behavior, con-
cern for task and concern for relationship. Blanchard (1969) defines
"task oriented behavior" as:
The extent to which a leader is likely to organize and
define the relationship between himself and the members
of his group (followers); characterized by a tendency to
define the role which he expects each member of the group
to assume, endeavoring to establish well-defined patterns
*. or organization, channels of communication, and ways of
getting jobs done. (p. 7ii-
)
He defines "relationships oriented behavior" as:
The extent to which a leader is likely to maintain
personal relationships between himself and the member of
his group (followers); characterized by socio-emotional
support, such as friendship, mutual trust, respect for
followers' ideas, consideration for their feelings, (p.7l?)
Three widely acclaimed books in the early 1960's suggested that
industrial leadership behavior was characterized to a large extent by
a "high task" orientation, and that such behavior not only tended to
diminish opportunities of employees for responsible and meaningful work,
but had a long term negative effect on production as well. Douglas
McGregor, in The Human Side of Enterprise, fl96o} advanced the now
famous Theory X/Theory Y dichotomy and suggested that if employees were
treated as if they were competent individuals and allowed more freedom
to be self-directing, they would, in fact, become more competent and self
directing. Rensis Likert, in New Patterns of Management,^! 96l> offered
evidence to show that the most effective managers were those who were
>
concerned with l) productivity and attitudes, 2) shifts in employee
attitudes, and 3) applying minimum hierarchical pressure on
employees
to increase production. Chris Argyris, in Interpersonal
Competence and
Organizational Effectiveness, (19621 believed that most management
practises encourage employees to be obedient, docile, uninvolved, and
immature; given opportunity for growth, Argyris said, employees would
grow. Taken together, these arguments constituted a strong push for
decreasing the amount of "task" oriented leader- behavior in industry
and increasing the amount of "relationship" oriented behavior. Roughly,
it could be said that these authors were arguing for more "democratic"
leader behavior and less "autocratic" leader behavior. (See Lewin,
Lippit, and White, 1939.)
Here, as well, educators have made ample use of the theorems of
industrial leadership. Sinclair (1968) argues that current strategies
for fostering change "challenge the rationality of highly directive
leadership." "Leadership for the innovative principal," he writes, "is
a process of stimulating and aiding groups of teachers to determine
common objectives and to voluntarily design means for moving toward
their achievement." (pp.32-3.) Goodwin Watson (1967) suggests that
effective leadership will encourage "acceptance, support, trust, and
confidence" between members of the work group. Gross (1971) has argued
persuasively that leadership is the "single most important factor" in
determining the success of educational reforms. Bennis ( 1 96U) contends
that effective leadership for change in any organizational setting re-
quires building "interdependencies and shared responsibility," and "con-
flict resolution through bargaining." (p.309.)
The leadership style of the staff of the Clinic for Learning was
characterized by a high concern for relationships. Numerous statements
by Clinic staff members about the Project Director indicate that he was
"non-directive," had great faith in people's ability to "solve their own
problems," was supportive of others' initiative, and seldom gave direct
19
orders. One Cluster Coordinator said: "(He) believes the goodness of
% • ‘
people will out, in the proper environment... if only he could free
teachers, who were good, to do some of the good things they would do if
they were free." 14 Another characterized him as "a kind of laissez faire
}
leader *" The structure of the Cluster, it was made clear from the be-
ginning, was to be administered in a "democratic" manner. Preliminary
statements from NYU Cluster Coordinators, along with the previously cited
,
statements having to do with teacher participation in decision-making —
a basic characteristic of a high relationship
-low task leader — docu-
ment their leadership intention. "As you can see, our Cluster requires
a deep personal commitment to the values of human relationships in a
major social effort." Another: "What we do, above all, should be as new
and as daring as each teacher can allow himself to be." As a Cluster,
another wrote, we will "try to implement all those feelings and thoughts
that have been stuck away in the back of our heads." Another wrote of
the central need for developing "closer relationships" with students and
other teachers.'* Only one Cluster Coordinator was inclined toward a
slower relationship-higher task leadership style, but he was convinced by
the others to adapt. Later he said, "The assumption of the others was
.
that you can't ram a program down people's throats; and that the poten-
6
tial for growth was in the teachers."
Statements of Clinic planners and Cluster Coordinators indicate
that although they did have specific ideas as to how the school should
change^ there was little tendency to "define role expectations," “estab-
lish well-defined patterns of organization," or dictate "ways of getting
jobs done." That is, there was little evidence that Clinic staff intended
to use high task leadership. One Cluster leader wrote of thirteen anthro-
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pological topics which he hoped "by the end of the seventh grade our stu-
dents will have inquired into." But he suggests no group or individual
tasks, no group or individual roles, no pattern of group organization.
After suggesting a number of possible activities, he finishes by saying
teachers will make all the decisions related to their interests and needs.
The introductory statement of another Coordinator indicates great concern
for the child as a person and makes suggestions concerning the inquiry
method of teaching. His last paragraph begins: "But what are we actually
going to do in class? the group, he finishes, will decide. Another
points to the importance of on-going teacher-student dialogue, talks
about various teaching strategies which "can be envisioned," and concludes
with a quote concerning effective teaching. There is no suggestion that
tasks or roles of teachers be further clarified. The one Coordinator who
tended toward higher task presented his design for a "language oriented"
Cluster very affirmatively. The ambivalence of his position is illustra-
c
ted by his concluding paragraph: "The teachers will work together planning
materials, strategies, units of study and programs." Still another
Cluster Coordinator talks in general about learning and handling children
and his summary conclusion includes: "It is hoped that the Qluster set-
up will enable the teacher to concentrate his effort, assume greater re-
sponsibility for his own and fellow students’ behavior." There is in
this statement one indication of high task behavior: "All teachers in
the Cluster will be given steno books and carbon paper and will be expec-
ted to keep a log of highlights of each day." In all of the introductory
7
statements this is the only specific task that is mentioned.
Proposition #3 * Parents and community groups in inner cities must be
given broader opportunity to participate in the life of
the school.
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Proposition #3a - The Clinic for Learning could act as a catalyst for
increased involvement by parents and community.
In September, 1966, when the Clinic for Learning came to JHS 57,
& controversy was swirling in another part of New York City which re-
soundingly defined the need for community involvement in the public
schools. Of dourse, parent and community support have always been con-
sidered a prereouisite for effective schooling (Dewey, 1915), but it was
only in the early 1960's that attention was brought to the vast gaps that
separated public school bureaucracies in large cities from their black
and Puerto Rican constituents. (Schrag, 1967.) As Michael Katz (1971) .
has shown, centralization in public education has produced uniformity of
curriculum, standards, hiring, and promotional practises which has almost
totally insulated inner city schools from inner city parents and com-
munity interests. Now, in the fall of 1966, picket lines ringed Inter-
mediate School 201, demonstrators scuffled with police, while parent
groups demanded the resignation of the principal.
For three years the controversy stirrounding the location, con-
/ struction, and curriculum of I.S. 201 in Harlem had escalated to an un-
precendented degree. Following central board decisions, curriculum was
to stress Negro and Puerto Rican culture, there were to be after school
courses and activities for young people and adults, and "full-time com-
munity relations specialists to encourage closer parent and citizen in-
volvement in the school program." Fantini, et al>(1970, p.5«)
f The loudest parent demand, however, was for integration; but
when
it became clear that housing patterns and white resistance would fore-
close all hope of a desegregated school, parents sought still more
power
o
over the school that would now serve their children exclusively. But ,
authorizing community control over financial and personnel matters,
said
22
the central board, would violate state law; and althou^i the Super-
intendent of Schools assured community groups they could choose a new
principal, the central board refused to allow it. (Rogers, 1968, p.367.)
In response, parents called a school boycott and for ten days in Septem-
ber, 1966, the new school remained closed. The controversy reemerged
sporatically over the next several years, but the central issue remained
the same: parents wanted more effective schools; they felt those in power
- had failed their children.
. |
A widely read and quoted article appeared in the July 1966
issue of The Urban Review
, written by a black educator familiar with the
Harlem community, which both analyzed the dynamics of the I.S. 201 con-
frontation and provided a model for improved school-community relations,
without relying on integration (Wasserman, 1970). He proposed the estab-
lishment of a "community school," functioning as a community center, and
as an after school center for tutorial work, discussions of community
problems, and various cultural events. He concluded:
What this experimental program offers is the possibility
/ that, in at least one school in one community, the school
administrators and teachers will be made accountable to the
community, and the community made obligated to them in such
a way that responsibility for successes and failures is
shared. In the process, one can expect the school in the
ghetto to become what schools in more privileged areas are,
a reflection of local interests and resources, instead of a
subtle rejection of them. (Wilcox, 1966, p.12.)
The article established a paradigm school-community alliance.
The New York State Legislature no doubt had a similar paradigm in mind
when it directed the Mayor of New York in 1967 to establish a committee
to study the feasibility of decentralization. "Increased community aware-
ness," read the legislative directive, "and participation in the educa-
/
tional process is essential to the furtherance of educational innovation
r
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and excellence in the public school system of the City of Nev York .
"
8
(emph. added.
)
Later in 1967, the Mayor's committee, headed by McGeorge Bundy, produced
a report on decentralization entitled, significantly, "Reconnection for
Learning." They wrote, "... in New York the malaise of parents is
v
|
heightened by their increasing disability to obtain redress or response
9to their concerns." Their proposals were intended to "reconnect" the
school and the community. As a result of the Bundy Report, and with
a
added funding from the Ford Foundation, three "experimental districts"
-
•
1
were established to test out the viability of increased community re-
sponsibility and control in the educational process. Without dwelling
on the details of the celebrated confrontation at OceanHill-Brownville,
which pitted forces of community control against the power brokers of
traditional school alignments, it is enough to indicate that the great
majority of educational observers see some form of increased community
involvement in schools not only as beneficial, but inevitable. (Fantini,
et al, 1970: Gittel, 1967: Levin, 1970.) In Washington, D.C., Philadel-
phia, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and elsewhere, central school boards
are seeking to make schools more responsive to communities and parents
are demanding decision making powers. (Miller and Woock, 1970, p.388.)
In 1969, the New York State Legislature passed a bill setting up thirty-
one community school boards in New York City with certain limited re-
sponsibilities in the areas of staffing and curriculum development. It
is doubtful that the community control issue will end here. The principle
of increased community participation in the life of the public schools
gained in support through the 1960's, reaching a crescendo of sorts in
the summer and fall of 1966 in New York City, and making it apparent
that
the gap between what communities wanted for their children and
what the
school system provided, was too wide to ignore. For many other urban
communities today, the struggle for community control has just begun.
_It was on this basis” that the planners of the Clinic for Learning
advanced community development as one of the/fcentral foci. The; initial
Project Proposal stated:,
I
The Clinic for Learning will become a community school in the
middle of the urban slumm... fthe Clinic for Learning] will create
a school and a community involvement that both educates lay people
in the community for better jobs and maximizes the use of their
knowledge, know-how and talent for the education of their child-
ren. The parents of disadvantaged children and the urban com-
munities in which they live clearly need more attention from the
school then they now receive. in10
.1
The first communication between the Clinic and the staff of JHS 57 in
September, 1966, reiterated this intent:
t
We are in the process of interviewing four Community Coordina-
tors. When selected, these men and women who share insights,
backgrounds and needs of the people in the community will be
the personnel for beginning a new kind of inter-relationship
between the school and the community.^
A community coordinator was to work with every Cluster, maintain close
contact with parents, planning community activities in the school, and
facilitating parent involvement in the educational process. A major
communication from the Project Director to the staff of JHS £7 in Decem-
ber, 1966, again placed heavy emphasis on community involvement. The
community agents, the paper read, "are proceeding step by step toward
relating the efforts of the Clinic and school toward making JHS 57 a com-
munity school. In the best sense of the word, we are already involved in
ir
many school -community activities." One of the original community agents
said later: "Our job was to organize and facilitate the connection between
the community’s interests and the school’s interests." Looking back
on the experience, the Project Director saw closer school -community
interaction as a clearly desirable goal, supported by "all the conven- y
tional wisdom" of the profession. "Sure," the Project Director said,
"the Clinic was an attempt to use the school system to reach the broader
population. We said — and I don't see this as being controversial at
I
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all — that the school should serve the community""
Subsequent conversations with other community agents, Clinic per-
sonnel, teachers and administrators of JHS 57, and outside observers
indicate conclusively that a large part of the Clinic effort was based
on the proposition that parents and community should be brought closer
into the life of the school.
Proposition - If education is to be effective, in a case where it is
now ineffective, the total environment surrounding the
child must be affected in a positive way.
Proposition #Ua - The public school can act as a tool for beginning to
change the total environment.
Since the advent of mass public education in the United States,
through testing and research, it has become virtually axiomatic that a
child's success in school is somehow related to the cultural and familial
influences on his life. The dimensions and extent of this relationship
are subjects of continuous controversy, but not even scholars of genetics
deny that environment plays a significant role in determing intelligence.
(Jensen, 1969.) Nor do geneticists, or anyone else, argue that intelli-
gence is the sole determinant of "success" in a public school; values,
family support, Deer interaction, "hidden curriculums
,
“ and a host of
other factors bearing on the total environment of a child all
affect the
life of a child in school. Throughout the 1960's an immense
amount of
data has shown that black and Puerto Rican students, for
whatever rea-
sons, do not score as well on standardized achievement
tests as their
middle -class, mostly white counterparts. The entire thrust of compen-
satory education has been to improve on this performance by "compensat-
ing" for the purportedly "damaging" effects of the environment of lower
class children by providing extra money, programs, and resources. Re-,
suits in most compensatory programs have been disappointing; at best,
achievement scores have been raised only slightly. In response, many
observers have pointed out that compensatory education did not take into
account that successful schooling is dependent on more tham ju3t the five
or six hours per day spent in school. (New Republic , 1967.) Gordon and
Wilkerson (1966) note that most compensatory programs have put sole
emphasis on making the lower class children "fit" the middle class
school, without taking account of cultural differences. Compensatory
education, in effect, has been competing rather unsuccessfully with the
overall matrix of cultural influences on the lower class child. Those
who argue for integration rest their case largely on this point: an in-
tegrated school environment will have a larger impact on an "underachiev-
ing" child's total environment, his view of himself and his world, hence
his propensity for success will increase. As the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights (196?) has reported:
Yet the evidence reviewed here suggests that efforts to
improve a child's self-esteem cannot be wholly productive in
a student environment (i.a. segregated) which seems to deny
his worth... Thus, the comnensatory programs reviewed here
appear to suffer from the defect inherent in attempting to
solve oroblems stemming in part from racial and social class
isolation in schools which themselves are isolated by race and
social class, (pp. 138-9.)
Numerous research efforts support the thesis that altering a
child's educational opportunity demands attention to more than
just
the individual student-teacher relationship in a school
setting. Miller
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and Woock (1966) point to the writings of Allison Davis and Herbert J.
* »• *
Gans to support four essential value differences between lower class
and middle class youth which bear heavily on the prospects of a lower
class student's success in school: 1) a different time perspective, with
more emphasis on immediate problems, and less on long range planning or
goal setting; 2) a stronger orientation toward persons and interpersonal
relations than toward more remote "career" or vocational goals; 3) a
,"weaker" self image, which tends to diminish confidence in one's own
potential and ability; and 1*) physical agressiveness, a characteristic
product of a lower class reward and punishment scheme which relies more
heavily on physical force. Oscar Lewis in La Vida has made famous his
theory of the "culture of poverty." The culture of poverty, in-bred,
self-perpetuating, isolated from the dominant culture, may be found in
capitalist countries, which provide no formal means of organization for
the lower classes. The culture of poverty is characterized by feelings
of marginality, dependence, and despair; and in many cases, Lewis notes,
these feelings are accurate reflections of reality. In a culture of
poverty, then, a child's failure to perform well in school is related
to the "failure"of his subculture to "perform" well in the society at
large. Prom this point of view, it follows that significantly changing
performance levels of children in a culture of poverty involves corre-
sponding changes in the overall relationship of the subculture to the
majority culture.
* Martin Deutsch (1963) has made popular the notion of "stimulus
deprivation" in lower class homes. He argues that success in schools de-
pends largely on certain cognitive skills which are not normally
acquired
in lower class homes. Thus, the middle class child learns to
distinguish
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shapes, sizes, colors, he learns the art of memorizing, and he learns
i
how to relate to adults as resources to a greater extent than the lower
class child. Again, it is apparent that affecting the life of the
child in school requires attendance to these "facts of life" in the
child's total world.
Basil Bernstein has shown that lower class families engage in a
"restricted" language pattern. Ideas are not clarified; imperatives are
not explained; distinctions are not made. This language pattern, Bern-
stein suggests, makes abstract thinking, which is a sine qua non of
school success, difficult for the child. Other authors have made similar
observations about the clash between family and cultural values of "dis-
advantaged students," and the largely middle class values according to
which they are often judged inadequate. (Fantini and Weinstein, 1968.)
All of the authors mentioned share the contention that change in a lower
class child's schooling, if it is to be successful, will be greatly en-
hanced by the elimination of "hidden" value conflicts between home and
school
.
The planners of the Clinic for Learning were aware of the fail-
ures of compensatory education. They were aware that the subservient
status of many blacks and Puerto Rican children vis a vis the school was
little more than a reflection of the subservient status of their parents
in the larger society. As the Project Director wrote in an early com-
munication to the staff of JHS 5>7 , "It is important that we have no
illusions about the severity of the problem we face.... Ultimately the
slum must be eradicated." The planners of the Clinic felt that through
the public school the culture of poverty that existed in the
Bedford-
Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn could in some small way be affected;
that
the self-perpetuating cycles of social and economic
isolation could begin
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to be broken. The initial project proposal spoke of the obvious link
between the lower class school 11 and the "lower class community" i
If, as our society exists today, there is to be any
permanent amelioration of the plight of the impoverished
with, as the final goal, the eventual eradication of the
city slum, education must play an essential role. It has
been documented time and again that in large measure the
inadequate education of the inhabitants of these neighbor-
hoods grievously limits the possibility for a basic im-
provement in their condition....
The typical school in a disadvantaged neighborhood in
,
many ways reflects the mood that exists in the slum gener-
ally. Even well prepared teachers and administrators are
overwhelmed by the pressure of the environment... We be-
lieve we can alter these circumstances.
1U
In the major communication to teachers in December, the Project
Director quotes from an article by Oscar Lewis: "It (culture of poverty}
represents an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair
that arise from the realization by the members of marginal communities
in those societies of the improbability of their achieving success in
terms of the prevailing values and goals." The Project Director stresses
that no change can take place in the child* s learning possibilities
^without affecting his overall environment. '-'This matrix of people,
personalities, and significant factors in the environment including the
mood of the community originally molds the individual and then continues
to sustain him as a functioning person..." He notes the failure of
compensatory education: "Recent reports from other compensatory education
programs indicate that little, if any, lasting effects in achievement
levels Qf disadvantaged students have been affected, despite some very
strong efforts in various parts of the country. ... It is my contention
that we can succeed if we change the setting around the childV’^
(emphasis added.)
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The Clinic strategy was to affect the total school environment
by_"saturating" the school with supportive, communicative, concerned
adults. An altered school environment, they believed, would have some
T
— •?
impact on the total environment of the child. The original proposal
stressed the use of "preprofessional personnel" -- i.e. undergraduate
i
and graduate students from New York University — "in dynamic relation-
ship" with the Clinic staff and the regular JHS 57 staff to change the
school environment and individualize instruction. In the first com-
munication to the JHS 57 staff in September, under a subheading of
"Major Assumptions Basic to Educational Work in JHS 57," were listed:
|
1. The discipline, general behavior, reading and general
competence of the students cannot be positively changed
without a great deal of individual attention, both in
class and non-class situations.
2. Positively motivated New York University students in
association with trained teachers can make it possible
to provide highly individualized quality education for
the Junior High School students.^
The "saturation" strategy was again stressed by the Project in the
December, 1966 memorandum to teachers:
It is our plan to progressively surround the child with
positively oriented people who care about him and his learn-
ing, in ways deliberately arranged to make their particular
talents effective with the child.
^
The Clinic for Learning, in short, was designed not to suffer from
the same oversights as previous compensatory programs. The intent of
the Clinic was bo deal, in a sophisticated way, with the child as a
whole person in a total environment, not simply as an entity that would
or would not perform well on a standardized achievement test.
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^Interview, Project Director, July 16, 1972.
2Clinic paper, "From Here On..." p.U.
3 •Clinic paper, "Preliminary Statements of Cluster Coordinators,"
September, 1966.
^Interview, Cluster Coordinator 1, July 23, 1971.
Clinic Paper, "Preliminary Statements of Cluster Coordinators,"
September, 1966.
^Interview, Cluster Coordinator 2, August 3, 1971.
7
Clinic paper, "Preliminary Statements of Cluster Coordinators,"
September, 1966.
^McKinney’s, 1967, Session Laws of New York, Ch.l$H.
^Mayor's Advisory Commission on Decentralization of the New
York City Schools. Reconnection for Learning. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1969, p.1.
^Clinic paper, Project Proposal, p.1.
^Clinic paper, "From Here One..." p.£.
^Interview, Community Agent 1, January 28, 1972.
^Interview, Project Director, July 16, 1971.
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Clinic paper, Project Proposal, pp.1-2.
^Clinic paper, "Perspective at Christmas Time," December,
1966, pp.3-li.
* ^Clinic paper, "From Here On..." p.1.
^Clinic paper, "Perspective at Christmas Time," p.6.
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Chapter 2
RESEARCH METHODS
When I determined to write about the Clinic for Learning it was
apparent that the case study wa3 the only research methodology available
to me. I had not been involved in the project and the simple matter of
*• collecting information was an obvious obstacle. A case study would pro-
vice me, first, with the greatest possible amount of data about the
Clinic, which could then be focused toward specific hypothetical concerns
and used to draw attention to new interpretations and new hypotheses.
As Katz (1953) has written: The case study method is designed to "utilize
to the full the advantage of seeing the situation as a whole and of
attempting to grasp fundamental relationships." (p.75«) Smith and
Geoffrey (1968) say: "... our observations make us privy to an immense
number of sequences of events. As we try to shape these into empirical
and conceptual order, hypotheses arise." (p.26l.) Gross, et al (1971)
adopted the case study approach to permit "in-depth observations of the
several aspects of the dynamics of an effort to institute planned change.
The case study as well would allow me to focus on the more sociological
dynamics which interested me (Propositions 3 and 1* above) . Only by first
recreating the overall seouence of events and interactions could I hope
to extract insights which might prove useful to future educational "in-
novators."
In using the case" study approach I was at a decided disadvantage.
» ** I
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The rate of teacher turnover at the school was very high and I suspected
that few Clinic teachers were left. The community was transient and I
knew it would be difficult to contact many students or parents who had
been involved. Thirdly, I had discovered that Some of the Clinic staff
\
members were no longer in New York, and some were out of the country.
Finally, I knew that although I would have access to most of the avail-
able literature that passed between the Clinic and the school, there had
been little effort by Clinic staff to document their experience and much
of the interchange was carried out by phone or private conversations.
This was in the spring of 1 971
.
By chance I had recently finished T. Harry Williams brilliant
biography of Huey Long, which relied on the research technique of "oral
history." Those who convinced Mr. Williams to adopt this technique "were
concerned with preserving the history of the recent past.... but they
emphasized that to do the job properly, a new research technique would
have to be utilized, the tape recorded interview with persons still liv-
ing. Thi s technique was necessary because of the impact of modem tech-
nology on communications." In this way, historians could "rescue a
history that would otherwise disappear." The history of the Clinic for
Learning, as a monumental effort to change American education, it seemed
to me, was already in grave danger of disappearing.
An initial search revealed that the principle actors in the Clinic
for Learning were still available those who funded and planned the
*
Clinic, those who adminstered the school, those who were
spokesmen for
the community, and enough teachers and students (together
with my experi-
ence working with teachers and students at JHS 97) to make
sense out of
\ \ i <
the Clinic. The District Superintendent had himself
suggested to me tnat
t3U
a study of the "Chaos for Learning" would make a good dissertation topic.
The Project Director and the Principal of the school at the time of the
Clinic applauded my intention to study the Clinic. I felt, then, that
the case study approach buttressed by the techniques of oral history .
‘ would provide a solid basis for studying the Clinic for Learning.
Data Collection
At the outset, I was given free access to the complete files of
1) the Project Director of the Clinic for Learning; 2) the District Super-
intendent of the local school district; 3) the then Principal of JHS 97 .
(who, in 1971, was principal of a Long Island junior high school); U) the
present Principal (in spring, 1971) of JHS 97 who had been the chief lia-
son between the school and the Clinic. As I proceeded to interview, other
• Clinic staff and .JHS 97 regular teachers offered me notes, recollections,
Clinic handouts, and other written communications they had retained since
the end of the Clinic. In all, the written material was considerable and
provided crucial insights into the functioning of the Clime for Learn-
ing.
I conceived that there were six major groups of people that I
would have to interview in order to complete the study of the Clinic.
They were, 1) .JHS 97 teachers who had worked with the Clinic; 2) the ad-
ministration of -JHS 97 ? 3) the students of .HJS 97 who had been involved
with the Clinic; h) the complete staff of the Clinic for Learning; 9)
parents and community leaders who had been involved with the Clinic; and
6) other involved persons, including funding agents, higher
administra-
tors in the N.Y.C. school system and high administration officials
at
New York University.
In May of 1971, I drew up a list of well over one hundred
questions
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which covered every conceivable avenue of inquiry. I broke this list
down into five sub-lists, each directed at a specific sub-group, teach-
ers, administrators, parents, students, or Clinic personnel. There was
considerable overlap in a number of areas. Virtually all of these ques-
tions related directly or indirectly to the four areas which appeared to
me to be crucial teacher participation, leadership behavior of the
outside change agents, school-community relations, and the goals of the
Clinic, the school, and the parents although they were not conceptu-
alized as outlined above (see the four propositions above).
In late May, 1971, I was given a regular seventh grade Social
Studies teaching program in JHS 57, and I began interviewing teachers.
I encountered some early difficulties, but not from the teachers. At the
end of my first week, before I had begun recorded interviews, my notebook,
which contained the five lists of questions and about 25-30 pages of
written notes disappeared. It reappeared the next day in the hands of
one of my students, my name crossed out, pages of writing and materials
removed without a sign. Needless to say, it was a setback. On the first
day of the third week, after completing the first three taped interviews
with teachers, my tape recorder was stolen, along with sixty minutes of
taped interviews. Another setback. Fortunately, the enthusiasm and
strong feelings of the teachers buoyed me. During five weeks in May and
June, I interviewed all the teachers at JHS 57, and several who had left
the school, who had been involved in the Clinic for Learning; nearly
twenty-five teachers, which accounted for about two-thirds of all teach-
ers involved.
Having lost my questions, I was forced to use another interview-
ing technique. Preparation of the question sheets in itself had
allowed
me to conceptualize the problems. After several interviews,
struggling
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with makeshift questions, I realized that .the. prime requisite was allow-
ing the interviewee to " speak his mind," without forcing him into a pre-
arranged conceptual framework. My first question, then, invariably be-
C
came, "How did you first get involved or hear about the Clinic?" The
• speed, pattern, and emphasis of the interview was thus determined largely
by the interviewee
,
though I made sure each interview covered the same
basic areas. This interviewing technique was consistent with my inten-
i
». tion to allow the facts to suggest the conclusions, not the other wav
I
around. In short, the first theft left me in a somewhat stronger posi-
i
tion. Since I had access to another tape recorder, the second theft only
damaged my self-esteem (after two years in the school, T thought I knew
the ropes).
In late June and July, I spoke to the principal of the school who
had been the JHS £7 liason with the Clinic, to several other administra-
tors who had been directly or indirectly involved, and to the ex-JHS 57
' principal who now worked in Long Island. This latter interview lasted
for three and a half hours.
y
In July and August, I contacted all Clinic planners and top staff
members who were still in New York, about half the total. The remaining
i
Clinic personnel were somewhat more difficult to locate and get responses
from. From those who were unavailable for direct interviewing I asked
for and received, from all but one person of significance, extensive
written communications.
* During the fall of 1971, I spoke to a number of people who were
only indirectly involved but whose input I felt was crucial,
specifically
Mario Fantini, then education officer at the Ford Foundation;
Bernard
Donovan, then Superintendent of New York City Public Schools;
Daniel
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Griffiths, then Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Education; and Dr. A.
Tauchner, then District Superintendent of the local school district.
During this time, as well as during the summer and throughout the
succeeding year, I contacted a large number of parents and community
'
people. In February, 1972, I mailed letters to seventy-five students
who had been most involved with the Clinic for Learning. Unfortunately,
only a small number replied, yet from speaking to these few and reading
the written material available on student attitudes, I was able to get
an adequate reading on student attitudes concerning the Clinic. I also •
i
contacted some fifteen of the most involved parents either by mail or in
person.
In all, I took over twenty-five hours of taped and transcribed
interviews, as well as more than twenty of untaped interview material,
and written communications from half a dozen principle characters. All
persons whom I interviewed or contacted are listed in the bibliography.
x Limitations of the Study
There are some obvious limitations to a study of this kind. This
is not a study of the teaching-learning process, nor a study of how the
public school impinges on or facilitates that process. Eleanor Leacock
(1971 ) has probed masterfully into these areas. This is not a study
of
planned organizational change, although I have borrowed certain research
findings from this field. The Clinic for Learning was not perceived by
its planners in such terms and the facts do not fit neatly into
such
constructs; there are simply too many uncontrollable variables.
Finally
this study is not "scientific" in any strict sense; people's
opinions
\ i 1 t
have changed in the five years since the Clinic closed,
the country has
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changed, black and Puerto Rican communities have changed. In parts, it
will read more like an historical tract than a scientific document. The
evidence, then, which supports my theses is less "rigorous" or objective
than I would have liked. But the span of five* years does provide me
with a time perspective not often granted to "project evaluators." This
has afforded me a chance to place the study into a broader sociological
context, and allowed me to focus on underlying factors which might escape
one who was "too close to the action."
*
\ v /
Chapter 3
THE CLINIC FOR LEARNING, 1 966-68
In the early spring of 1966 the Director of the New York Univer-
sity Project APEX was dismissed by the Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Edu-
cation. The causes were both personal and substantive. The Dean, and
some other APEX staff members, felt the Project Director was headstrong
and difficult to work with. The Director, and others, saw it as a clash
of ideologies: whether to reform the university to accomodate sixty "dis-
advantaged" students attending N.Y.U. under the auspices of APEX; or, as
the Dean and the others wanted, to mould the students to fit the tradi-
tional \miversity program. The Project Director argued that bringing
black and Puerto Rican students with general (vs. academic) high school
diplomas to New York University in order to certify them to become teach-
ers in their own communities, and requiring them to undertake the conven-
tional program of study was tantamount to insuring their failure. APEX
would fail, he warned, because the others were not serious about £nnda-
mental change in educational policy. This dissent prompted his removal;
and from these ruins emerged the Clinic for Learning.
Central to the thinking of the Project Director were two tenets:
first, that the "ghetto" "overwhelmed" most people who lived and
worked
there, and only fresh infusions of people from the outside
could have a
positive impact on it’s malaise; second, that university
students could
not learn about the "disadvantaged," about the "ghetto,"
about "urban
it i
3?
ho
problems" sit-ting in a university classroom.' I.f somehow the university
could merge into or unify with a public school, then not only would there
be a life size forum for university student learning, but the resources
of the university could help transform the school. The beginnings of
%
such an alliance had been implanted in Project APEX, when twelve APEX
students had been given work-study fellowships in Junior High School 57
for much of the school year 1965-66. They had helped patrol the halls,
*
^
taken disruptive students out of class, performed clerical tasks, and in
certain cases, assisted teachers in lesson planning or teaching. The
Principal of the school had welcomed the added help and believed the APEX
concept, of preparing blacks and Puerto Ricans to teach in their own com-
munities, was a worthy one. Teachers and administrators viewed the APEX
students as useful and industrious. It was a short step, in the Project
Director’s mind, from this kind of collaboration to a more complete kind
in which N.Y.U. and JHS 57 would join together for mutual benefit. The
school could be used as a lever to change the university — by getting
undergraduates and graduates out of the ivory tower; the university could
be used as resource to change the school — by providing fresh recruits
to help win the battles for the hearts and minds of ghetto children.
(jt is this latter prong of intent that forms the subject of this study.
I found it nearly impossible to accumulate adequate data about the effec-
tiveness of the teacher training program that was the other thrust of the
Clinic for Learning, although there were frequent indications that it
was
a unique and successful one^j
Junior High School 57 had been built in 1955 to hold twelve
hundred
students: by 1965 there was already an enrollment of about
fourteen hundred^
U1
p
and it was rising rapidly. The school stood' at the edge of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, on Stuyvesant Avenue, and by 1955 the
neighborhood had already turned from predominantly Jewish and Italian
to almost completely black. On the other side of Stuyvesant Avenue some
Italians remained, but by 1965 they had almost all been replaced by new-
ly arrived Puerto Ricans. The school was about three-fourths black, one-
fourth Puerto Rican, and one percent " other" in 1966 when the Clinic for
Learning arrived. The school was run under the normally tight fist of
a centralized bureaucracy. Virtually all of the teachers had been assigned
to the school by the Board, some from as far away as the Bronx. Because
it was not a "good" school, many of the older teachers had voluntarily
transferred out. Administrators used the school as a stepping stone to
higher administrative positions elsewhere. Class periods were forty min-
utes long, there were four major subjects.- Science, Math, English, Social
Studies, no electives; lesson plans were to be turned in every week to
•
’
,e
subject supervisors, rollbooks as "legal documents" were checked scrupul-
ously, mid-term tests were mandatory, and final exams, and standardized
reading and math tests; in school, there was "no talking," "no cheating,
"no eating in class," hall passes were (theoretically required) letters
were sent to parents of children who didn't hand in homework, or who cut
class, truancy was rampant, fights were frequent, teachers bore the ex-
cessive weight of clerical chores, principals and supervisors were back
room cronies, most teachers left exactly at 3:00 p.m....; hut,
there was
job security, the pay was steady, parents were not much of a threat (in
1965), and very few at any level fancied themselves to
be "reformers. 1
9
All told, a fairly typical inner city public school.
In the spring of 1965, JHS 57 ranked number 10U in
reading achieve
th2
ment out of 108 junior high schools in New York City. This fact caught
the eye of the recently deposed APEX Director, and he began to formulate
his ideas for a "demonstration school in the heart of an urban slum."
He began to assemble a team, initially only himself, his secretary, and
two doctoral student/instructors, one of whom had supervised the twelve
APEX students in JHS 57 for a semester. Others were quickly recruited:
two experienced teachers who were completing a one year internship with
the NDEA Institute for teachers of the Disadvantaged; two members of the
N.Y.U. School of Education faculty, one of whom had and has since written
several widely read books on inner city education; two other doctoral
students who had been involved with APEX; and, in time, several other
graduate students, university instructors, and others not associated with
N.Y.U. who were simply looking for work. There was no process of selec-
tion as such; most of the recruits were known by the Project Director,
two responded to newspaper articles, and one was referred to the Director
o
by one of the Professors. The Project Director had almost complete dis-
x cretion in determining who would and who would not be included.
As the group was forming and expanding, and after the rudiments
of the project had been discussed, the Principal and Assistant Principal
of JHS 57 were approached. First, they were asked, did they think
that
a public school and a committed urban university could form an
alliance
that would work for the betterment of all. Secondly, was JHS 57
willing
to give it a try. Not surprisingly, the answer to both
questions was
affirmative. "He fProject Director) is a salesman," the Assistant Prin-
cipal said later, "and he sold us on the Clinic."
1
But, sold only m
general terms, there were few specifics to quarrel
about, ^ower, certain
ly, or conflicting lines of authority, or specific
responsibilities were
143
not- discussed in "these early meetings . No one would have to give up
anything in a project of this type, and everyone would stand to gain.
The school administration expressed strong support. "I was darned ex-
cited,” the Principal confessed, "Not excited for any personal glory,
}
but almost more excited than anyone. Here was an opportunity for some-
2thing to be done that was unusual and unique."
A proposal for funding, which had been written by the Clinic
staff and modified only slightly by the school administrators, was sub-
mitted to the Ford Foundation in the late spring of 1966. To the officer
at Ford who eventually awarded the money, "The Project appeared to have
a good chance for s\iccess. We felt it was important for universities to
3
get involved with schools." With the sometimes ambivalent support of
the Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Education, the Clinic Director then
approached the New York City Superintendent of Schools seeking approval
and added funding. The Ford Foundation as well was interested in some
expression of financial support from the New York Board of Education.
On Hay U, 1966, the Superintendent wrote the Ford Foundation "to confirm
in writing... my firm advocacy of the Clinic for Learning." "I supported
any reasonably projected, innovative process that I thought would improve
the instructional program," he said later. "The Clinic for Learning
seemed to have a process of staff training and utilization that looked
to me as if it had some promise to it."
14 By early June, arrangements
had been made for a two and a half year grant of $3^0,000 from the Ford
Foundation, and an additional $100,000 from the Board of Education, this
to pay salaries of several full time teachers who would be
recruited by
o
the Clinic to. relieve some of the burden on regular teachers
these
teachers, paid by the Board of Education, but owing their
allegiance to
Ihh
the Clinic, were called "Clinic teachers.".
i * 1
In June, 1966, a meeting was held in the school library with the
entire faculty and staff of JHS 97 to determine their receptivity to the
*
project. The Project Director and the Principal of the school were the
chief speakers, and they displayed a strong commitment to the Clinic for
I
Learning.; The Project Director stressed the supportive characteristics
of the Clinic model: "What are your needs?" he asked the teachers, "and
l
'.how can we help meet them?" The Clinic for Learning, he said, backed by
New York University, would be at the service of the school. Dental care,
legal care, psychological assistance would be provided; additional per-
sonnel would result in smaller classes, fewer discipline problems, in-
dividualized instruction; the brightest children would be given special
|
programs at N.Y.U., teachers would be given college credit for partici-
pating in certain Clinic activities; faculty advisors from N.Y.U. would
come to the school to advise teachers. The Principal stressed that this
was a unique chance to make a "mediocre" school into an "excellent" one:
"None of us think that JHS 97 is as good as it could be; this is our
chance to make it better." The Principal did a solid job of selling, and
all of the "key people in the school" — respected teachers, union lead-
! i
ers, administrators — were in favor of the project. "I think people
caught my enthusiasm," said the Principal, "I tried to sell it hard."'’
As presented, the Clinic for Learning appeared to the teachers
as a gift from heaven. It would mean more help, fewer problems, less
chaos in the classroom; it would mean that "emotionally disturbed" stu-
dents could get the help they need; it would mean that teachers could con-
centrate on teaching. The teachers had been told that N.Y.U. would help
solve their problems — class size, more materials, more help with
clerical
US
tasks; other than accepting student teachers, there was no hint that any
concessions would be required from them.
Only one Clinic staff member, the one more inclined to be
directive, sensed a discrepancy. "What he [Project Director] said, and
‘
i
what we are going to do,” said the staff member, "are two different things.'
The Project Director had implied that the Clinic for Learning would only
help teachers do better what they were already doing. There had been no
*-
suggestion that certain, perhaps most, Clinic staff members felt that
i
teachers should be doing other things, more creative, more imaginative
things; nor had the Project Director expressed his own strongly held be-
lief that once teachers were freed of excessive and trivial bureaucratic
responsibilities, they would of their own volition change their teaching
behavior. In short, the expectations of the Clinic Staff were never ex-
plored; the Clinic for Learning was to be a one way exchange: the Univer-
)
sity gave and the school received.
During the summer of 1 ?66 a camp was held in upstate Mew York
for sixty incoming seventh graders. Staffed by four regular JHS 57
teachers, one "Clinic" teacher, one Clinic staff member, and the Princi-
pal and his family, the camp proved to be a remarkable success. About
thirty students attended each of the two week sessions; each staff person
lived with and was responsible for five; the days were planned by the
students themselves, nothing was compulsory, no tests were given, the
common .goal was enjoyment. Everyone was called by his first name, re-
sponsibilities were shared, affection was open, emotions were legitimate.
And throughout the camp, in the words of one of the staff,
"learning was
always going on.” Mot only were there frequent study
groups formed
around a specific tonic, like hygiene, or geography,
or geology, but
ft
U6
games and talent shows were held with a nearby all-white private camp. 7
Better than any other event in the Clinic for Learning, this
summer camp reflected the intent of Clinic planners to affect the child
by changing the setting around him. That there were no "discipline"
,
,
I
•
problems at the camp, that interpersonal, relations between students and
staff were warm and supportive, that the students did demonstrate their
innate curiosity and creativity was further verification of the Project
1
" Director's belief that a child's environment greatly determined his
chances for success in an educational venture. In the humane, democratic,
sharing environment of the camp, the students grew immeasurably. A num-
I
ber of students who attended this carp remember it as one of the most
satisfying experiences of their lives. Several students, who later became
I
serious problems in the JHS 57 environment, were among the most active
I
and involved students at the camp.
The staff of the camp met several times during the early weeks
of the school year to discuss what leamingscould be transferred to the
school, setting. The lessons of the camp, they felt, were too powerful,
too important to be forgotten. But the school presented a different
challenge, with different mandates, and the discussions came to nought.
Several favorable news reports appeared in New York newspapers
during the summer of 19^6. The New vork Times lauded the Clinic for
Learning as "an effort to show that a slum neighborhood can be rehabili-
tated by making the school the center of reform." The Principal of the
u
school was ouoted as saying "This will give a tremendous boost to our
teacher morale. Suddenly we see goals that can be attained." Another
article spoke of the importance of the university-school "alliance.
\ V i rtn i
The camp, the news articles, and the commitment and resolve
that
sprang from continuous planning sessions held by the Clinic staff gave
rise in the early fall of 1966 to high optimism. To involve the entire
staff of JHS 57, a weekend retreat was planned for all teachers immedi-
ately before the start of school.
.
Written invitations had been sent out
*
|during the summer, and on the Friday before the Monday opening of classes,
chartered buses were at JHS 57 to transport teachers to the N.Y.U. camp
near Holmes, New York. More than two-thirds of the entire faculty, or
A •
about sixty-five teachers, attended this weekend which was conceived by
the Clinic planners as a means to "accruaint teachers with the Clinic
j
staff and the Clinic program.” The Project Director told the teachers
that the success of the "weekend would depend on their involvement; dis-
|
cussion groups would be held, but they would be conducted more like lead-
erless rap sessions than informational presentations; nothing would be
mandatory, everything, hopefully, would be open and trusting. The Clinic
staff hoped that the weekend would help create the kind of interpersonal
atmosphere that would ease their entry in JHS 57. The weekend was de-
signed for ice breaking, not policy making.
It was at this weekend that a few of the teachers became skepti-
cal. The statements of two teachers span the gamut of diverse reaction
to the same set of experiences. One said:
We had fun at the camp. I felt (the Project Director) accom-
plished what he had set out to do because I got the feeling that
he wanted a very free and very relaxed atmosphere so that people
would get to know each other. They hpd conferences, but they
weren’t too well planned, kind of like you hopped from one group
to another, and open debate. And he kind of encouraged people
to talk.... After the camp I felt good. I thought it was going
to work.
p
A second teacher recalled:
' k « l
I got the impression that the camp was for a good time. We
U8
did have neet-ingSj conferences, but. "the whole atmosphere was
superficial. Nothing w^>s definitely planned. The whole idea
seemed to be a recreation time. Things were touched on, but
very lightly. And T got a very unpleasant feeling about the
project there. This is when I became very bitter.... (The
Clinic sta^f) outlined the scope of the project, but there
was nothing specific. It had not been planned, it was all
talk, frequently from the top' of the head. This irritated
me. We didn’t receive copies of what was to be done, no
general outline. I knew that first day it was going to be
a flop.
lQ
Most teachers, however, were not so ouick to judge. The majority of the
4
teachers enjoyed the weekend; they were aware that the Clinic staff could
not be fully specific until school was in session; they were less inclined
to see it as an activity requiring their participation than as a "free
weekend .
"
It. was at the weekend that the Ci.inic staff notified the school
administration of their decision to adopt the Cluster format. The seven-
teen seventh grade classes were to be broken down into six Clusters, of
two or three classes each, with a regular teacher from each subject area
teaching all classes in the Cluster; thus, each Cluster would be composed
of teachers teaching the same students. Putting this into effect
reouired total rescheduling of the seventh grade and although the previ-
ous schedule done in the spring had taken into account almost every
teacher’s individual needs, and had given rise to no grievances or com-
plaints, the school administrators on the opening Monday of school plung-
ed into total rescheduling of the seventh grade. By Thursday this task,
requiring some 20-30 man-hours of work, was completed, and on the follow-
ing Monday each seventh grade class had a totally new program with new
teachers. The teachers in each Cluster had a common free period desig-
nated as the .mandatory meeting time for Clusters. Cluster meetings
be-
gan that second week.
Policy decisions has been made by Clinic planners at the end of
the summer which first defined the nature of the Cluster. During the
summer, the Project Director and a majority of his staff came to feel
that no single "program" would work for all Clusters or all teachers.
The task of the Clusters in their view would be to facilitate a problem
solving environment, to establish a process whereby teachers, by them-
selves but with advice from Clinic personnel, could find more satisfy-
ing and productive ways to teach. It was thought that each Cluster
would vary according to the personality and competencies of the Coordi-
nators, and the best feature of each would eventually be replicated and
a model Cluster would evolve. It was essential from this point of view
to get assurance from the school administration that decisions made by
teachers in the Clusters regarding curriculum, small group work, and use
of N.Y.U. student teachers and other undergraduates would not be counter-
manded; the enthusiasm of the Principal during the early months made
* K ©
this assurance a certainty.
There was critical assumption underlying this position; namely
that teachers wanted to find more productive and humane teaching tech-
niques, as per Clinic staff expectations. On this basis, a Cluster
arrangement was the least overbearing and autocratic plan for change,
most suited to the needs and personalities of Clinic staff members.
The assumption, however, may have been premature, based only on the
library meeting the previous spring and the assurances of the Principal.
Though the Principal was avid, the teachers had been only passively
acceptant; they were enthusiastic, perhaps, but in a very real sense,
the Clinic for Learning was thrust upon them. Clinic planners failed
to consider that without real teacher support, an^ program, no matter
how unthreatening, would be seen as an intrusion.
A smaller number of Clinic staff, led by the only other full
Professor on the staff, felt that a definite program which could be
implemented and which teachers could "use" was critical. There was
not sufficient time, they felt, to develop the kind of interpersonal
rapport necessary for "process oriented" Clusters. The Professor had
been asked by the Project Director to participate in the Clinic as
Associate Director with responsibility for the "instructional program,"
and from this he inferred he would be training Cluster Coordinators
to work with teachers, as well as working directly with teachers.
Initially, this group had argued for Clusters grouped around subjects,
an extension of the subject matter departments which already existed in
i
the school. One Cluster Coordinator competent in the field of English
felt that each Coordinator should have a specific "game plan" for his
Cluster; "I thought the big challenge was an instructional one," he
said later. Another, billed as an expert in "Learning and Problem
Solving" felt that the Clinic team should arrive with instructional
materials — worksheets, games, activities — which the teachers
could begin to use immediately. This faction assumed that the
Clinic for Learning had some authorization to implement its plans.
One Coordinator referred to a letter written by the Superintendent of
Schools to the Project Director which appeared to give the Clinic "carte
blanche" in changing the school. This was a faulty inference — the
Superintendent hadn't suggested that the Principal relinquish his role
as final authority in the school — but for some it remained a prime
t$0
instance of bureaucratic duplicity. This latter position was eventually
overruled by those who felt that the Cluster coordinators would have to
create their own personal power bases, and that teachers were the only
ones competent to find solutions to their problems.
From the beginning, this modus operand! of the Clusters caused
confusion and resentment among many teachers. Some viewed their Cluster
leaders as "lackadaisical," or "wishy-washy," and Cluster meetings became
"rap sessions," of "idle talk," where "anything I said was right." Many
teachers came to the meetings looking for "solutions," but since there
1
were none, they quickly lost interest. Because some Cluster Coordinators
had never taught in a black or Puerto Rican school, teachers mocked the ir
.
credibility. Other teachers made more of an effort to listen, but found
J
that the ideas for change were too radical, "with no thought of some of
the consequences." Or, "[cluster Coordinators] had very far fetched ideas
about teaching that had nothing to do with reading. One lesson he taught
to my class made me furious; it had something to do with taste, sour
and
sweet salt, and I did not interpret that as a reading lesson."
Many
teachers simply went to the meetings because they felt obliged to
go;
"some would show up just because they were cooperative people," sand
one
Coordinator. Although there had been an abundance of volunteers,
some
seasoned seventh grade teachers, who wanted to remain
with the seventh
grade, were fo-ced to participate in the Clinic or
lose their seventh
grade; as well, many experienced eighth or ninth
grade teachers who volun-
teered could not be included. Some teachers
were attracted by the pros-
pects of reduced class sice, new resources
in the classroom, and a little
extra pay for after school Clinic activities.
The teachers who were "co-
erced " or "bought" in this way came to
the Cluster meetings resentfully.
51
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and seldom participated actively in the discussions.
Querulous and skeptical teachers were quick to seize on embar-
rassing Incidents to attack the Clinic for Learning. One Cluster Coordi-
nator agreed with a community person that karate should be taught in the
j
classroom, both because "self protection was important" and because it
would serve as a way to "get to" the students. The Project Director sup-
ported the Coordinator, the Principal said no, and the confrontation blew
i
well out of proportion — but no karate was ever taught. One Coordinator
took his entire Cluster, teachers and students, to Coney Island and, in
the words of an assistant principal, "got bombed out by the kids." Other
Coordinators tried to teach demonstration lessons and all too often the
students, who can recognize a novice in seconds, destroyed the act. "Dur-
ing one lesson," recalled one teacher, "I had to physical!1 y hold the stu-
dents in their seats just so he could finish." On another occasion,
several TT.Y.U. staff had allowed their small group of students to begin
a papcr-and-wnstebasket "basketball" game, and when asked by the admini-
strator on duty in the halls, they had replied that the "lesson was over' 1
for the day. Undergraduates who came to the school once a week as part
of a regular course reouirement increased the defensiveness that teachers
were inclined to feel. Sitting in the back of a classroom, sometimes as
many as ten together, undergraduates would surrepticiously or openly
challenge a teacher's method or a point he was making. As one undergradu-
ate said, "No one ever told them (other undergraduates] to shut their
mouths, whether they liked what the teachers were doing or not, to learn
how to have manners whether the teacher was right or wrong, you certainly
don’t say it in.Jfront of the whole classroom."
11
Finally, administrators
and teachers were constantly provoked by the apparent disdain
show by
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Clinic staff for the normal school scheduling Cluster Coordinators
missed Cluster meetings, or a3ked to work a four day week, or arrived
late in the morning, the Project Director was frequently not at JHS 57, e
and undergraduates often came and went from classes at will.
Although the Principal had said prior to the opening of school
I
I /
"We have at least sixty friends to start the year,” the transition from
camp life to school life may have caused additional problems. Students
who called teachers by their first names at the camp were told that was
improper in school. "Things are free and easy on the outside," teachers
agreed, "the classroom inhibits
; we have to do what we can." Clinic
i
staff members were more reluctant to reach that conclusion, and often
treated students in the same "free and easy" way as at the camp. Most
*
Clinic staff were quick to excuse a student from a class if it appeared
j
that the child was "stiffled," and he was free to go to the Clinic office,
Room 10,3. Teachers, even those who had been at the camp, resented these
infractions, but often to no avail. Eventually, distnought students
would simply leave their regularly scheduled classes to find sanctuary
in Room 103. To many of the Clinic staff, this was further evidence of
the oppressive nature of the typical classroom; to many teachers, this
further marked the Clinic as soft and patronizing. "Students are in
school to learn," said the teachers: "Students cannot be forced to learn."
replied the Clinic,
The community development dimension of the Clinic program also
*
/
encountered early difficulties. Two "community agents" had been chosen
Trr the Rroiect Director, but neither was from the community nor had ary
special knowledge of it. One was a tennis pro during the summer
months,
recently turned educator with limited experience teaching in
Harlem.
S3
The other hati graduated two years previously' from the M.Y.U. School of
Commerce, and had just returned from, the Peace Corps. During the summer
they spent time in the conmufdty, meeting local leaders, taking walking'
tours, and trying to plan their activities for -the fall. Their role was
originally conceived as supporting the Clusters, one community agent
assigned to each Cluster, visiting parents of disruptive students, fol-
lowing up notices about PTA meetings, arranging for parents to come to
(
the school to observe or assist. The two original community agents were
responsible for hiring others, a policy which one referred to later as
I
a "colossal blunder." In the early fall, a woman who lived one block
from the school but who sent her two junior high school aged daughters
to school in Queens to avoid JHS 57, read about the Clinic in a newspaper
report. After several months of volunteering, the agents asked her to
join the Clinic staff and she accepted. A woman who understood verv
little of the political and educational realities that undergird the
public schools in New York City, with only slight experience with Wel-
fare Rights Organizations, she became one of the most active members of
the Clinic staff, alternately confronting the Principal and the Project
Director. Her story will become a crucial focus for understanding the
efforts of the Clinic for Learning on the commiinity at large.
The other community agent hired w=s the Chairman of the Local
School Board, a body which in I 966 had almost no substantive power save
as an advisory body. She had been reading the New York Tj mes at Jones
Beach in July, 1966, when she came across an article announcing that
JHS 57, a school in her district, was to be "adopted" by New York Univer-
sity. She notified the School-Community Coordinator working out of the
District Superintendent’s office, and they exchanged incredulities. She
and the District Superintendent were included' in the weekend for teach-
ers preceding the opening of school. It was not until several months
later, however, that she joined the staff of the Clinic for Learning as
community agent. Thus, for the first weeks and months of the Clinic.
i
the community staff consisted only of two men, both white, who knew very
little of the community. The School
-Community Coordinator of the District,
who was black and from the community, assisted the two agents, but by
their own admissions and the comments of both the Cluster Coordinators
and regular JHS £7 teachers, they offered little support to the operation
of the Clinic for Learning.
The concentration of problems that beset the Clinic in the early
weeks gave rise to a more fundamental clash, between the Principal and
the Project Director, over issues of power and authority. The Principal
was the first to feel the bind: "Teachers would say I don't want any N.Y.U.
people coming into my classroom. When I get that it hurts. Because now
I'm caught in a very awkward situation; I have to stand up for the teach-
-^er." Subject department chairmen, most of whom had been in the New York
City system for at least ten years, began recounting tales of Clinic in-
competence and irregularity: "Mr. B—- has not been in school for the
past two days"; "Mr. F— has planned a trip with his students for to-
morrow — he has no parent permission slips and no authorization from
the District Office"; "Miss L wants to allow untrained undergraduates
to teach our students on a small group basis"; "Mr. M— is suggesting
*
to his Cl\ister that the entire English and Social Studies curriculums be
thrown out." Increasingly, the Principal interceded on behalf of his
staff, and he w^s forced to countermand decisions made by the Clinic's
* \ \ « 4m |
on-site Administrative Assistant. When word of resistance reached the
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Project Director, he more often than not assumed the peacemaker "man for
all seasons" stance that he had used so successfully at the school meet-
ing in the library the previous spring. Often disputes were buried
under mountains of conciliatory words, offerred in reasonable dialogue,,
in search of a common solution. But increasingly, Clinic trips and room
changes and curriculum suggestions were thwarted by the "rules" of the
bureaucracy, and the Project Director, realizing that his very right to
..remain in the school depended on the continuing good will of the school
administration, almost invariably had to back down.
This left him open to criticism from his own staff. " [The Pro-
ject Director} refused to fight the administration when fthe Principal}
and his people began to set up road blocks," said one Cluster Coordinator.
"With the administration refusing to help and teachers refusing to help,
progress in the Clinic became impossible. Since [the Project Director]
did not want to face up to that reality, we were able to make little pro-
12
gress." Most Cluster Coordinators were floundering, and they looked
to the Project Director for support. Said one: "Many of the people in
the Clinic needed strong direction, and [the Project Director} does not
believe in that. He believes that the goodness of people will out in
the proper environment. Maybe all of us were clever and did some in-
teresting things but we all needed a better overall sense of how to
accomplish our goals." Another: "[The Project Director} chose six
people [as Cluster Coordinators} that he had faith in and his idea was
that each one of these people was to dictate and institute his own policy.
Now we all found out that this wasn’t possible without power to do it. We
had not power at all, you understand. The only influences we co>ild mus-
ter were bargaining power. The Director of Evaluation of the Clinic,
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vho personally and professionally was perhaps the closest of all Clinic
staff to the Project Director, spoke more bitterly:
Never having anticipated such ruthless undermining of our
efforts and not being really sophisticated enough to begin to
cope effectively with it, and having no real power in the
school and rather little back at the university, wo were, in
' effect, rruite defenseless and were all but wiped out.... For
us as a team the first h-6 weeks were both the beginning and
the end of the project.,.
^
.
'*
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The Project Director and his staff were caught in the ambivalent posture
*
of trying to justify their presence in the face of mounting criticism.
In conception, the Clinic for Learning vras to have operated as a support
system to aid teachers, thus, as a non-directive experimental program;
in fact. Cluster Coordinators to a greater or lesser degree felt inclined
to offer free advice — new curriculum designs, new teaching techniques,
etc. When teachers and administrators would voice opposition to the
"radical," or "impractical" suggestions, the Clinic staff, and the Pro-
ject Director in particular, would retreat: "We are simply here for an
experiment; if something isn't workable, throw it out; we have no inten-
^ tion of imposing solutions on you."
A
By Christmas time, 1?66, the Clinic for Learning had almost
nothing to show for its efforts. In some Clusters, more than half the
regular JHS £7 teachers had stopped coming to Cluster meetings. Others
would soon inform the Principal that they wanted no New York University
personnel whatsoever in their classrooms. Regular subject department
chairmen had virtually never been encouraged to attend Cluster meetings,
*
and they began to blame the Clinic program and Clinic "permissiveness"
for the alarming discipline situation that was appearing, both in class-
rooms and hallways, whero students roamed with impunity armed with the
\ V I *• I
careful retort, "I'm going to Room 103." The Project Director, anxious
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to regain some of the lost momentum of the Project, sent a thirteen
page, “Perspective at Christmas Time," to all JHS £7 staff. It began:
Perhaps because of the pressures inherent in the process
of joining the efforts of a school and a university; certainlv
because of the scope and depth of the problems involved in
; educating disadvantaged children; and perhaps beca\ise we in
the Clinic h^ve been working our way into the problem, I find
considerable confusion as to the goals, working assumptions
and the meaning of specific activities in the Clinic.
16
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Much of what followed was an adaptation, of the original project proposal:
three pages explaining the "culture of poverty" concept, several pages
of Clinic goals — "progressively surround the child with positively
oriented people who care,” "to reach the child as a person," "individual-
ized instruction," "curriculum development," etc. --- two pages on com-
munity development almost directly quoted from the project proposal; and
• two pages on research and evaluation (a process which in fact never
really began). The final sentences are suggestive of the Project Direc-
tor’s disposition:
I would define winning as motivating more people to work
on the problems of the disadvantaged. I hope we can demon-
strate in some small way that slums and the defeatism they
breed can be eliminated. I don't non how we nan lose if we
keep typing. (emphasis added.
But many of the Clinic staff by January, 1967, were no longer will
ing to keep trying. The Professor hired as Director of Instruction re-
signed because "there didn’t seem to be much time for an educational
„18
policy or any other planning... there was no function for me to serve.
One Cluster Coordinator, the one who had supervised the APEX students
the year before, resigned and accepted a college teaching position in
New Jersey. "I had the feeling," he said, "that we were going nowhere."
Another Coordinator remembers precisely the day in early February when
he "gave up." "Emotionally," he said, "I quit in February. It just
didn't make any difference if I came in or not." At least three Clinic
teachers, those hired by the Clinic but paid with Board of Education
money, also resigned in January. And although it is certainly not true
that all Cluster Coordinators or Clinic teachers "stopped trying,"
school-Clinic relations had reached a low ebb, and all Clinic staff were
struggling.
In January, an Ad Hoc Teachers Group made up principally of
Teachers' Union representatives in the school formed to discuss the
Clinic with the Project Director, his on-site Administrative Assistant,
and the Director of Evaluation, who was soon to replace the Administra-
tive Assistant. The Ad Hoc Committee communicated the following con-
cerns: students must not be allowed to go to Room 103 without passes;
student teachers should be directed by the Clinic staff to assist with
problems of discipline; the community agents should spend more time on
• o
individual behavioral problems; Cluster Coordinators should be more
19
"active and direct" in participating in the Cluster meetings.
The Principal continued to receive notes from dissenting teach-
ers. One teacher wrote to say she would
have no part of the Clinic, and I feel like I speak for
many of the teachers. The Clinic has done nothing for me,
only caused confusion, with pupils coming and going for no
apparent purpose. Cluster meetings have been worthless, no
planning or ideas, and no help. I accepted a student teach-
er because I didn't think it nice to say no, **20
In the next few months, Cluster leaders tried to
consolidate the
gains they had made, and salvage what they could of the
second semester.
In March, 1967, a "Progress Report" was assembled
and submitted to the
Ford Foundation in which Cluster leaders catalogued
their successes.
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Through thin veneers of optimism, it is apparent that two Clusters had
all but ceased functioning. One writes: "We have maintained the 'normal
school structures' in all of our classes. The main thrust of our work
has been in the area of Science." After which it becomes clear that
the regular JHS 57 Science teacher is the only teacher who will accept
any advice or assistance from the Clinic, though two other teachers in
the Cluster grudgingly agreed to accept student teachers. "People are
not in a hurry to let us in -- to change things around," he writes.
"They are very hesitant to change the usual structure and pattern of
the school." A second Cluster leader is still offering "'the language
arts' as the focus of work in the Cluster." But the Cluster doesn't
function anymore, and "the major thrust of my work with the Cluster has
been coordinating (time} schedules, (and} working with the N.Y.U. per-
sonnel." A third Cluster leader, although admitting the demise of his
Cluster, points to two notable successes: one, "the Clinic teacher with
• o
the help of NYU student teachers and undergraduates takes one half of
Class 7-15 for Art, Social Studies, and English" and provides them with
cocoa and cookies at the start of the day as well as intensive remedial
work and a revamped curriculum. (The cocoa program ended shortly there-
after when a hat and coat were discovered in the cocoa vat.) Secondly,
the Cluster Math teacher with some NYU staff had devised new material
for the three Cluster classes which offered every child a Math program
more nearly matched to his abilities. A fourth Cluster, led by perhaps
the mo3t non-directive and least threatening Coordinator, also pointed
to two successes: "We have split class 7-13 in half for eight English
and four Math periods," taught jointly by the Cluster Coordinator and
the Clinic teacher; secondly, the regular Social Studies was "experi-
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menting" with breaking his class down into small groups. A fifth
i
•
Cluster, led by the young woman whom most people referred to as the most
dedicated and successful of all Clinic staff, had several more achieve-
o
ments to tout: "Class 7-5 was split in two groups," one half working
with the Coordinator, the Clinic teacher, and all other NYU personnel.
Accompanying this report was a lengthy documentation of all curriculum
and teaching innovations used with the class. Secondly, the "non-
readers" of Classes 7-12 and 7-lU "are being taken out of English,
Social Studies, Science, and Art classes for intensified and more indi-
vidualized reading instruction." Three of the regular JHS 57 teachers
)
in this Cluster are quoted as saying the new class breakdowns are "very
helpful," and each suggests how Cluster meetings could be made more
productive. But the fourth regular teacher "has a definite point of
view about the NYU operation. He feels that the Clinic should do more
research and come up with specific suggestions.... fHe} uses NYU per-
sonnel only on tangential class work." The last Cluster leader, who
had been a Clinic teacher in the fall and who replaced the departed
Cluster Coordinator, was struggling to maintain close relations with
the four teachers in her Cluster and plan some sort of "regrouping" of
i
students which would reduce class size. By the end of the semester she
had achieved some success in communicating with parents, assisting teach-
ers, and working with small groups of students.
During this time, the community agents were becoming more effec-
tive both in the school and in the community. In January and February,
one of the original agents was personally responsible for getting new
eye glasses for fifty children in the school. Attendance at PTA meetings
had risen from several in September to as many as fifty in February.
i
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Some Cluster leaders began to rely on the reports of community agents
on home visitations. As well, a number of local leaders in the Bed-
ford-Stuyvesant community weio attracted by news of "trouble at 57."
In the age of riots and rising militancy, black leaders were quick to
*
i
attack the white "missionaries" from New York University. Fanned by the
criticisms of the community agent who sent her children to school in
j :
Queens, the community at large began to respond to some obvious short-
«
comings of the Clinic for Learning: none of the Clinic staff were black,
none of the regular JHS 57 teachers involved were black and only one
*
Clinic teacher was black; no parents or community people had been in-
volved in the planning of the Clinic for Learning; all reports out of
JHS 57 indicated that Clinic staff were too "easy" with students, let-
ting them out of class at their whim, not requiring homework, being
"friendly" with the children but not "teaching" them anything. Parents
began to complain about the Clinic to the District Superintendent. The
community agent/President of the Local School Board also heard complaints
and when forced to choose between the Clinic and the community, she chose
community. In March, the District Superintendent and the School Board
President notified the officials from the Ford Foundation who had funded
the Clinic, and they came to the school to observe. "Things did not
look to be functioning anywhere near what I had expected," reported the
chief officer from Ford. "It was a mess," said another.
Pressure from all sides resulted in the formation of a Community
Advisory Board for the Clinic for Learning, which met first on March 17,
1967. The Advisory Board was a quick assemblage of community agents,
Local School Board members, PTA members, community leaders, school ad-
ministrators, and Clinic directors. The first meeting was not tranquil;
l
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abuse was heaped on the Clinic by disappointed and disillusioned com-
munity members. "It was not so much that they failed," reported one
Advisory Board member. "But that they promised so much and we listen-
ed." The loudest clash was over the issues of money and accountability.
The Advisory Board asked for a list of expenditures and a current bud-
get; the Project Director said this was private Clinic for Learning
«
*
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information. Aghast, the community demanded to know whether the Clinic
was serving the community, or trying to disrupt it. Eventually, grudg-
ingly, at a later meeting, the Project Director did present a sketchy
outline of the Clinic budget, and the issue was not raised again -
—
though the damage had been done.
No doubt the Clinic staff was sincere in its efforts to reconnect
.
the school and the community. In April, another weekend retreat was
planned for Clinic staff and community leaders. The director of Brook-
lyn CORE, the head of a Youth Leadership Institute, and leaders of local
anti -poverty projects, religious organizations, and local politicians
were invited. By the end of the session, only the two black community
agents and one white priest remained with the Clinic staff; the others
had returned prematurely to Brooklyn. The meeting made a large impact
on the Project Director and he considered it a success. But the com-
munity agent with children in Queens saw it differently: "They (com-
munity leaders) were talking about community power, and the Clinic peo-
ple didn't understand."
On April 17, a film about JHS $7 was shown on national televi-
sion which did more to alienate the community than any other single
event in the life of the Clinic for Learning — to this day, community
residents vow to "wring the neck of whoever made that movie."
It was
(
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made by an independent film producer, white, commissioned by National
Education Television, who worked closely with the Clinic and was lauded
by both the Principal and the Project Director for his "sensitive under-
standing" of the plight of ghetto education. "The extent to which our
film will bring home to the viewer the full impact of this complex and
desperate situation," wrote the filmmaker to the JHS 57 staff several
22
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weeks before its completion, "will be the measure of our success." To
be sure, the film, entitled "The Way It Is," showed that the situation
in a black school in a black community was very desperate. "No one can .
function well in the ghetto," says the Project Director in the opening
scene ; "ninety percent of the students are not moving ahead, something
happens to them that keeps them from learning," chimed in the Principal.
"More radical solutions are necessary," added the Project Director at
the end of the film; "the crisis is heightening," concluded the narrator.
Anyone who han spent time in JHS 57 will recognize that, in fact, the
film accurately depicts much of what goes on in the school in
class-
rooms of inexperienced teachers, in hallways, in offices. One
also
knows that the school is far from an ideal learning
environment. In one
sense, the parents and community of JHS 57 responded
negatively because
they were unprepared to accept how "bad" the school
actually was. But
more than this, it was the characterization of the
school attended by
their children in their neighborhood as a
"battleground," as desperate,
as "almost hopeless," which brought many
parents to the point of outrage.
"Many people who used to be my friends now
hate my guts because they
think I had something to do with that
movie," reflected one of the orig-
inal community agents.
The faculty of the school also
reacted strongly. As one teacher
said, "Before the film we were a divided faculty, but the film brought
us together — none of us liked it." The basic problem, they said, was
that only first year teachers were shown in action; none of the experi-
enced teachers, in whose rooms "education and learning" proceeded no
differently than in thousands of seventh grade classrooms across the
country, were even on the film. If the community was irate because the
film reflected negatively on them, the teachers felt attacked in the
same way. One teacher auestioned: "How could anyone who was involved
with that school still hold his head up high after seeing that movie?"
In May
,
the future of the Clinic
,
which had been funded as a
two and a half year project, came under discussion. Four of the Clus-
ter Coordinators indicated they would not be available for a second year,
as did both original community agents, as did both men who had served
as on-site Administrative Assistant, as did all but two Clinic teachers.
A number of community persons, especially those from the wider community
who were not parents, demanded that the entire Clinic for Learning
staff return to New York University. The Principal too suggested this
would be the wisest resolution of the conflict. Other Advisory Board
members and parents were anxious for the Clinic to stay, as long as the
community could monitor and direct the use of resources; $U50,000 pro-
jects, they said, were not easy to come by in Beford-Stuyvesant and they
should be maintained at all costs. Nor was the hope of the Principal
entirely crushed and in private he offered uo resign his office if he
would be made on-site Director of the Clinic. The Dean of the N.Y.U.
School of Education and the Project Director refused the offer suggest-
ing that the Clinic, to be effective, had to remain independent of the
school system.
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The Project Director told the Community Advisory Board that the
objectives of the Clinic program for the second year would be "tighten
up," "replicate," and "institutionalize," but he later agreed to cut
back the program to only two Clusters. New promises were made to the
now vigilant Advisory Board of supplemental services, from the School
of Social Work, the School of Dentistry, the School of Law, and other
New York University departments. The structure and design of the pro-
i
gram, however, as detailed in a lengthy Advisory Board report dated May
23, 1967, was to remain essentially the same. There were three subtle
but consequential differences: 1) a "Negro male" would be appointed as
full time on-site administrator chosen jointly by "JHS 57, N.Y.U., the
District office. Local School Board, and the P.T.A."; 2) "community
agents would be chosen by the Local School Board, Clinic for Learning,
and the P.T.A." ; and 3) efforts would be made by Clusters to work close-
23ly with Subject and Grade Supervisors.
o
The summer of 1967, like the summer before, was another high
point for the Clinic. The community agent who had procured glasses for
students arranged for thirty boys labeled "discipline problems" by the
school to attend a Boy Scout camp in upstate New York. Again, the boys
reacted positively to the "freeing environment"; again, "reading and
writing in subjects akin to the camping experience became commonplace
and there was a huge amount of peer pressure created to achieve in cer-
tain skills that required classroom type skills" ; but again, as well,
from the camp evaluation, "there is no data as to how this success can
be transferred back to the schools in Bedford-Stuyvesant" .
^ The com-
munity agent also arranged for twelve other boys to leave Bedford-Stuy-
vesant for the summer to live with farm families in New York State.
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With no peer support, moat of the boys lasted less than two weeks, but
in the words of one, it was a "good experience."
The two most successful Cluster Coordinators and the community
agent/mother also combined in the summer of 1967 to create the single
most successful Clinic event, at least from the perspective of students
and parents. Called "Program Advancing College Education," (PACE), the
program offered forty-two students a "uniquely different and challenging
educational environment which might affect (their] attitudes, aspira-
tions and self-concepts," lasting over a four week period, held at N.Y.U.,
funded by the Clinic. Among other things, students used the N.Y.U.
language laboratory to learn French; elaborate student and parent evalu-
ations were prepared; overall attendance was computed at ninety-one per-
cent; every student was given a "diploma"; and for many of them, it "was
just like going to college."
During the summer a "Negro male" was recruited to be on-site
Clinic administrator for the coining year. A product of the New York
City School system, with nine years teaching and supervisory experience
in a Manhattan high school, he "was beginning to see bankruptcy in the
system," and he was eager to join in a reform project. Though hired by
the Project Director, with the approval of the Advisory Board, he was
ouick to direct his allegiance to the community. Challenged by the
Principal as a "spokesman" for the Project Director, he announced he was
"his own man" and joined the Board of Directors of the most powerful
local anti -poverty project. first goal," he said later, "was to get
the community involved." Accountable to no one during its first year,
the new on-site Director demanded that the Clinic be accountable to
parents and students. Under the constant pressure of the community
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agent with children in Queens
,
he opened the Clinic budget for inspec-
tion, sought to build a power base for the Clinic in the community, and
began to use the Advisory Board as his central polioy making body. 2 '’
But the new Director was unable to fully mend the precarious
power balance that had undermined the first year of the Clinic. The
Clinic still had no legitimate right to be in the school save at the
confirmation of the school administration. The only power which the new
' Director could wield was "whatever [he]] could muster or cajole by virtue
of (hisj personality and interaction with people." And by the time the
new Director assumed his position, the relationship of the Clinic for
Learning and the school had deteriorated almost beyond repair. Only
eight teachers had volunteered to work in a Cluster the second year,
only half of these were involved the first year, and at least one had
joined with the specific purpose of "finding out how to get rid of N.Y.U."
No administrator was supportive, the Principal remained ambivalent.
"(The new Director]) was a really dedicated sincere fellow," said the
Principal later. "Despite a number of disagreements we had, which were
because we picked up after a full year of operation, he had his mind in
the right direction. He was in a bind. We locked horns, but we respec-
ted each other." Above all, the new Director understood how a New
York City school functioned; and because he accepted certain immutable
organizational facts — e.g., hierarchical authority, bureaucratic
timidity, the "artificial" classroom — he was able to avoid the con
stant confrontations which plagued the first year and gather the respect
of most JHS ^7 staff.
During the fall the two Clusters, which often met together to
form one Cluster of eight teachers, began to function as they
had been
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intended. Often with a psychologist and a social worker from N.Y.U.,
occasionally with department chairmen and other administrators, regu-
lar toachers and Clinic teachers and Cluster loaders frequently got
beyond questions of discipline and disruptive ohildren, which had domi-
nated most. Clustor meetings the previous year, and reaohed broader Issues
of teaching and learning. But the gains were small; there were no break-
throughs, no "innovative programs" with wide impact in the sohool, and
no model Cluster evolved. Simply, the meetings provided teachers a time
to discuss their work, which was the Justification for Clusters from the
beginning.
TMo movie, "The Way It Is," was shown frequently during the sum-
mer and fall of 1967 on National Education Television and each time new
revenge minded recruits Joined the community faction wholly against the
Clinic for Loarning. The movie was made by a man eager to bring millions
in touch with the depressing realities of ghetto education, but for the
supposed edification of the country, he had sacrificed the eelf-respeot
of one sohool community. In the minds of many, the Clinic for Learning
was on a like course: it was not solving problems, it was blaming the
parents and the children; it was not helping the school, it was expos-
ing it to immense degradation; to some, the Clinic was destroying the
sohool. Just to make n point. As more and more parents came to see that
the school was failing, as more and more visited the sohool and saw chaos
in the hallo and classrooms, the Clinic for Learning bore the larger bur-
den of guilt. Curiously, for a time, the administration of the school
wore the mantle of dedicated community service, immune from attack. By
winter, 1967-68, the community, awaking to the plight of the school,
would no longer tolerate it and they demanded action: the Clinic must
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go. In December, 1967, the Community Advisory Board formed a committee
of five community leaders to evaluate the Clinic for Learning and JHS 57.
The rage of the community is only lightly concealed in the document
which appeared two months later. "The progress report £of the Clinic
for Learning) is a complete ’lie.’ The goals are a fairy tale. Goals
are set up so that the child will be completely dissatisfied with living
,
in the ghetto." (emphasis added.) And:
The Clinic for Learning should not be continued in the
New York City public school system. The present teaching
methods, the organization, the personnel, and the whole
philosophy of the Clinic for Learning is ineffective for
improving the level of achievement of the ’disadvantaged*
child.
Reading scores of last year’s seventh graders, the report shows, had not
risen more than usual. Because "the whole emphasis is on teacher train-
ing (of N.Y.U. undergraduates), the Clinic for Learning should be called
rClinic for Teacher Training.”’ Although the report pointed to "chaotic
conditions" in the school, they were hesitant to blame the teachers and
administrators, and called instead for the Principal to take over full
control administering the Clinic.
As allies against the Clinic, the regular JHS 57 teachers and the
community did their best to subvert the Clinic’s authorization from
above. As early as April, 1967, the Dean of the N.Y.U. School of
Educa-
tion had been asked to attend a Community Advisory Board meeting
and,
in the words of the Principal, "had been taken to task by
a lot of peo-
p le." In May and June other meetings
were held in the Dean's offices
at N.Y.U., and In the fall and Vinter of the
folloving year, (1967-68),
he continued to hear from irate parents and
teachers. In October, 1967,
a dispute over the responsibilities of a Clinic
teacher, paid vith Board
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of Education funds, was taken directly to the Superintendent of Schools.
By mid winter, frequent reports of incompetence and confusion reached
the office of the Superintendent, and although he was not often person-
ally involved in settling disputes, his patience was growing short.
Sometime in the early spring of 1968, he told the Education Dean that
the Clinic for Learning had outlived its usefulness: the Dean replied
that he had already notified the Project Director to discontinue the
after June, 1968. The recollections of the Superintendent of
Schools are instructive:
The one thing that stands out in my mind it was the
only project I know of, while I was superintendent, that
turned out to be such a foul ball. The only one. Some
Projects didn't succeed as well as they should have. That's
understandable. This is the only one I had to step into
and say we're not going to continue it-
2 g
In March, 1968, a research team from Hofstra University came to
the school and were enlisted to conduct an evaluation. The task was
monumental. The Clinic for Learning had made almost no effort to evalu-
ate itself, there was never real collaboration between Cluster Coordina-
tors either the first or second year. Clinic expenditures were not audi-
ted, and Clinic directors and staff had made no effort to document or
publish their findings. "In the last week of the second year," recalled
one of the most successful Clinic teachers, "we tried to cone up with
some evaluation of the program. But it was hopeless. We sat around and
t 29
talked and some of us got good and angry. We all felt so let down."
Given the disappointing content of the Hofstra report which finally
appeared in September, 1970, it is likely that neither the Ford Founda-
tion nor the central Board of Education nor the administrators of New
\ v i
York University nor the public at large have learned anything from the
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experience of the Clinic for Learning.
The Project continued to operate in JHS 57 until June, but it
was only for show. Mo3t teachers and students had nothing to do with
the N.Y.U. personnel. Administrators were no longer threatened, and
' theY returned to old routines. Parents for a time continued to attack,
but as the Clinic 1 s visibility faded they saw no improvement in the
school's performance and they were forced to redirect their ire back to
' the primary target, the school itself.
^Interview, Assistant Principal, June 25, 1971.
2
Interview, Principal, July 1 5, 1971.
o
Interview, Mario Fantini, Urban Education Officer, Ford
Foundation, November 22, 1971.
^Intepview, Bernard Donovan, Superintendent of Schools,
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Chapter U
Proposition #1 - Effective changes in schools is- facilitated by oarti-
cipation of teachers in all decision making proceeds
which affect them.
Though the Clinic planners intended to, and, in their
estimation, actually did involve teachers in decision-
making processes, their unilateral resolution to im-
plement a Cluster arrangement was in blatant contra-
diction. Because the Clinic staff was unable to change
the knowledge and attitudes of regular school per-
sonnel to support this structural innovation, teachers
never really cared about the Cluster and ’understood
neither its function nor their roles in it. Based
on other research the failure of the Clusters may be
explained satisfactorily, however, additional re-
search findings may point to a necessary extension of
the above proposition.
Clinic for Learning planners had every intention of relying
on the above proposition in implementing their project.* As we have
seen, the Cluster arrangement was specifically designed to involve
teachers in decision making and was to be the source of all classroom
innovations. Yet, plainly, the Cluster arrangement did not have the
intended impact on the Clinic program. Rather, the Cluster became the
focus of considerable negative reaction from teachers, which served more
to inhibit than to facilitate change. To determine whether this repre-
sents a failure of the proposition, or a failure of the Clinic staff tc
use it properly, or both, requires a closer look at the available data.
Before the Clusters
The Clinic effort to involve teachers in decision making was sub
verted almost before it began. Teachers in JKS 57 were to be involved
in the decision making of the Cluster, but no teacher participated in
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*Note: See Chap.1, pp. 13-15, above.
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the decision to establish Clusters. Apparently without the understand-
ing of either the Project Director, the Principal, or many of the Clinic
staff, the first major resolution reached by the Clinic staff to
C
adopt Clusters resulted in a highly inflexible, unilateral, interven-
tion, totally in contradiction to the avowed precepts of democracy and
non-authoritarianism espoused by the Clinic. And not only was the de-
cision made without teachers, the strategy of implementation — by order
* °f the Principal could only reinforce to teachers their essential
marginality vis-a-vis the Clinic for Learning. In the library meeting
the previous spring, the teachers had stated they needed more materials,
smaller classes, more help with discipline, and more help with clerical
tasks; they did not say they needed a decision making process in which
to fashion changes for themselves and JHS 57. Not only were teachers
impeded by the bureaucratic fact of life which frowns on risk taking or
reform, but many teachers, especially those who were in their first year
of teaching, recall that they were already struggling very hard to ad-
just to the ever present confusion in the school and in their classrooms.
The Cluster arrangement, then, was not simply, as the Project Director
said, "a system of planning for planning, 11 it was a mandatory addition
i /
to a teacher’s already harried schedule. It did not merely provide
teachers with a neutral opportunity to "solve their own problems," it
gave them the added responsibilities of curriculum revision, improved
teaching, and supervision of N.Y.U. undergraduates. "To let teachers
solve their own problems" appears to be a laudable goal for education re-
form, but when a teacher is pressured or forced into a position where he
must make decisions which previously have been made for him, it becomes,
in the words of the Clinic Director during the second year, a "kind of
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subtle authoritarianism" to which he is being subjected. In retrospect,
it seems clear that had the Clinic arrived at the school with the pro-
mised services and resources, had a relationship of mutual respect be-
tween Clinic and school developed, and had teachers themselves been re-.
,
sponsible for the decision adopting Clusters, teacher participation in
Cluster activities would have been maximized. This approach, at least,
would have been consistent with the precept of teacher participation.
*-
Bu-t considering this hypothetical approach raises still other
considerations, for it is nowhere clear that under any circumstances the
teachers of JHS 57 would have voluntarily chosen to adopt Clusters.
Consistent teacher participation may have been a less effective implemen-
tation strategy than the one which was used. The contradictory reliance
on the power of the Principal in imposing Clusters may have been, with
hindsight, a wise choice. (What is curious, of course, is the almost
complete lack of awareness of the contradiction among the Clinic staff
five years after the project's end.) In fact, there is research which
x
indicates that enforced structural innovation was the intervention
technique most likely to affect JHS 57 . According to Blanchard and
Hersey (1972), a "coerced change cycle" which relies on power and auth-
ority is most appropriate with "immature" people who are "often depend-
ent and not willing to take new responsibilities unless forced to do
so." Such people, they argue, "might prefer direction and structure
to being faced with decisions that might be frightening to them."
1
We
have no evidence in this study to indicate that JHS 57 teachers fall
into this ‘“immature" category, though the problem is considered in
greater detail elsewhere in this chapter. Nevertheless, because tne
*Note: See Chapter 1*, pp. 89-89 , below.
actions of the Clinic belie it's intention to use a democratic or parti-
cipative change cycle, it may be appropriate to look more closely at
the "coerced" or "structural" change cycle.
f
According to Blanchard and Hersey, there are four levels of
change in individuals ; changes in knowledge, in attitudes, in individual
behavior, and in group or organizational behavior. Following a struct-
^ural change cycle, the first level of change is that of group behavior.
By virtue of the legitimate power which accrues because of an administra-
tor's rank in the educational hierarchy, that is, because of his "position
power," a change is imposed on subordinates. This results in the second
level of change, that of individual behavior as subordinates are forced
to behave in different ways. This is precisely what occurred in the
Clinic for Learning: the decision to adopt Clusters was imposed by the
Principal, and teachers were immediately forced to begin to behave in
different ways-, if only to attend one Cluster meeting per week. The
third level of change which must be accomplished in the successful
structural or coerced change cycle is individual knowledge; that is,
subordinates must now be made aware of the justifications for the impos-
ed change, the attendant advantages, the potential benefits, and the
overall objectives the change is pursuing. This in turn will lead
to the fourth level of change, change in attitudes. At this final
stage, employees will come to understand the wisdom behind the innova-
tion, they will come to identify with its objectives, and participate
actively in its fruition. The model of the coerced change cycle
offered by Blanchard and Hersey appears in Table I:
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In the participative change cycle, on the other hand, change
in knowledge is first precipitated by personal or informational power,
which precedes change in attitudes, which precede changes in individual
and group behavior, as per Table II:
Table II
change cycle, the tasks of the successful change program become sililar
to those of the participative cycle: inducing changes in the knowledge
9
and attitude levels of subordinates. Whether we view the Clinic
according
r
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to it's intention of using a participative change cycle, or according
to the coerced change cycle which was actually set in motion by the im-
position of Clusters, the functions of the Cluster leaders were the same:
to extend knowledge of educational innovations and reforms, to demon-
strate to teachers that the Cluster could provide them with help, to
show teachers how the Cluster could be a potent forum for change, and
finally to induce the belief that change was necessary and good. In
short, the Clusters were to expand the knowledge and attitudes of teach-
ers in support of educational reform.
The Clusters
The six Clusters of the Clinic for Learning relied solely on
participative methods. Based on the responses of all teachers who were
interviewed, it is clear that no Cluster Coordinator or Clinic staff mem-
ber ever mandated a curriculum change, or an alteration of teaching be-
havior, or a different method of disciplining, or any other matter relat-
ed to a teacher's activities in or out of the classroom. All teachers
responded negatively when asked: "Were you ever forced by the Cluster
Coordinator to do anything differently?"* All decisions which emanated
from the Clusters, though indeed they were few, were made by the teachers.
All teachers confirmed that "every teacher was given the same chance to
participate in the Cluster meetings." No Cluster Coordinator, with the
possible exception of one, arrived at JHS $7 with a "program for change."
Rather, they viewed themselves^s part of a process for change from which
structure and content would evolve. The one exception, the leader of the
*Note: Although this question (and some that follow) was not asked
to every teacher in precisely these words, I have reviewed the
transcripts of teacher and Cluster Coordinator interviews and
have made certain of various responses by referring to close-
ly related questions and answers.
language oriented cluster," "had made a metaphysical assumption that if
you present people with evidence they will listen to it."‘ Although this
Cluster leader tried to induce his Cluster to make certain decisions,
everyone was equally aware that he was powerless to impose anything on
the teachers. "I did more learning than teaching," he said later. Fin-
ally, the Project Director and his chief Administrative Assistant both
supported the notion that teachers must find their own solutions to their
fi
_
problems. "We weren't going to plan anything for anybody," said the Pro-
ject Director. "Teachers must be free to change at their own speed," said
his assistant.
Despite these efforts at securing support of the teachers, at
almost no time during the school year 1966-67 did the Clusters function
as they were intended to function. Although a sizeable number of teachers
interviewed felt that "the Cluster arrangement could be a useful means
for improving a school," no more than a few of the teachers felt they
o
"had received any benefit from the Cluster meetings" of the Clinic, for
Learning. Not a single teacher admitted that his teaching behavior had
been significantly affected by the Cluster meetings. The withdrawal of
many teachers, the breakdown of several Clusters, the resignation of
numerous Clinic personnel, and the intense frustration felt by all members
of the Clinic staff will attest to the fact that the Cluster arrangement
did not facilitate the efforts the Clinic for Learning to change the
school
.*
From the data, it appears there were four principle reasons why
*Note: See Chapter 3, above.
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involving the teachers in the decision making of the Clusters hindered
rather than encouraged the Clinic for Learning. 1) The Clinic never de-
livered the resources it promised and teachers grew skeptical; 2) Teach-
ers were unclear as to how their Cluster responsibilities correlated
with the demands of administrators and the requirements with which they
were more familiar, e.g., lesson plans, Board of Education curriculum,
etc.; 3) The attitudes of many of the Clinic staff members foreclosed
the possibility of meaningful interchange with teachers; and U) Many tea-
chers never identified with the process of solving their own problems,
it was never "their" process, and it became instead just another
problem.
:l) No resources provided.
!
Clinic planners had been anxious to secure a school as a "reality
base" for the teacher training component of the Clinic program, and they
viewed teacher receptivity as crucial. Most JHS 57 teachers remember
the meeting in the library in the spring of 1966 as having one dominant
theme: New York University was prepared to commit itself to the improve-
ment of JHS 57. Teachers were asked repeatedly to express their needs;
the Project Director vowed to help meet those needs, and the Principal
urged his teachers to listen and join. The message was that burdens
would be lifted and problems would be solved. But these were promises
that were never kept. No resources from the Schools of Social Work,
Law, Dentistry, appeared at the school the first year, and when they did
*
appear, the project was already beyond repair. No psychological ser-
vices were provided for the "emotionally disturbed." "Teachers were al-
r>
ways asking, 'Where are all the resources*'" recalled the Principal.
During the first, semester, there wa3 only one student teacher available,
/
and though there were twenty in the second semester by this time the
Clinic was so fragmented that it had little effect on their perform-
ance. (A number of teachers °surmised that the effectiveness of student
teachers was due to traditional restraints —
-the grade from the co-
operating teacher, the simple need to "survive" — not to their associ-
ation with the Clinic.) Teachers were unprepared in the fall to be made
part of a "process of decision making" when all the while they were
expecting to get help . They had participated in what they saw as the
most crucial decision: how would N.Y.U. help JHS 57? They expected to
benefit from the fruits of their input. When they saw that Cluster
leaders as a group had no knowledge of JHS 57, no special qualifications,
no "useful" resources or materials, and on several occasions actually
demonstrated their incompetence by trying to teach a "model lesson,"
many quickly dropped out. Because they expected their jobs to be made
easier, they soon came to view the Cluster, with its opportunities for
involvement in decision making, as a waste of time and a sham.
J
2) Conflict with existing power relationships.
In introducing the Cluster to JHS 57, Clinic planners exhibited
a gross lack of concern for existing power arrangements among administra-
tors in the school. In a junior high school, each of the major subjects
has a departmental chairman, who may also be an assistant principal, and
who is responsible to the principal. Among the duties of department
chairmen are collecting weekly lesson plans from teachers, holding
periodic meetings of all department teachers to coordinate examinations,
curriculum, and other matters, insuring that new teachers in the depart-
ment are given spme assistance adjusting to the school, and occasionally
teaching demonstration lessons. There were four such men in JHS 57
in
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the fall of 1966. Each had been encouraged by the Principal to accept
the Clinic for Learning, and work closely with its staff, even though
many of the proposed responsibilities of the Cluster Coordinators were
under the jurisdiction of the department chairmen. The Clinic staff made
almost no effort to alleviate this obvious conflict of interest. De-
partment chairmen were not invited to Cluster meetings, they were con-
sulted very infrequently by the Clinic staff, and generally held in low
esteem. It is not surprising that they came increasingly to resent the
Clinic. "They said we were rigid, no flexibility, and the kids disliked
us because we were authority," said one administrator. "We wanted to see
it succeed, but we couldn't help, and so we turned our backs on it." The
Principal had made it clear that Cluster teachers need not remain with-
in the Board of Education curriculum; subject department chairmen made
their dissatisfaction about this policy known by demanding lesson plans,
insisting upon frequent classroom observations, and refusing to give
assistance to new teachers brought in by the Clinic.
3) Clinic staff attitudes. J
/
The Project Director had also asked at the library meeting, "Are
you doing the best job you possibly can?. Are kids really learning as
much as they should?" And when the teachers said "No," he asked "How
can we help?" This presumably was done to put the onus for change on the
teachers. But such shallow and transparent psychology was hardly enough
to convince teachers that the Clinic^as not coming to the school with
the already finished assumption that they (the teachers) were doing an
inadequate job. At the spring meeting, Clinic staff members acknowledged
none of their predispositions about JHS 57 and it's "bankrupt" educational
policy. It was precisely at this point that dialogue between the Clinic
and the teachers became nearly impossible.
.By refusing to admit they
felt the school was "bad," even "destructive," they insured that that
message would be communicated in countless other ways. By failing to
exorcise negative assumptions about the teachers, the subtle maneuver-
ing of the Clinic staff to reform JHS 57 was bound to produce open and
venomous resistance. To adopt a stance which condemns poor teaching is
certainly legitimate and probably would have caused, in the words of one
Cluster Coordinator, more "original hostility," but to adopt such a
stance without acknowledging it is almost certain to backfire. As it
happened. Clinic staff members sought to conceal their arrogance; but
their later reflections belie any claims to equanimity. One Cluster
Coordinator recalled: "The teachers didn’t want us around. What did
we come out there for, anyway? They were getting along alright. No-
body learned anything — but who cared?" Another said: "We just didn't
know how bad the teachers actually were." ^ A Clinic administrator ad-
mitted: "We had hypothesized that teacher-student relationships were
negative and punitive ^ Other Coordinators railed at teachers who, they
said, only wanted to hit and defeat and punish the students. It is not
surprising that many teachers felt harrassed and threatened by the in-
truders from N.Y.U.
li) Teachers never identified with the process of problem solving.
No doubt, there was some truth to the implicit accusations of
the Clinic staff. But this is not K,o suggest that all teachers at JHS
57 were tradition bound and inflexible and unimaginative. Teachers who
would not fit this description also rejected the decision making cap-
abilities of the Cluster for related, but different reasons. These
8U
teachers, in all but a few cases, rejected the Cluster because it never
was "their' s,“ it never was useful to then, and it was something over
vhich they had no control.
-I went to a couple meetings, saw that it
was nothing, and stopped going,” said one teacher? “The meetings had
almost no effect on me; I thought they were a waste of time,” recalled
another. For these teachers there was almost nothing to induce commit-
ment no special problems to solve, no responsibilities, no apparent
benefits to them or the school. The Cluster simply existed outside of
their sphere of interest.
Theoretical Implications
In the minds of the Clinic planners, reliance on proposition #1
stated above, involving teachers in decision making, was highly justi-
fied on a theoretical basis. As we have seen, their initial reliance
was undercut by their failure to recognize the implications of their de-
cision to adopt Clusters. Yet the Cluster could have served its intend-
* o
ed purposes — to elevate the knowledge and attitude levels of teachers
with regard to educational change. Involving teachers in the Clusters
did not have the intended consequences for the four reasons outlined
above: 1) failure to deliver promised resources, 2) organizational con-
flicts with school administrators, 3) Clinic staff attitudes, and U) no
teacher identification with the Clusters. In determining whether this
reflects an inadequacy of the proposition, or of the way it was used,
other research may be useful.
Gross et al (1971), in a case study of an education innovation,
rejects the view that subordinate participation is positively related to
O
\ \ t
successful implementation of innovations. After an extensive review of
the literature, Gross finds that
evidence to test the relative effectiveness of strate-
gies of initiation that stress participation in comparison
with other methods, for example, imposition from the top,
is not available. Most proponents of subordinate partici-
pation use as the basis for their advocacy of this approach
personal experience, logical argument, or the findings of
a few empirical studies, (p.26.)
Other literature points to the excessive extremes to which the principle
of subordinate participation can be extended, for example, allowing wage
earners to participate in determining overall organizational goals
(Leavitt, 1965; Herzberg, Mausner, Snyderman, 1959). Most of this dis-
sent, however, concerns the nature of the decisions on which employee
participation is solicited; there seems to be very widespread agreement
that employees should participate in some decisions which affect them,
although determining which decisions, and how, are subjects of some
controversy.
As outlined in Chapter 1 above, Bridges and Owens have suggested
three criteria for determing when a particular decision making process
should involve subordinates, a test for relevance, a test for expertise,
and a test for jurisdiction. According to Bridges a decision is "rele-
I K - . ^ ——’ —
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vant" to a teacher, and the teacher should be included in the decision
making processes, if the teacher has a "hjLgh personal stake" and concern
in it. The Cluster was designed to make all decisions about "What shall
be taught," and "Who shall teach what." It would appear that no decision
could be more relevant to a teacher than "what shall be taught" or "who
shall teach what." To try to reach decisions about these matters with-
out the participation of teachers would be clearly unwise. On the other
hand, the Cluster had very little legitimacy in the eyes of many teachers
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since they had had no hand in its design.' They could be fairly certain
that no decision would come from the Cluster which would adversely af-
fect them. Thus, it was not that the decisions weren't relevant, but
that for many teachers there were no decisions to be made; hence, the
Cluster itself was irrelevant.
Bridges uses a "test for expertise" to determine whether a de-
cision is "outside the scope of experience and sphere of competence."
It is likely that some teachers felt unsure of their ability to perform
tasks suggested by Cluster Coordinators. It is likely that some were
confused and uncertain about what the role of Cluster teacher would be.
Had innovations been imposed on teachers, no doubt many would have pro-
tested their inability to perform in new ways. But because the few de-
cisions which came from the Clusters were made by the teachers them-
selves, one must presume they felt competent, and experienced to deal
with the implications of the decision.
Owens has suggested as a third criteria a "test for jurisdiction,
that is, do the teachers have the requisite authority to implement their
decision. There is some cause to doubt whether the proposed decisions
met this test in JHS 57. We have already observed that one reason for
the failure of the Clusters was resistance from administrators who view-
ed them as an encroachment on the rules and regulations for which they
were responsible. Subject department chairmen were the administrators
least likely to willingly abide by curriculum and staff decisions that
came from the Clusters. For two reasons, however, we may suggest that
the Cluster arrangement did not totally fail to meet Owens' third crit-
eria. First, although department chairmen were resentful, there were
many potential areas of decision making which had only a small effect on
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the chairmen. Secondly, the Principal, especially i„ the early months,
was staunchly in support of the Clinic and impressed upon the staff
that Cluster decisions would, within the boundaries of legality, be <.
legitimate.
•
Based upon these three criteria one might predict that the
Cluster arrangement, though precarious, would not have been the sorry
failure that it was. Another widely reported but generally unheeded
study may help clarify this discrepancy. In I960, three researchers
tried to replicate the findings of the Coch and French study* by measur-
ing the effects of increased participation on workers' productivity in
a Norwegian shoe factory. (French, et al, i960.) Of nine four-man
work groups involved,
five experimental groups met with their foreman and
representatives of the planning department to plan.... Two
of the experimental groups held two additional meetings in
which they participated in deciding about the division of
labor into four jobs.... (etc.} (p.18.)
Results showed no difference in the productivity of the experimental
groups. To explain the apparent contradiction of the Coch and French
finding, the authors pointed to the "presence of relatively strong group
standards for the 'fair' or 'safe' level of production." The workers
reported they would "not risk going beyond a given level" of production
for fear that wage rates and benefits would be changed. Also, "the
Norwegian worker had a stronger tradition of being organized in a union
than had the workers in the American factory {of Coch and French} . This
in turn can produce an attitude that the legitimate pattern of partici-
pation is through union representatives rather than direct participation."
—
Note: See Chapter 1, p.13, above.
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(p.18.) In other words, due to certain unanticipated variables, workers
felt that increased production would have an overall detrimental effect
on their interests. The authors do not suggest that the theory of
employee participation needs revision, rather, “it is a theory that could
explain differing effects of participation among different cultures, among
different factories in the same culture, and among individuals in the same
factory."
Numerous authors have asserted that a big city public school
bureaucracy is bound and gagged by the fear of its employees to risk
reprimand by stepping outside of their assigned roles. (Katz, 1971; Fantini,
1970; Levin, 1970). David Rogers (1968), in 110 Livingston Street
,
per-
haps the best analysis of New York City, has blamed the "professional
bureaucracy" for the general stagnation of the system. "What's wrong with
the system," he quotes one Principal as saying, "is the teachers who won't
take any responsibility for trying anything new. The reason they won't do
so is that assistant principals, principals, and district superintendents
won't either, and this goes all the way up the chain of command." (p.279.)
In the environment of JHS 57, innovation in teaching and curriculum use
was not rewarded; "controD " was. Teachers who were committed to the
children and to their growth were not respected; teachers who could main-
tain silence in their classroom were. Department Chairmen who encouraged
their teachers to experiment were tolerated; those who collected lesson
plans were "hard working." This milieu may well have contributed to the
failure of the participation strategy of the Clinic for Learning. Re-
search would be needed to verify this hypotheses. But based on it, and
on the hypothesis of the Norwegian study that “group standards" obviated
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the effects of increased participation, a fourth criteria may be necessary
to determine whether participation would be beneficial: a test for environ-
ment. Roughly, this test should determine whether the subsystem in which
employees, i.e. teachers, operate is conducive to change; whether partici-
pation is valued; whether individual initiative is recognized as important;
and whether new ideas and new ways of operating are looked at warily by
those in power. It may well be that in an environment not conducive to
change, participation will have no effect on performance and may, as in the
case of JHS 57, work against the success of a change project.
Note: One instrument for assessing environment is the Organizational
Climate Description Questionnaire (OCDQ) developed by Andrew W. Halpin.
Unfortunately, this instrument has been used primarily for research pur-
poses, and less often to guide innovations. (See Halpin, 1963.)
^ Kenneth Blanchard and Paul Hersey, Management of Organizational
Behavior
.
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1971), p.161.
p
Interview, Cluster Coordinator 3, August 15, 1971.
3
Interview, Cluster Coordinator 1, July 23, 1971.
^Written Communication, Director of Evaluation, May 5, 1972.
'’interview, JHS 57 teacher 9, June 22, 1971.
^Interview, JHS 57 teacher 10, June 2, 1971.
Chapter 5
Proposition #2: Leadership behavior of outside change agents should be
high in relationship and low in task.
Leadership is vital to successful educational change. The
Clinic directors and Cluster Coordinators were to exercise the
kind of leadership defined by theorists of "organizational be-
havior and change" as being most appropriate for "change agents"
or "outside consultants," that is, high relationship, low task
behavior. The Clinic staff was uniformly ineffective in per-
forming their leadership tasks. Because in varying degrees they
lacked knowledge, experience, and insight they failed to "lead"
the teachers in the Clusters or the school administrators in
any real sense. This failure, however, may have been predict-
able from the beginning: the non-directive, facilitative style
of leadership employed by the Clinic staff, the only style
available to them as outsiders, was the style least likely to
have an impact on the regular JHS 57 teachers who required more
structured and directive leadership. Theoretical implications
of this conflict are considered.
A considerable amount of research has stressed the importance of
leadership in schools. Gross and Herriot (1965) found that Principals
who exhibited a high "Executive Professional Leadership" as determined
by teachers' responses to questions tended to correlate with higher
teacher morale, more professional behavior, and higher pupil achievement.
Herriot and St. John (1966) found that in lower socio-economic schools,
the Principal tended to have more impact on teachers' handling of prob-
lems of student discipline and school control. Other authors have
argued that leadership is the single most important factor in in imple-
menting successful change projects (Gross, et al, 1971). It is important
to note, however, that these and other studies concern only those within
\ \ % i
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a given organizational structure. In evaluating the performance of the
N.Y.U. Clinic for Learning, a more limited definition of leadership must
be construed to account for the fact that Clinic staff members held no
position within the heirarchy of the N.Y.C. School System. Whereas
the Principal of a school presumably has a full range of leadership pos-
tures available to him, the Clinic staff was forced to rely on a very
restricted kind of leadership behavior, one which insured their continued
, acceptance in the school, on the one hand, and which fostered innovations
in teaching, on the other.
There is widespread agreement among theorists about the leader-
ship objectives that the successful outside consultants must pursue
(Jung, 1967; Bennis, 1966; Sarason, 1971; Owens, 1970; Golembiewski
,
1970;
Argynis, 1971). Generally, these objectives can be grouped in four cate-
gories: 1) diagnosing, 2) building an environment conducive to change,
3) providing linkages between clients and outside resources, and !*)
facilitate setting of common goals.
1) Diagnosis: The most crucial job of an outside consultant
before he can exercise leadership is, in the phrase of Seymour Sarason,
to understand "the culture of the school." He must know which factors
keep the school in equilibrium, and maintain the balances of power, in-
fluence, and responsibility: he must recognize the relationship between
teachers and administrators, between teachers and students, and between
the internal school environment and extfcmcJ. pressures; he must decipher
group norms, peer relationships and pressures, the "modal," or normal
change processes which occur in the school, and make a rudimentary
"force-field analysis," cataloguing the positive and negative forces for
change. The task of diagnosis is never complete, and there are no final
'
rules as to what constitutes a competent diagnosis. Because so called
"change agents" are the chief purveyors and benefactors of intervention
theories which highlight the importance of diagnosing the client system,
they most often make this final determination themselves, with the ad-
vice of those who have sanctioned their presence — i.e., in schools,
administrators and principals.
2) Building an environment conducive to change: The emergence
of the role of outside consultant as facilitators has roughly paralleled
the growth since the late 19U0's of "T-Groups," or Training Groups.
T-Groups are small groups usually numbering no more than twelve, in which
the reluctance of the nominal leader to exercise leadership results in a
"leadership vacuum" in which participants are encouraged to explore
questions relating to their own behavior. Relying heavily on the tech-
nique of "feed-back," offering descriptive and non-evaluative comments
to another about his behavior patterns and its effects on others, a T-
Group is designed to facilitate personal and professional growth. In
the non-authoritarian, non-threatening environment of a T-Group, open-
ness, trusting, and sharing are highly valued, and pent-up feelings or
emotional blockages give way to more complete, and satisfying communica-
tion. The literature reveals that virtually all proponents of outside
change agents support if not its full techniques at least the goals of
the T-Group, that is, its supportive, open, democratic ambiance. In a
contrasting "closed" environment, "feedback" often becomes "criticism,"
trust is dangerous and ill-advised, and closely shielded emotions stifle
interpersonal communication. Change of any sort in such a setting is fraught
with risk; in an '"open" system, change agents believe, participants will
be more acceptant of new attitudes and behaviors.
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^3) Providing linkages with outside resources: Presumably,
change agents have a wide range of knowledge and experience which will
allow them to link clients, for example, teachers, to a multitude of
resources which alone they would have neither the time nor the inclina-
tion to seek out. Change agents can provide teachers with the products
of scientific research, with new materials, with direct contact with
"experts" in a given field, and with other teachers and administrators
in the same school who may have new ideas. In short, the change agent
can act as a connecting pin between the internal system and its surround-
ing environment.
4) Setting common goals: Depending on the client system, an
outside change agent will be called upon to assist in formulating change
objectives. In some cases, such as the new Math program reported by
Sarason ( 1 971 ) , the overall goals of the proposed innovation will have
been decided by higher administrators before a change agent is solici-
ted. In such a case, the change agent would be useful in devising sub-
goals to facilitate implementation. In other situations, such as the
one described by Fantini and Weinstein (1968), change agents are in-
strumental in specifying problem areas and determining which problems to
attack. In this latter situation, which roughly corresponds to the
Clinic for Learning, the central task of the group facilitator/change
agent is to lead his group to a consensus and a common commitment to
change
.
It is apparent here that none of the functions of an outside
•
.
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change agent are suggestive of a "high task" leadership style. Because
*See Chapter 1, p.17, for full definition.
of his role as an outsider, high task behaviors — defining roles and
responsibilities, establishing patterns of organization, directing sub-
ordinate involvement — are unavailable to the consultant. Indeed, the
"temporary social system" which the change agent- is seeking to build
stands at the antithesis of authoritarianism or directiveness in any
sense. Most theorists of planned organizational change fully recognize
that this lack of "position power," that is, formal power within the
organization, limits the behavior of the outside consultant. Bennis
(1961*) has written that "of the possible sources of power" available to
change agents, the most effective is "value power"
:
the ability to influence through representing and trans-
mitting values which are admired and desired by the client
system. . . . concern for our fellow man, experimental!sm, open-
ness and honesty, flexibility, cooperation, and democracy.
(p.36l.)
It is for this reason that strategies developed for change agents
stress interpersonal and human relations skills. Thus, change agents are
fiiost successful using a "high relationship" leadership style — stress-
-8-B*
ing personal relationships, socio-emotional support, mutual trust.
Presumably, given a modicum of credibility within an organization, the
change agent will be able to establish a "personal power" base by virtue
of his own expertise.
The intentions of the Clinic for Learning staff suggest an aware-
ness of the need for a high relationship and low task leadership style.***
The values listed by Bennis are precisely those espoused by the Clinic
See Chapter 1, pi 17, above for full definition.
See Chapter 1, pp.11*-l6, above for full explanation.
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staff. Despite some early disagreements, the staff pursued the leader-
ship behavior which appeared most likely to protect the fragile power
base upon which the Clinic for Learning rested. Directing and organiz-
ing almost nothing, they sought simply to engage the regular JHS 57
staff in a process of problem solving, whereby teachers would dictate
tasks to themselves. Based on the four objectives of leadership defined
above, how well did the Clinic staff fare?
1) Diagnosis: The complaint heard most frequently from regular
JHS ^7 teachers was that the Clinic staff did not "understand" the
school. They did not, said the teachers, recognize the absolute neces-
sity of strict discipline both in and out of the classroom; they refused
to give up ivory tower notions that "coerced learning" is somehow contra-
dictory; they showed little respect for the opinions of experienced teac-
hers and administrators. The Principal and his chief assistant shared
the conclusion that the Clinic failed to "take the school as it was."
"If you get people running it," said the Principal with reference to the
Clinic staff, "who haven't had any experience in education, suddenly
saying, 'You don't know what you're doing,' and 'This system you're
holding up has to be destroyed,' people say 'Wait a minute.' Because
this is their livlihood, and every man has a right to protect it." 1
Several of the Cluster Coordinators confirmed, with hindsight, that the
Clinic staff had failed to look closely enough at the reality of JHS 57.
Said one: "We didn't very clearly analyze the classroom teacher in the
school — what makes up the system she's in, what her problems are, her
investments are, her vested interests, commitment to the status quo,
what indoctrination she has had, how she has already had to conform to
2
the system because she's been there a couple of years." Another: "Our
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planning was rather extensive, however,.... we were primarily working and
talking about problems of students. Once the program began our main
problems were teachers' and administrators' resistance to any and all
of the innovations we had so diligently planned in the ivory towers of
N.Y.U." Another spoke in more personal terms: "I wasn't prepared for
the fact that an overwhelming number of seventh grade kids weren't even
functioning on a first grade level. I wasn't prepared for the absolute
depth of the problems. With hindsight, I look back and wonder why it
should have upset me . " ^ And, not surprisingly, the community was almost
unanimously in accord with its evaluation report finding that "The plan
for the Clinic was conceived by N.Y.U. personnel who had not taught in
Bedford-Stuyvesant and were not involved in Bedford-Stuyvesant community
affairs."^ The only man whom teachers and community considered to have
an adequate understanding of the school was the on-site Director the
second year of the Clinic. There were two crucial tenets which guided
him. First, he recognized that an inner city school made different de-
mands on teachers, administrators, and potential change agents. "You
have to know the needs of the community," he said later:
Black children need more of an authority figure in the
classroom. The majority of the Clinic staff was coming from
a white, middle class background, and they didn't have what
it takes. Sometimes it almost reauires you to subvert your
professionalism to meet the needs of the kids, (emphasis
added.
In other words, the educational theories do not always apply.
Given that the Clinic for Learning was trying ultimately to improve the
lot of the child, they did woefully little to comprehend his complex
world at JHS 57. As one teacher commented:
The kids, in Bedford-Stuyvesant are like kids no where
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else. The Clinic people had read a few books about "dis-
advantaged students," but when they came to 57, they didn'tknow anything.^
Without knowing the child, there was little hope for empathy or
understanding with teachers. Had they understood, it is very unlikely
they would have devised a change strategy based on a high relationship-
low task leadership style. In such a situation, the outsider without
power stands almost no chance of having an impact on the school. The
second belief that guided the second year Director was that change would
be small, it would not be "revolutionary," it would not be primed for
nationwide replication." In working with the system, he was willing to
accept the paramount goals and vested interests that supported it. Hav-
ing reached this basic accomodation, he was able to maneuver.
We did find some administrative running room. I did not
find regulations constantly binding. There were openings
that could be exploited. But they were small openings. The
big issues were not open.g
% c
By the time the second year Director arrived, the damage result-
ing from poor diagnosis had already been done. His experience and in-
sight could have almost no impact on the overall fate of the Clinic.
In short, five years after the demise of the Clinic for Learning,
the evidence apoears overwhelming that Clinic planners failed dismally
in diagnosing the school. This verdict, however, may not be sufficient.
Piecing together the events of the spring and summer of 1966 reveals that
a large number of respected, apparently responsible and competent men
and women did not share this conclusion of history. The Principal, who
presumably knew the school better than anyone, was exhuberant all during
the planning phases. The Dean of the N.Y.U. School of Education was
instrumental in finding funds for the Clinic, and although he held some
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reservations about the abilities of the Project Director based on his
experiences with Project APEX, the Doan did not counsel for "more com-
plete diagnosis" of the school. The officers at the Ford Foundation
went over the project proposal minutely; their presumption was that the
Clinic staff did understand the school sufficiently. Furthermore, all
of the Cluster Coordinators except one had taught at the secondary level;
four of them had taught black or Puerto Rican children; all but one of
them had on at least several occasions been in JHS 57 during the spring
of 1966. Finally, the amount of time which the Clinic staff spent plan-
ning ("8-10 hours a day") during the summer suggests they felt that any
deficiencies which existed in their diagnosis would not prove disastrous.
This is not to imply that the Clinic staff did, in fact, conduct
a satisfactory analysis of the school before entering it. Rather, it is
to point to the elusive nature of any "diagnosis"
; in retrospect, it
appears that change agents who "succeed" have diagnosed well, those who
^"fail" have not. Is "diagnose," then, more than just a convenient means
of explaining what has already happened? Certainly no responsible edu-
cator, like the members of the Clinic staff, would undertake a change
project knowing that he had conducted a "poor" diagnosis of the client
system; as with the "personality theory" outlined above,* "poor diagno-
sis" may be a too simple explanation of failure.
2) Building environment conducive to change: Proponents of
planned organizational change processes will argue that leading a
successful Training Group (T-Group) demands experience and skill. (Miles,
Note: See Introduction, p.7, above,
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1959: Bradford, Benne, Gibb, 1961*). The staff of the Clinic for Learn-
ing made no pretense of possessing such skills; indeed, there is little
indication they were even familiar with the concepts of the T-Group, or
of "group process," or even of "organizational change," as they are
commonly thought of. Yet the objectives which Cluster leaders sought
are similar to the objectives of an organizational change strategy
openness, information sharing, common involvement, team building, etc.
Whereas "professional" change agents or Training Group leaders would no
doubt scoff at the efforts of the unskilled Cluster leaders, other com-
mentators are more cautious. For example, Odiorne (1970) has written:
In the absence of any research evidence which demon-
strates that (T -Grouping) changes behavior, we are left
with nothing but anecdotal evidence and example drawn
from experience. This qualifies any number of people to
judge, (p.277.)
Skousen (1970) suggests that irreparable damage may be caused by T-Group
tampering with the possibly precarious emotional balance of participants.
;o
These authors would undoubtedly argue that the "skilled" T-Group leader
is no more valuable than the reasonably competent but "unskilled" leader
of any work group in a job setting. To the extent that they were sin-
cere, the Cluster leaders were behaving no differently than countless
scores of those in "helping relationships" before the "science" of organi-
zational change was born.
Again, this is not to absolve the Clinic staff, rather, to sug-
gest that their lack of interpersonal competence was not the decisive
factor in their inability to create an environment conducive to change.
At least two other reasons are critical. First, because they were
essentially uninvited by the regular teachers, the Cluster meeting be-
' \ • itM
came almost unavoidably a threatening experience. Because "improved
teaching behavior" was always an implicit goal of the Clinic for Learn-
ing, teachers implicitly defended themselves. A favorite defense was
labeling the Clinic "a waste of time." One teacher may have been
talking about himself when he said:
I think that for some teachers there was not that much
willingness to cooperate, because a lot of the ideas that
were being tossed around were old hat. They had been tried
already
.
^
1
Only the most self-assured and capable teachers, a very small percentage,
could use the Cluster as a resource; for the others it was simply another
source of embarrassment and irritation. One Cluster leader put it this
way:
A lot of teachers were put in a very difficult position...
The Clinic, with all its high ideals, placed teachers in a
position where they had to appear to be mercenary and some-
times pretty rotten people.^
That this conflict was never brought to light, in any of the Clusters,
foreclosed any chance of real collaboration. Secondly, the goal of an
^ open, trusting Cluster was anomalous in the closed, bureaucratic, hier-
archical ambiance of the school. It was not likely that teachers would
drop their guard for Cluster meetings when guarding was such a vital
part of their survival in dealings with students, department chairmen,
and top administrators. In the "survival environment" of the urban
classroom, humanitarian precepts often fall on deaf ears, (see, for ex-
ample, Gentry, et al, 1971).
3) Providing linkages: Virtually all of the teachers complained
that the Clinic for Learning reneged on its promise to mobilize the re-
sources of New York University. Nor did the teachers receive enough
new materials or "expert" advice to satisfy them. The administration
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and the community charged the Clinic with providing only unfulfilled
pledges and useless verbiage.
_
The evidence here is preponderantly
against the Clinio staff. Time and again, expectations were inflated
then crushed. Despite their early questioning of teachers, little actu-
al planning was done to determine what in fact teachers did need, and
could use in their classrooms. Valuable linkages with the external
environment were not provided. Nevertheless, damning commentary comes
mostly from those whom the Clinic failed, i.e., teachers, administrators
and community. The Project Director, on the other hand, recalls:
in tu
11 the p®°P?-e [Clinic staff) were experienced personnelin the public schools, in their field and in their profession.
,,t this moment I still would have no criticism of these people. 11
Although some "gave up" after no more than a month or two, all of the
Cluster leaders arrived at JHS 57 with a common resolve; to help make
the school a better place for students and teachers alike. The link-
ages they provided with outside resources proved to be inadequate, yet
they were experienced, professional people presumably doing their best.
The faulty, and very common, assumption they held was that good people,
working hard, improvising, innovating could succeed in changing a school
i
In fact, very extensive planning and coordination were required to pro-
vide adequate outside resources, and this was never done. The assistant
Principal, the chief liason between the school administration and the
Clinic, summed up the Clinic’s strategy:
I used to ask for reports, guidelines (from the Cluster
Coordinators}. They said, ,rWe can't plan in advance, we
take it as it happens." "Okay," I said, "What happened
last week?" "Well, we didn't take any notes."
^
k) Setting common goals: For all of the reasons cited above
there is little doubt that the Clinic for Learning staff was grossly
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unsuccessful in facilitating common goal setting among the teachers and
administrators in JHS 57. One focal consideration deserves repeating:
essentially, Clinic planners relied on the intrinsic motivation of JHS
57 teachers to provide the impetus for change in the Clusters. Aside
from this, there was nothing to encourage teacher involvement, nothing
to persuade teachers that replacing time worn but predictable behaviors
with new and uncertain ones was in any sense worth the effort. Because
intrinsic motivation often does not prosper in a chaotic survival environ-
ment, the Clinic and the school remained at odds. Far from becoming a
"process of problem solving," the Cluster arrangement became for most
teachers simply another problem.
Based on the, at best, ambivalent performance of the Clinic
.
staff in achieving the four objectives commonly associated with outside
change agents, a satisfactory explanation of the failure of the Clinic
can be fashioned. It would seem that no change project could withstand
the burdens of poor diagnosis, weak environment building, inadequate re-
/
sources, and undefined goals. And yet the hesitations of judgment above
indicate a reluctance to conclude on this note. Somehow, it seems as
if a team of even the most widely competent and professional change
agents, experts at diagnosis, environment building, etc., would have had
difficulty in JHS 57. Somehow, the above discussion does not seem to
tell the whole story.
In trying to describe leadership behavior, we have relied on the
two dimensions most commonly used by theorists of organizational
change —
task oriented behavior and relationship oriented behavior.
Blanchard
and Hersey (197.1) have suggested the need for a third
dimension, effect-
*See Chapter 1, p.17, above.
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iveness, to aid administrators in choosing an appropriate leadership
style. Relying on studies which conclude' there is no single "best”
a ership style, they argue that the only appropriate measurement of
leadership is its success in achieving defined goals. Rejecting the
widely held belief that high task-high relationship - called "team"
leadership by Blake and Mouton (196b) - is the best leadership style,
they postulate a "life cycle" theory which holds that leadership must
be dependent on subordinates' maturity levels that is, on the ability
and motivation of subordinates to act with independence and responsi-
bility and internal satisfaction. They argue that for very immature em-
ployees, those incapable of thinking and acting for themselves, high
task-low relationship style is most appropriate. As employees become
less dependent and more capable of independent activity, the measure of
task behavior will decrease while concern for relationship increases.
For highly motivated, highly competent people, a low task-low relation-
ship style is most appropriate. (See Table III.)
TABLE III
subordinates
maturity level: mature 4 ),
high 3
r
2
concern for relationship
l
j
V
low Jk 1\
low high
concern for task
immature
leadership
behavior
If, as we hypothesized in the previous chapter, it is true that
teachers in the New York City School System are rewarded not for teaching
?
9
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but for controlling students, and if the bureaucratic milieu is respon-
sible for the cautious and dependent behavior that seems to characterize
many teachers, and if most JHS 57 teachers had been struggling before
the Clinic to reach some sort of satisfactory accommodation to their
strenuous predicament as ghetto teachers, then according to Blanchard and
Hersey's schema the most appropriate style of administrative leadership
would tend toward high task-low relationship (Quadrant 1 above)
,
or per-
haps high task-high relationship (Quadrant 2) . In such an environment
a high relationship-low task leadership style (Quadrant 3) or a low re-
lationship-low task style (Quadrant U) will be misconstrued as "weak"
leadership and the increased freedoms for independent activity will be
abused. A useful analogy to illustrate this dynamic is found in the re-
lationship between students and teachers in inner city schools. Gerald
Levy (1970) has perceptively described the plight of the "liberal,"
"humanitarian, " hence, "high relationship" teacher in the ghetto school:
(jbey) are unprepared for the task assigned them. The
abstract morality of their suburban and academic past does
not prepare them for ghetto education. -Their assumption
that teaching will provide an arena for the expression of
their humanitarianism is severely tested by their initiation
into Midway's life. Destroyed by the children and forced to
fall back on the illiberal techniques they so despise many
experience the bankruptcy of their liberalism. (p.175»)
McMillan (1971), in an article written about JHS 57, has argued that "in
the beginning one must be the teacher that the children do respect —
the mean teacher — not only the teacher that they should respect — the
concerned, imaginative teacher." (p.65.) The point of both authors is
that a high relationship-low task teaching style will result in the
"destruction" of the teacher by the students. The only functional teacn-
ing style, then, is one which measures up to the students'
expectations
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of strict discipline and high task behavior. A similar argument can be
made about teacher expectations: their immersion in the system, among
other things, has lead them to rely on the strong bureaucratic and ad-
ministrative limits placed on their behavior; they are not generally
accustomed to responsibility and independence. Following Blanchard and
Horsey’ s argument, the only leadership style which will be successful is
one which corresponds to their level of maturity, that is, a high task
style
.
Theoretical Implications
This theoretical formulation, however, is designed to aid
persons
who hold legitimate positions within an organization, a
Principal, a de-
partment chairman, a teacher. We have seen that the
most appropriate
leadership style for the outside consultant, based on
the guidelines of
research which defines the role of the "change agent,"
is one which re-
lies he«?i^m^no»atic and humanitarian values. What, then,
is the
task of the outside consultant in a school
such as JHS 57 ? How does a
consultant exercise "value power" in an
organisation where democratic and
humanitarian value systems are rejected? On the
other hand, how does one
exercise high task leadership when he
has little authority to implement
any of his decisions?
A few of the Cluster Coordinators
felt that if they had it to
do over again," they would have
never done it. "The way we
had it
planned," said one, "there was no
way for it to work." Said
another:
4t we had examined the system and the
school, we wouldn't have used
the
Cluster." Yet notwithstanding
this pessimism, there were at
least two
avenues open for the Clinic
staff, two avenues open for
future consults
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teams in inner city schools: first, relying' heavily on the position power
of the Principal, and secondly, providing a very high level of technical
competence.
Position Power of the Principal
j
—
As we noted in Chapter Three above, a few of the Clinic staff
members felt that the original strategy of implementing an instructional
program, a direction eventually discarded by the majority of the Clinic
staff, would have been more successful. This would have required the
consistently strong administrative leadership of the Principal. The de-
cision to adopt Clusters was mandated by the Principal. But rather than
rely Pu**ther on administrative fiat to implement curriculum or scheduling
decisions, the Clinic for Learning both turned away, and was driven away.
It turned away for philosophical reasons, force and coercion were not
consistent with what they believed to be their more ethical value system.
In a very real sense they looked down on the JHS 57 staff for the timid
manner in which they submitted to and perpetuated the rigidly hierarchical
authority structure of "the school system. They were driven away, as we
have seen, by their failure to deliver the promised services and by their
i
refusal to compromise on even the most uninhibiting administrative re-
straints — for example, parent permission slips for student trips. By
not understanding, or accepting, that authority is the cornerstone of
bureaucracy, the Clinic stumbled helplessly into an inevitable series of
confrontations, first with teachers, then administrators, then parents.
Not recognizing the usefulness of administrative strength, and hypocriti-
cally rejecting the tactic of coercion, they foreclosed at least one
avenue that might have proved useful. For in the early days of the Clinic,
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the Principal, with the support of the District Superintendent, the
Superintendent of Schools, and the Board of Education, was unmistakably
and unequivocally a friend. The Clinic all but ignored what could have
been a most potent impetus for reform.
There is some evidence that Clinio planners at least recognized
this possibility in the early stages of planning. Early Clinic literature
suggests that each Cluster would vary according to the specific competen-
cies of the Coordinator. The Cluster Coordinator most in favor of the
direct implementation strategy lamented later, ” I thought the program we
came up with was going to be implemented strongly.” The assistant Prin-
cipal in charge of liason recalled, "At the beginning we got the impres-
sion that each Cluster Coordinator would come in with a definite plan in
mind for direction. But we never saw these guidelines." But as we have
seen, those advocating a "totally" collaborative change strategy were in
the majority and were eventually responsible for fashioning the Cluster
as the focus of the Clinic's low task-high relationship leadership style.
Finally, it is curious that all of the Clinic planners whom I
contacted have simply "forgotterf that Clusters had been unilaterally
imposed on teachers. Not a single Clinic staff member spoke to me of
this contradiction, in a direct way; indeed, most still believe that
they did everything possible to establish a democratic, collaborative
environment in which teachers could change themselves; that teachers
didn't change only proves further their ineptitude.
High Technical Competence
A second solution lies in the definition of "high task" leader-
ship. Blanchard and Hersey ( 1969 ) write: "In brief, task oriented
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behavior consists of structuring the relationship and activities in a
group situation in terras of task accomplishment." But this type of be-
havior is not available to an outsider, who must gain credibility by
offering values that are respected and rewarded in the organization.
The solution lies in broadening the definition of "task" behavior to in-
clude highly skilled and/or highly technical behavior of the kind re-
spected by subordinates. Stuart-Kotze (1972) has developed this thesis
by suggesting that for immature employees effective leaders will not only
have to "plan, control, design, etc." but exhibit a high level of "techni-
cal competence." In an educational change setting, "technically compe-
tent behavior" is of a kind which teachers will both respect and seek to
emulate. JHS 57 teachers, as practitioners, had strong opinions about
what would and would not work in their classrooms; as noted above, there
is little doubt they would have graciously adopted techniques they felt
would result in higher reading and math scores for their children. Simi-
larly, they would be immediately grateful for any added resources or
materials that would make their jobs easier. Had the Clinic been able
to produce on their promises of psychological and legal assistance, had
they come to the school loaded with materials that teachers could use,
even something as simple as mimeographed worksheets, if real "experts"
who knew how to teach in a black and Puerto Rican school had accompanied
the Clinic, thj.t is, had they performed in a technically competent manner,
and had the resultant benefits continued for a sufficient length of time,
then it is likely that a climate of change would have developed in which
teachers would have been more receptive to the leadership behavior
of an
outside consultant.
High technical competence leadership will have two major effects.
First, it will help provide an environment in which high concern for
relationships will be valued by subordinates; once consultants have, in
a sense, "proved" themselves to subordinates, their highly affective and
humane styles are not so likely to be judged "wishy-washy" or "impracti-
cal." Secondly, technically competent behavior can provide a certain
cushion of credibility for consultants which will allow them to exercise
a high task
-high relationship leadership. Immature employees are far more
likely to take orders from someone who has "done them a favor," than from
someone who has only promised to do so.
The efforts of the Clinic for Learning staff to exercise techni-
cally competent leadership were unsuccessful. Not only did the Clinic
staff not possess the kind of competencies that would have benefitted
teachers, they were dismally incapable of mobilizing the skills that were
available — experts from New York University, abundant written and audio-
visual materials, and above all, experienced teachers and administrators.
Clinic planners had been well aware that gaining teachers' support would
demand some kind of new reward system; the total inadequacy of what they
provided is only another indication of their cursory understanding of
teacher needs
.
During the second year of the Clinic there was one dynamic and
successful example of technically competent leadership. A Social Studies
"expert" from N.Y.U. who had little to do with the Clinic was in charge
of supervising several undergraduate student teachers. One was assigned
to an eighth grade class in which the regular teacher had "given up"
because the class was in perpetual and uncontrollable bedlam. The student
o
teacher came to the expert desperate and in tears and asked for help.
The expert replied:
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stuff l? ’u
you don,t agree a lot of
^5 because you think it's kind of reaction-ary, and fascist, but you've tried your thing and it'sf
?
Lle
+^
S° tlT mine * 1 told her not to balk to any kids
lv +
lnt° the r°°m this meant being unfriend-
u
her
x’”
because y°u lose your class that way... Itoid her to prepare written work... I told her even if
she got into a good discussion about something to go onto the next p ast of the lesson.
The students came in, she silently waved them away from the desk, gave
them the written work, proceeded briskly through the lesson, and the
bell rang without so much as a raised voice. "The cooperating teacher
is sitting in the back telling me he doesn't believe it," said the
expert later. Soon after this incident, regular teachers began seek-
ing him out, teachers who hated the Clinic and everything about it, to
ask his advice. As one of the Clinic staff members reflected: "He
was the only one that came up with anything meaningful for the new
teachers. But by then it was too late." 1 ^ This was the kind of
c
immediate help that might have launched the Clinic for Learning, but
when it came the Clinic was effectively over.
^Interview, Principal, July l£, 1971.
2
Interview, Cluster Coordinator 1, July 23, 1971.
^Written Communication, Cluster Coordinator 2, August 3, 1971.
1 •
^Interview, Cluster Coordinator 2, August 3, 1971.
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Community Paper, "Report of the Community Committee,"
February 8, 1968.
^Interview, On-Site Clinic Director, 1967-68, October 15
8
Interview, JHS 57 teacher 5, June 13 , 1971 .
i
Interview, On-Site Clinic Director, 1967-68, October 15
Interview, JHS 57 teacher 6, June 17, 1971.
10
.
Interview, Cluster Coordinator 3, August 5, 1971.
11
Interview, Project Director, July 16, 1971.
12
Interview, Assistant Principal, June 25, 1971.
13
Interview, N.Y.U. Professor, November 1, 1971.
^Interview, Clinic teacher, August 28, 1971.
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Chapter 6
Proposition #3: Parents and community groups in inner cities must be
given broader opportunity to participate in the life
of the public school.
Proposition #3a: The Clinic for Learning could act as a catalyst for
increased involvement by parents and community.
».
^ $7 is a failing institution. Historicallv, the failure
of efforts to improve education for ‘'disadvantaged" students
has led to sporadic attempts by black and Puerto Rican parents
to exercise more control over the public school. The community
development plan of the Clinic for Learning was of low priority
in 1966, but in 1968, parent and community reaction had brought
it to center stage. The issues surrounding the Clinic's
attempts to catalyze the community are complex, and are best
seen through the eyes and experiences of the two community
agents from the community. The majority of parents were "tradi-
tionalists" and reacted negatively to the Clinic, as did one
community agent. A small but growing percentage backed the
3^8 attacked the school administration, as did the other.
The film, "The Wav It Is," highlighted even more the split in
community reaction. Though there is a lack of data to determine
whether the limited community participation the Clinic evoked
benefitted the school, certain directions can be discerned.
Background
In JHS 57, where in 1965 students ranked one hundred and four in
reading achievement out of one hundred and eight New York City junior
high schools, only about two-thirds of the students entering the seventh
grade finish the ninth grade; thus, the seventeen seventh grade classes
in September, 1966, became only twelve ninth grade classes in June, 1969*
Of these, approximately one-third graduated from the ninth grade with an
academic diploma, signifying that they had scored over a seventh grade
level in reading and word comprehension. Based on Board of Education
statistics, it is likely that no more than half of this number ever
finished high school, and probably no more than half again received aca-
demic diplomas. Thus, given a class of six hundred fifty seventh graders,
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no more than four hundred fifty are likely to graduate from ninth grade,
and only about two hundred will graduate with academic diplomas. Of
these two hundred, about one
-hundred will finish high school, and maybe
fifty, at best, will receive academic diplomas. In short, roughly twelve
out of every thirteen seventh grade students in some black and/or Puerto
Rican schools in New York City, that is, as many as ninety percent of
them, will not successfully navigate the public school course, (see
It was not until the late 19^0' s and early 1960's that the plight
of the "culturally disadvantaged child" came into vogue among liberal
white educators. Some professional educators focused on the child and
his cultural milieu; the child's inability was alternately blamed on
"sensory deprivation," language patterns in the home, value differences,
social deprivation, poverty, and a host of other environmentalist ex-
planations. At the same time, an increasing number of liberal educators
began to discern failings in the curriculum; observers became aware of
the implicit presence of "middle class values" in most public school
curriculums, and this was posited as the reason why lower class black
children were unable to achieve at rates similar to whites. More recent-
ly the argument that insensitive, racist, incompetent, middle class
teachers are responsible for black and Puerto Rican underachievement has
gained wide support. But the attacks are usually anecdotal, highly sub-
jective and personally vituperative, and do little to improve the quali-
ty of teaching.
disadvantaged children, some researchers turned back to the child himself,
Brooklyn Educ. Task Force, 1970).
/
As if in desperation to explain the "failure" of millions of
See Chapter 1, pp. 25-28, above.
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and found that it was he himself, genetically, who was inferior. A few
joined the ranks of Jensen (1969) in arguing that heredity not environ-
ment was at the heart of the dilemma, but far more continued to apply
and reapply the old theorems of cultural or curricular or teacher dis-
advantage. In all, the problems of minority education continued unabated;
urban public schools continued to turn out negligible percentages of stu-
dents who are equipped, in the traditional sense, to become productive
members of the economy, especially in light of the fact that education
is being used increasingly by employers as a basis of preliminary selec-
tion for skilled and even unskilled jobs. (For example, to become a
sanitation worker in New York City requires a high school diploma.)
As we have seen, a new thrust for educational reform emerged in
the middle and late 1960's to challenge the seemingly hopeless prescrip-
tions of the professional educators. The movement for "community con-
trol" — defined here as the efforts of predominantly black and Puerto
/ Rican parents to have a larger voice in the education of their children —
was the last desperate attempt to make public education truly a means of
upward social mobility, and make minority children competitive on the
job market with white children. Had "compensatory education" succeeded
in this goal, had "relevant curriculums" raised reading scores, had a
"humanization of teachers" ever become a reality, then it is quite un-
likely that coriimunity control would have been born. But given the al-
most complete powerlessness of inner city parents in dealing with huge
centralized educational bureaucracies, which determine from their central
*See Chapter 1, pp. 21-23, above.
Loffices all matters of hiring, firing, promotions, curriculum, scheduling,
standards of success, expenditures, etc, it is not difficult to Justify
their rancor.
"Community control" may not be the answer to ghetto education
either. Even in New York City where a decentralization law has now em-
powered thirty-one Community School Boards to act in certain matters of
school governance, a loud dialogue continues over its effectiveness.
Fantini and Gittel, two strong advocates of community participation in
the public schools, admit that community control “can hardly be considered
a full-fledged movement" (Fantini, et al, 1970, p.228); while respected
detractors argue that it "can only promise future conflicts, continued
and cumulative inferiority, and ultimate national disaster" (Pfautz, 1970,
p.39)» Although it is true that parents in smaller communities through-
out the country have always controlled the schools, it does not necessar-
ily follow that all big city bureaucracies are incapable of providing
/ quality education. Although conventional solutions to the problems of
educating the "disadvantaged" have demonstrated no instant success,
there is no suggestion that the conventional wisdom is bankrupt. Never-
theless, the glaring truth that white educators have been unable to
educate black and Puerto Rican younsters remains intact, and regardless
of who is to blame, some black and Puerto Rican parents have announced
to the nation that they want to try it themselves.
The Clinic for Learning provides a unique vantage point for ob-
serving this interaction between a public school and an inner city com-
munity. In a single school, we can view this transitional phase of edu-
cational reform, when certain segments of an inner city community began
to lose faith in the conventional cures and began struggling to fashion
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their own. This process is occurring throughout the country in the
1970 s and will no doubt continue until community control succeeds, or
until it is proven hollow. Countless change projects since 1968 have
reflected the Clinic's concern with providing access for control to
parents and communities, and the Clinic for Learning may rightly be con-
sidered a forerunner in this regard. Looking to the past, they chose a
mixture of conventional "solutions" which together they hoped would
affect the students -- they subscribed wholeheartedly to theories of
cultural deprivation; they argued for revised curriculums; they insisted
on close human interaction between teachers and students. Finally,
grappling with the avant garde, they advanced a program of community in-
volvement. Their efforts to involve the community in 1966 were not of
very high priority. Yet, in the two years from 1966 to 1968, parents
of JHS ^7 students, like minority parents throughout New York City be-
gan to reexamine public school failure. They reviewed the deplorable
record of defeat of past educational reform, and more and more of them
came to see the problem not in terms of curriculum or reading scores
but in terms of control . Coming as it did in this critical period of
transition, the Clinic for Learning exerted a far larger effect on the
community than its efforts warranted. Almost unwittingly, the Clinic
played a vital role in the emergence of an active community voice among
the parents of JHS 57 students.
Two questions form the heart of our inquiry into the Clinic's
attempts to build a community school. Neither purport to carry the same
scientific weight as the more theoretical approaches used in previous
chapters; yet both are broad enough to encompass certain societal
vari-
ables crucial to a full understanding. First, how
effective was the
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Clinic for Learning in achieving its avowed goal of creating a viable
school-community
"partnership"? And secondly, to what extent did com-
munity participation benefit the school? The first question is answer-
able in this study. Though the survey of parents and students herein
was small, certain firm conclusions can be reached. We will view this
question by way of the two most significant aspects of the Clinic which
affected the community, that is, the community agents and the film. The
second question is only approachable here, and we must respond to it
cautiously
,
recognizing that it touches upon far broader questions of
social policy than can be dealt with here.
1) How effective was the Clinic in creating a viable "school-
community partnership"?
Community Agents
The principle means of seeking community involvement was through
the community agents. As we have seen, the original agents were neither
• \c
knowledgeable nor experienced in black communities, and during the first
months of the Clinic, the community knew little or nothing about its
activities in JHS 57.* Both community agents were described by a number
of community residents as "sincere," but because they were white their
forays into the community often met with resistance and mistrust. Be-
cause there had been no effort by the Clinic to involve the community in
planning the Clinic program, because there had been no attempt to pub-
licize the arrival of the $1*50,000 change project in the community, and
because the great majority of parents were as estranged from the schools
See Chapter pp.52-5U, above.
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as their children, the community agents appeared as an unwelcome exten-
sion of the school. Community agents were authorized to offer the parents
no more than the school itself could offer, that is, Parent Teachers
Association meetings, visits with teachers, observation in classrooms,
i
special school
-community events, etc. Increased community participation
in these areas would have benefitted the school, but over a short period
of time, with culturally alien community agents, it was not at all like-
ly to happen.
A first major breakthrough in the community development program
occurred with the hiring of the Local School Board Chairman^ and the
neighboring parent with children in Queens as community agents in the
late fall of 1966. Each remained on the staff of the Clinic for Learning
for the next year and a half, until June, 1968; each performed the cen-
tral tasks of a community agent as directed by the Clinic directors,
that is, visiting parents, encouraging PTA membership, following up dis-
y cipline problems, etc.: and, most importantly, each in an almost com-
pletely different way was responsible for the failure of the Clinic’s
community development program. Although it is impossible given the
limitations of research to accurately measure the response of parents
and community to the Clinic, we can focus on the polarity and intensity
of response by looking closely at these two community agents. Each
represented a different pole, had different followers, and each tried
to influence the Clinic, the community, and the school in different
**Note: The Local School Board in 1966 was a purely advisory
community body. It was replaced in 1969 by a. Com-
munity School Board with limited but substantive
powers
.
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directions. Contemporary conflicts between community groups are finely
drawn between these two.
The School Board Chairman was a seasoned "school person"; she
was familiar with the administrative restraints', the procedural regula-
tions, and countless rules that kept the public school system running.
Even before she became a community agent, she had asked one of the
Cluster Coordinators how any new curriculum suggested by the Clinic staff
would correspond with the mandatory city-wide examinations. She was
stunned to hear the response: "What city-wide examinations?" In the
first weeks of the Clinic, Cluster Coordinators planned student trips
without approval from the district office and without parent permission
slips. "I hit the ceiling," she recalled later. She was furious at the
Clinic practise of letting children leave regularly assigned classes to
go to Room 103, and it was clear to her that the "missionary" mentality
of the Clinic staff, steeped in the rhetoric of humanism, was totally
incapable of teaching black and Puerto Rican children. On a tour of the
school with Ford Foundation officials, she protested the use of an under-
ground newspaper with unsavory language in a Clinic classroom. She be-
came an active member of the community Advisory Board, and came to feel
that her dual role as community agent and community resident was vital
in keep ing the community informed. Although she remained on the Clinic
staff until the end, her ire was almost always focused on her N.Y.U.
superiors and almost never on the school administration. To this extent
she became an ally of the Principal, the District Superintendent, and the
Board of Education.^
Two of her most trusted confidants were the Vice Chairman of the
Local School Board and the District Superintendent's School-Community
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Coordinator. Both of these women also had vested interests in the stable
functioning of JHS 57, and both were sympathetic to the Principal. From
their point of view, the Clinic staff was grossly ignorant about the
New York City Public School System and grossly incapable of helping JHS
57 function as it was intended to function. The School
-Community Coordi-
nator commented on the Project Director of the Clinic:
He was a maverick and liked to do things in a maverick way.
».
However, there are certain things, like contracts and kids and
bureaucracy
,
which are going to do in any maverick. He just
didn't know how to work within a school situation.
^
Because these three women held established positions in the educational
system, they had easy access to parents and the community at large. No
one accused them of sabotaging the Clinic, and certainly they were ada-
mant about improving education, but even the most neutral communication
about the Clinic was bound to raise the hackles of large numbers of
parents. For, with few exceptions, the parents of JHS 57 students are
educational "traditionalists." School, they will argue, is a place to
learn; children are in school to be educated; teachers are in school to
teach: everything else is secondary. Contrary to certain theories of
"cultural disadvantage," black and Puerto Rican parents place a high pri-
!
ority on education and view success in school as one of the few avail-
able avenues for upward social mobility. (See Glazer and Moynihan,
1963.) The parents at JHS 57 were interested in higher reading scores,
not "improved self-concept" for their children; to get into high school
children had to take statewide Math and History and Science examinations,
not list the number of culturally enriching trips they had taken. Tales
of "permissiveness" that reached many parents evoked doubt and skepticism
^ 1 % <*»•
in some, anger and resentment in others. "We were being experimented with
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again," said one hostile parent. "They should go back where they came
from." Almost before they were settled, the Clinic for Learning staff
was hearing this kind of reproach from the community. To be sure, the
Local School Board Chairman, aided by the Vice-Chairman and the School-
Community Coordinator, provided a communications link between the Clinic
and the community, but given the Clinic's insensitivity to the educa-
tional conservatism of many parents, given its hiring of two white, in-
*
experienced, non
-community residents as community agents, and given the
"subtly authoritarian" manner in which Clinic plans were introduced
without so much as informing community groups, it became progressively
more difficult, indeed impossible, for the Clinic to win significant
community support. The Clinic, in this light, became the enemy of the
community much as it became the enemy of the school. The reaction of a
great number of parents and community residents was well stated in the
Community Evaluation Report in February, 1968:
The Clinic for Learning was brought in without the knowledge
of the community or the Parent's Association. The community was
not involved in the organization or the selection of personnel
for the Clinic . . . there was no orientation for the staff of
Junior High School 5>7. The Clinic staff was likewise not orient-
ed to its function. The students were not aware that the Clinic
was coming into the school. As a result they did not know the
role the Clinic would play or their roles as students. The
plan for the Clinic was conceived by NTU personnel who had not
taught in Bedford-Stuvvesant and were not involved in Bedford-
Stuyvesant community affairs.^
From this community point of view, the Clinic program was a gross and
total mistake.
The other community agent — with children in school in Queens
together with the most active original community agent came to exercise
a ouite different though much more limited effect on the community.
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While struggling to connect the Clinic for Learning and the community,
they grew to feel that the school itself was the crucial barrier. Par-
ents, they argued, had no idea of the chaos and confusion that had lacer-
ated JHS £7 since long before the Clinic had arrived, and which would
continue long after the Clinic had left. "Parents," said the original
community agent, "wanted their children educated They didn’t know the
only object of the school was control.... There was no way for the com-
munity interest to come in line with the school's interests. The school
didn t give a s about the kids."^ The other community agent (with
children) was always sympathetic to the travails of the Project Director
and the Clinic staff; the failure of the Clinic, she observed, was not
due as much to Clinic incompetence as to the inability of the Principal
to change. She said that the Clinic for Learning was simply two years
of "quiet harrassment" of the Principal. "He just didn't have it," she
said later. "He couldn't take the criticism and he didn't know how to
handle {the Project Director)."'’ Her communications with the parents
and community had a decidedly different ring than those of the School
Board Chairman. She sought to rally the community in defense of the
children, in support of the Clinic, in opposition to the school. It was
clear to her that the Clinic staff was not overly aware or experienced,
but they were trying to make JHS £7 a better place and they were laying
blame in it3 proper place — at the feet of *he school administration and
teachers. At times she felt even the Clinic was too timid. During the
second year she berated the on-site Director for not confronting the
administration more forcefully; at one point, she was "fired" by the
Project Director and the Principal, then reinstated. Above all, she con-
tinually demanded that the school be held accountable for the children's
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failure
.
It would be difficult to overstate the split between these two
community agents, the School Board Chairman and the neighborhood resident,
one a respected member of the established education leadership elite and
the other a vocal and vitriolic newcomer. Their responses to the de-
parture of the Clinic in June, 1968, highlight the divergence again. The
School Board Chairman who with many parents and community groups argued
for the end of the Clinic said:
The most important thing at the end of the Clinic was
when the Superintendent of Schools promised in a meeting
with the Project Director and the Dean of the N.Y.U. School
of Education that no project would ever be allowed to come
into our district without first getting the permission of
the Local School Board./;
o
In terms of traditional alignments, this agreement granted the local school
board slightly more power vis a vis the school administration, and in a
traditional sense, it was a victory. But it would not be far-fetched
to argue that in terms of student learning the power to halt another "Clinic
for Learning" is really no power at all: with or without the Clinic, the
school fails far too many students. The other community agent, with scant
prior experience in education "cried when the Clinic left." The struggle
for real community influence in the school had begun, in her mind, and
she was heartbroken. "The school and the Clinic became enemies," she
said. And the only way for parents to make the school change was to ally
with the Clinic and force it to change. "But some parents wouldn't fight
hard enough. They couldn't handle the power situation; it was too polit-
ical." She was frustrated by what she saw as the innocence t and intransi-
gence of the parents, and she saw many of them closing ranks around the
Principal. The parents, like the Principal, were "not to the point of
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using negative commentary for positive use."^ Not surprisingly, her
views found more support among outspoken leaders of the Bedford-Stuyve-
c
sant than among traditionalist parents.
The Film vs. The Community
The airing of the film, "The Way It Is," was the second major
event in the Clinic's community development effort. Predictably, the re-
' sponse of the School Board Chairman and the school administration, on the
one hand, and the community agent (with children in Queens) and the Clinic
staff on the other, were almost diametrically at odds. The School Board
Chairman thought the film was "disastrous"; "no one from the community,
no parents, no students were allowed to see the movie before it was shown
nationwide," she said. She, and a great majority of parents and students
reacted strongly to the film's racist overtones. At a special School
Board meeting called at JHS 57 after the showing of the film, angry stu-
dents were the main speakers; they told how many scenes of classroom dis-
ruption had been staged for the camera, how two girls had been picked
especially to sing as they walked the hallway, and how filmed scenes
with well behaved students and competent teachers had been cut. At
I
least ten students wrote letters to the film's producer. One wrote:
"if people saw' the film they will say I will never take my child to
O
that school." Another: "I like the film a little bit. But it was a
o
disgrace to the community." Another: "I think that they should have
shown the good part of the film so we won't have something to be ashamed
of."
10
The PTA President was eoually appalled: "I just can't believe
that these children weren't deliberately encouraged to run up and down
the hall and scream."
12U
The Principal of the school and his chief assistant were eager
to join the chorus of nays. They agreed that the film was an affront
c
to the school and community, and they viewed it as part of the overall
design to discredit the "entrenched" administration. But this
outward response did not fully reveal the complex effects of the film on
the school administration. The Principal especially felt the salve of
sympathy from those who admired his "front line" service. The wife of
the film producer remembers that the Principal's wife turned to him
after a private screening of the film and said, with understanding, "So
this is what you have to go through." At a White House Conference on
Education, where the film was first shown to an assemblage of nation-
ally recognized educators, the Principal, who was the only practising
school administrator in attendance, received bounteous praise for his
dedication in the face of staggering odds. "This is the way it is,"
implored the Principal. "Yes," the liberal educators agreed, "It is
a desperate situation."
The other community agent, and a very few parents and students,
recognized that the film, though staged and one-sided and derogatory,
|
was very much closer to being "the way it is" than most parents or com-
munity residents cared to admit. "That film made the community mad as
hell," said the community agent. "But it was the truth." The community
agent asked the film producer and his wife to come to the school to
persuade angry parents that the film was a documentary not a criticism
of the school. One insightful student feared the awakening of parents:
"I didn’t like the film," she wrote to its producer, "because the children's
13
parents think that their children are good in school." A staunch PTA
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member felt it was time for the parents to "wake up." The movie "let
everyone know things they never knew." 1 ^
The Clinic staff bathed in some of the same ointment as the Prin-
cipal. All of the Cluster Coordinators and Clinic directors were in
Washington for the first screening of the film (a fact which made the
Principal and the School Board Chairman furious), and they accepted the
condolences from the professional educators about their "impossible sit-
uation
. By this time, the spring of 1967, the Clinic program had been
thoroughly demoralized and the staff found it easy to agree that the
inevitably desperate and hopeless plight of the ghetto had been the cause
of their defeat.
Without trying to oversimplify, we will hazard a few clarifying
generalizations about the film's effects. It angered one community
agent while it opened the way to higher social awareness for another.
The greater majority of parents saw the "truth" of the movie as an
attack on them; the majority of Clinic staff saw its truth as a vindi-
cation of their efforts. The school administration capitalized on the
adverse community reaction by further damning the Clinic. One community
agent tried to convince parents that the film was accurate; most parents
refused to believe it. In these conflicts it is difficult to speak of
rightness or wrongness or virtue or blame. Some, like one of the origi-
nal community agents, felt "the movie did more to perpetuate the myth of
black inferiority" than any event in the Clinic.^ Others, like the
Assistant Principal and many Clinic staff members (who continue to use
the film in classes for teacher preparation) argue that it "is a great
training film; it shows what can happen. There is truth in each
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position; the film is "good" and "bad"; and every interest group can
find justification in its stance. Like many controversial things, the
viewer's response will almost certainly be more a function of his social
and political interests than of his abstract appreciation. In this case,
the central social and political fact was the very loud and very nega-
tive reaction of a very large number of parents and community residents.
'1967-68, The Second Year of the Clinic
At the end of the first year, the Clinic for Learning had almost
no support among parents. Many parents and students spoke of feeling
"used" by the Clinic, especially after the film. But the following year
saw a small though perceptible shift in community feelings. The film had
aroused parents and community, and for better or worse, they knew more
about the school than they had the year before. By the time the Clinic
was driven out, the school had come into the spotlight of community con-
cern. Whereas the heavy preponderance of community sentiment during the
first year of the Clinic supported the School Board Chairman, more and
more interested parents and community residents gradually shook off the
shameful aftertaste of the film and began to follow the lead of the com-
munity agent who demanded accountability of the school officials. All
of the officers of the PTA (most often referred to simply as the "Parents
Association") finally applauded the efforts of the Clinic for Learning.
"Discipline is better now," the President was quoted as saying during the
second year, "Children are more relaxed, more attentive. They can com-
municate. It's a great improvement."^ The treasurer wrote later, "I
J8
think the Clinic for Learning was the best thing for JHS 57 ever.
The large number of parents of children who attended the P.A.C.E.
program
summer of 1967 had unanimously favored continuation of the program
for another summer, 19 and they were hesitant to believe that the Clinic
for Learning was not sincere in its efforts to help the school. In addi-
tion, a brief teachers union strike in the fall of 1967 over issues of
community control in the nearby OceanHill
-Brownsville district provided
ammunition for community agitation. Though the brunt of the community
evaluation of February, 1968 was anti
-Clinic, there were some subtle but
suggestive anti-school remarks as well; for example, "Parents have no
respect for teachers." (p.3.) The pro-Clinic community agent along with
radical members of the Bedford-Stuyvesant community sought to highlight
the Clinic's failure as being the result of an insensitive, unresponsive
public school bureaucracy.
Nevertheless, despite these enclaves of support, this more
agressive community stance never had a very large following among the
two to three thousand parents of JHS 57 students. Their traditional
alienation from the public school, their often unqualified respect for
"the teacher," and their own lack of academic skills left most parents
reluctant to begin "demanding" accountability. To this extent, the Clinic
for Learning failed to build a viable relationship with the community. On
the other hand, the activities of the Clinic did result in a significant-
ly larger participation by parents in school affairs; the primary "affair"
was eliminating the Clinic. But this was decidedly not the kind of
school community partnership Clinic planners had originally in mind. They
had no scheme to join the school and the community at their own expense,
and to this extent as well their plans for a school community alliance
were thwarted.
% * *
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Finally, we must note that the explanation for the failure of
the Clinic's community program does not reside solely in the implemen-
tation stage. Despite the unqualified original community agents, de-
spite the ignorance of Clinic staff about parental concerns, and despite
the offensive effects of the film, there is evidence that the failure
was due to the naively articulated and shallow liberalism that guided
the original project planners. The original project proposal stated:
i
The parents of disadvantaged children and the urban
communities in which they live clearly need more attention
from the school than they now receive. The staff feels
that only substantial increases in school personnel, in a
kind of "saturation" program, can provide this needed atten-
tion.
20
As conceived, the Clinic staff, not the school staff, would minister to
the community; the Clinic teachers, not the regular teachers, would
reach out to parents. In conception, the community development compo-
nent of the Clinic was designed not to coalesce the school and the com-
munity, but to drive the Clinic as a wedge between them. It was simply
assumed by Clinic planners that the community would become an ally.
Though they had little more to offer than "concern," Clinic planners
I
felt assured that the "parents of disadvantaged children" would be grate-
ful. Parents were given little credit for being able to determine what
would and would not benefit them. Clinic planners failed to realize
that "concern," or "attention," by itself, was not nearly enough. In a
sense. Clinic planners saw their mission in terms of educating parents,
as well as students, and they sought naively to hide the obvious pre-
sumptions that lay behind their plans: that is, that parents were not
"educated," did not know a3 much as the Clinic staff, did not understand
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why their children were failing in school, and that they would be better
off if they adopted the ideas of the Clinic for Learning. Again, here,
we reach the edge of racism.
Not only did Clinic planners underestimate both the wisdom and
the strength of parents, they nearly overlooked the power of the school
to rally itself under attack. They seemed to assume that the school
would be happy to change in the directions outlined by the Clinic. But
the school had no real intention of changing. As a result, the Clinic
for Learning was the "odd man out"
; the community, realizing that the
^ a<:* nothing substantive to offer them and seeing their ineffect-
iveness with the children, became an enemy; the school, with no interest
in granting the community power over any matters of school goverance, was
eager to encourage community flailing of the Clinic. Looking closely
at the original design of Clinic planners, it all seems quite predic-
table .
2) Did community participation benefit the school?
Although the Clinic for Learning was totally inept in building
the kind of community-school bond they had intended, their efforts aroused
a storm of controversy among parents and residents of Beford-Stuyvesant.
The film brought JHS £7 an unprecendented degree of notoriety. In the
process, a large number of parents came to the defense of the school ad-
ministration. Far more parents and community residents began to view the
school with increased interest. This parent and community response was
not foreseen by either the Clinic or the school administration, and it
would be difficult to argue, that the Clinic succeeded in spite of itself.
Nevertheless, in broad terms, the Clinic for Learning did result in more
— i
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community participation in the school. Most parents and community peo-
ple were glad to see the Clinic go; a few grieved; but, in all, a rela-
tively large number of people were involved.
• # •
There is little evidence to suggest that this kind of increased
community participation benefitted the school in any measurable ways.
Reading scores did not improve; attendance remained the same; suspensions
.remained high; discipline remained the central problem. Many teachers
argued that by the time the Clinic's seventh grade reached ninth grade,
in 1968-69, they were the worst ninth grade in the history of the school.
School administrators agreed. Most parents agreed with the School Board
Chairman that, when the Clinic left the school, "they left it in a mess."
The community Evaluation in February, 1968, found the school in a state
of "continuous disruption."
Aside from the fact that the community's ire was directed at
ousting the Clinic, and not at improving the school, there is another
underlying reason why the community failed to upgrade the school: they
had no formal organizational channel to express their sentiments and no
formal organizational power. The vested educational interests — the
teachers' union, the administrators' union, the Board of Education ad-
ministration, the state legislature, etc. — had not granted parent and
community groups responsibility in the schools, save as members of the
Parent Teachers Association. The Clinic for Learning was obviously in
K-
no position to grant the community any more responsibility. Because of the in-
eptness of the Clinic and the powerlessness of the community,we are barred here fr
*See Chapter 7, below.
0
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drawing any concisions about th. efficacy of comity participation in
For, in fact, there was no real community participation.
The impact of coarnmnity involvement as generated by the Clinic on JHS 57
must be the subject of another study which wc»ld properly include the
events of the intervening years. We will offer a brief sketch of events
following the end of the Clinic (see "Afterward" below), but conclude on
this note of uncertainty.
Afterward
In the summer of 1968, after the Clinic had left JHS 57, the
Principal resigned to become Principal of a Long Island junior high school
As reasons for this "unplanned" move, he cited school location, other per-
sonal considerations, and the fact that he felt "it was time for some of
the white administrators to step down." Many people connected with the
school felt that his departure was a result of his experiences with the
Clinic for Learning. He was replaced by an Assistant Principal who was
also English Department Chairman. In the fall of 1968, the tumultous
teachers strike over the community controlled demonstration district in
OceanHill
-Brownsville lasted almost until Thanksgiving. All of the black
staff members of JHS 57, about one-fourth of the total, attended school
every day during the strike. Over ninety percent of the white teachers
were on strike. The school operated in chaos for the remainder of the
year as students were required to come to school forty-five minutes
earlier to make up striking teacher’s salaries. In the summer of 1969,
the acting Principal sought and received a transfer to another New York
* ; 1*,
City school. Another assistant Principal, who had been the liason
Q
between the school and the Clinic for Learning was made acting Principal.
In 1969 the New York State Legislature passed a decentralization law
setting up thirty-one Community School Boards, with limited but identi-
fiable powers in matters of hiring and curriculum. In 1969 and 1970,
the community agent (with children in Queens) working for an educational
action group in Brooklyn, wrote two handbooks for parents, entitled "The
Parents Guide to Student Rights," and "The Parents Community Guide to
Educational and Legislative Change." In 1970 she was elected to the
Community School Board. In 1969-70 and 1970-71, new, more vocal parents
association officers were elected. Incidents involving parents increased
in frequency and intensity; talk in the teacher's lounge turned to dis-
cussion of protection for teachers. In the summer of 1971, the Community
School Board conducted a nationwide search for qualified black teachers.
In the fall the number of black teachers in major subject areas had in-
o
creased five times. In the fall of 1971, the acting Principal was removed
by the Community School Board and a lower administrator from another jun-
ior high school in the district was brought in as his replacement. This
man lived in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Within a month, the entire "tone" of
the school had been transformed. Year old bulletin boards displays were
replaced; each student was required to carry four text books, a notebook,
and pencils in order to gain admittance to the school in the morning;
teachers were constantly being observed by the Principal; the hallways
were quiet. Many teachers resented the increased pressure: One teacher
said: "The Clinic for Learning came and went; this guy will come and go
too. We'll still be here." Other teachers rejoiced in the ’Stabilization
of the school. When white teachers resigned, they were replaced by black
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teachers identified by the Community School Board. At one point, Puerto
Rican students complained that the school administration put too much
emphasis on Afro-Americans, not enough on Puerto Ricans. Comparative
reading scores have shown slight improvement, though it is too early to
discern a trend. Student morale appears to be high. Teacher morale is
both very high and very low.
f.
Implications
The virtues of community control can be neither argued nor proven
here. Yet we have seen that as a movement it possesses a measure of
historical continuity and credibility. We can proceed only on an act of
faith — that increased community participation is a bona fide objective
of educational reform. We trust that future studies will present evi-
dence to support this tenet. From this, the central question which emer-
ges here is, how can outside reformers spur community involvement in the
schools. Some obvious dicta emerge from the shambles of the Clinic for
Learning.
First, reformers can provide a vital communications link between
schools and communities. There is abundant evidence that before 1966 a
very large number of parents had no idea how poorly JHS 57 served their
children. The simple process of exposing the actual conditions of the
school, through community agents, and through the film, aroused a large
number of parents and community residents. More and more of them came
to feel that the manner in which the school was run was a disgrace to
the community. With concerted intent reformers can provide parents with
many avenues of access to the schools — places to meet, issues to dis-
cuss, information about school programming. Ellen Lurie has made us all
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aware that informed and angry parents can make a difference.
Secondly, outside reformers must do more than pay lip service to
the "needs of the community."* In many cases the community will perceive
its needs in terms far different from the professional reformer. The
right of parents, for example, to demand discipline and homework and
authority for their children must be respected. I have no doubt that
most Clinic staff would cringe if they knew that in 1972 children must
carry four books to gain admittance to JHS 57. But there is also no
doubt that this pleases far more parents than it displeases. Essentially,
I am suggesting that reformers must expunge "subtly authoritarian" de-
signs and listen to the community.
Thirdly, innovators must recognize the heavy political overtones
that accompany the rpest for community involvement in the schools. In
essence, increased community participation involves a transfer of power ~
from those who have it to those who want it. A cursory understanding of
American history reveals that such transfers are seldom achieved with-
out some kind of conflict or confrontation. Hence, reformers who shy
away from a conflict change model are unlikely to succeed. Machia-
vellian power politics is not nearly so out of date as some change agents
i
would have us believe.
Fourthly, it should be clear from our investigation that Clinic
planners had to rely on far less objective guideposts in charting their
efforts to bring change on the community level. It is nearly impossible
for the innovator to isolate enough variables to approach the question
of an improved school-community bond from a scientific framework. Simi-
larly, in evaluation we have stepped to the edge and outside of the de-
fined limits of social science.. Clearly, organizational change theorems
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illuminate the Clinic's struggles; yet the theorems appear to have
limited reach. Building a substantial school
-community relationship
involves not so much a change within the organization as it does a
change in the way the organization relates to its environment. Hence,
our shift from social science to sociology, from the narrowly defined
to the more general, has matched the shift in Clinic goals, from pre-
cise and measurable learning objectives to imprecise and subjective re-
alignment of certain power relationships. It is not clear that Clinic
planners understood this distinction — between educational goals and
the shifting of power; for future reform such understanding would seem
absolutely vital.
Finally, outsiders have to recognize the limitations on their
effectiveness. The weight of any community movement must be bom by
those in the community. And unless the community residents recognize
the need, there is no movement. A reformer without a constituency be-
comes a pointless visionary. The movement for community control of
schools must be led by parents, and the outsider, no matter how sincere,
is likely to be seen as excess baggage unless he performs at their
reouest.
^Interview, Community Agent 3, August 2, 1972.
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^Community paper, "Report of the Community Committee,"
February 8, 1969* p.2.
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IChapter 7
Proposition #1*:
Proposition #ha:
ilmrr ^
±on
f® t0 be effective, where it is nowineffective, the total environment surrounding
the child must be affected in a positive way.
The public school can act as a tool for changing
the total environment.
for
h
?
ls have never Provided avenues of upward mobility1 classes. A child's success in school is a functionof the parent s success in the society, not the reverse. Thetotal environment of the child, then, lies at the very root ofhis chances for success in school. Of more interest is Proposi-tion Ua, that the public school can act as a tool for changing thetotal environment, or put another way, the public school can be a
mechanism for social change. Peering more closely at the Clinicfor Learning experience, we will argue that public schools as
educational institutions cannot influence social policy and are
relatively powerless to affect economic and political arrange-
ments in the society. On the other hand, schools as social and
political institutions may have some potency in furthering
socially desirable ends.
The Clinic for Learning, as an effort to remake American educa-
tion corresponds in fundamental ways to most of what passes in the com-
mon liturgy as "educational reform." At its heart the Clinic repre-
sents the design of humane, egalitarian men and women to erect a more
just and responsible societal order by influencing changes in the public
schools. The Project Director and his staff were aiming ultimately at
the "eventual eradication of the slum, " to compensate for, as he said,
"centuries of brutality and injustice," to build an equality of educa-
tional opportunity grounded in fact as well as principle. Yet as a
growing number of revisionist educational historians are showing, public
U < — I t
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education has traditionally done more to perpetuate than to ameliorate
social and economic class differences, and has served more as a tool of
the upper classes for social and economic control than as a stepping stone
for lower class aspirations.
-The fundamental dilemma of the Clinic was
that educational reform is, and always has been, impotent to further the
ends of social justice, and the reoccurrent furor surrounding education-
al reform movements has only served to obscure the inherent inequality
of the public schools.
..
In Ifre Irony of Early School Reform
. Michael Katz (1968) relies
on primary source material to argue that the spread of public education
in Massachusetts in the mid-nineteenth century, far from being a humani-
tarian endeavor to dispense the virtues of Education to the commoners,
was an essentially conservative movement led by the richest and most
influenctial segments of the communities and aimed largely at unruly, un-
disciplined, often immigrant working class youth. The spread of public
schooling was not, as is the popular myth, due to the eagerness of the
lower classes to reap the bounties of upward mobility which public edu-
cation offered, but was due rather to mandatory state and federal atten-
dance laws passed by those with vested interests in social stability.
Colin Green, in Cobweb Attitudes: Essays on Educational and Cultural
Mythology
,
(*969; 1970) has presented evidence that "the public schools
have always failed the lower classes — black and white." Since the
1690' s, he argues, increased compulsory attendance in public schools
has only given rise to increased rates of failure in most of the nation's
major industrial areas. In New York City in the 1930's, only forty per-
cent of those in ninth grade graduated from high school; in Boston the
figures stood at barely fifty percent. Blacks, Greer writes, "have
\ . i*)
always epitomized the inexorable relationship between success and failure
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inside and outside school." Industrial expansion during the Second
World War brought millions of southern blacks into the cities of the
north, but after the war ended, as the economy cooled, as automation
advanced, as the number of unskilled jobs dwindled, and as the next
generation matured, blacks were told by society at large that the rea-
son they were unemployable was their lack of education. Recently, the
.
revolution of black consciousness has exacerbated social tranquility.
Greer writes:
We could afford failure in schools as long as the
economy had room for unskilled workers and as long as the
lowest classes accepted without protest what appeared to
be their inevitable place. Now, however, there are prac-
tically no jobs left for the unskilled and even if there
were the black lower class is no longer willing to accept
only that kind of opportunity — not, in a society in
which real wealth is increasing so fast. (1969, p.102.)
Lauter and Howe (1971) have extended the thesis of Katz and Greer,
that schools have never served as avenues of upward mobility for the
lower classes, into the present urban school systems by showing that
carefully devised "tracking systems" which separate the "less able"
from the "more able" act to solidify social and class distinctions:
Thus, just as the establishment of high schools in the
nineteenth century promoted the interests of middle -class
parents, so ability grouping has become an elaborate mech-
anism for ensuring those same interests. In this respect
the track system has joined with "the ordinary operations
of educational institutions," which, deliberate discrimation
aside, by themselves tend to deny, poor and working-class
children equal opportunities for social mobility, (p.77.)
They conclude pessimisstically:
The systems of tracking are so closely tied to those
who control American education and to the qualities of
American schools that it is hard to imagine their replace-
ment altogether — certainly not by a system which would
permit children to develop according to their own needs
and abilities. (p.8Ii.)
McMillan (1972) has argued that urban communities today are far
more sophisticated in dealing with the obvious discrimatory effects of
public education than their working class predecessors:
Urban communities and some urban educators are "educated"
aware, and politicized to the extent that they know that re-
form in schools, as it is traditionally thought, that is, re-
form as an effort to guide or mould society's values by intro-
ducing alterations in the way schools function, is a frustra-
almost endless task. Communities apparently have
seen that it is political, not educational, reform that stands
the best chance of impacting on the American value system. (p.£.)
Hence, as we saw in the previous chapter, urban educational reform move-
ments have become more rightly "political reform movements."
In perhaps the most penetrating statement of the revisionist stance,
Michael Katz (1971) has written:
An official idealogy that emphasizes the importance of free
enterprise and shuns state intervention has limited alternatives
with which to approach major social problems, such as poverty.
Massive income redistribution or broad scale intervention in the
economy generally has not been acceptable. Education on the
other hand, has aDpeared to be an immediate and effective solu-
tion to social problems. There is a surface logic, which remains
immensely appealing: Equipping children with appropriate skills
and attitudes can cause the problems of unemployment and poverty
to disappear . The illnesses of society become diagnosed as
simply a lack of education, and the prescription for reform be-
comes more education. The prescription, for one thing, unleashes
a flurry of seemingly purposeful activity and, for another, re-
quires no tampering with basic social structural or economic
characteristics, only with the attitudes of poor people, and that
has hardly caused a quiver. The problem... is that this approach
to social reform simply has not worked, (emphasis added.) (p.lUI.)
Current facts to support these contentions are not lacking.
Patricia Sexton ( 1 961 ) in her landmark study of educational opportunity.
Education and Income
,
found consistent evidence that economic disparities
between parents were invariably reflected in their children's performance
in school and in the liklihood that the children would never overcome
the adverse effects of early educational failure. Children of poor
11*1
parents did more poorly in school, and because they were educationally
"unqualified" their poverty was assured for another generation.
Gutherie, (et al, 1971) in a study of schools in Michigan, has shown
that schools attended by children of low socio-economic background re-
ceive lower quality services, less state money and resources, and pro-
duce students with little post-school chance for success*
Eleanor Leacock (1969) in Teaching and Learning in City Schools
has broadened the indictment of public schools by corroborating scien-
tifically the voluminous anecdotal evidence that teachers are the often
unwitting purveyors of racist, discrimatory, and demeaning messages to
lower classs children. What she observed in eight second and fifth
grade classes of differing socio-economic and racial composition was
"not the attempt to 'impose middle-class goals' on the children, but
rather a tacit assumption that these goals were not open to at least
the vast majority of them. The 'middle-class values' being imposed on
the low-income Negro children defined them as inadequate and their pro-
per role as one of deference." (emphasis in the original.) (p.312.)
One would surmise that aspiring middle-class teachers have always com-
municated such values to lower class children, but a century ago child-
ren were not required by law to soak up the disdain of the dominant
culture until the age of sixteen, or seventeen, or is it to be eighteen.
A century ago, one who rejected "middle-class values" as defined in
public schools was not ordained to a life of crime or public relief.
Finally, Gerald Levy in Ghetto School (1970) has leveled a rasp-
ing attack on the soceity which hypocritically and wilfully, for its own
safety and benefit, supports the systematic desecration of ghetto children.
L1U2
sPf'r -t:;;ghetto school would liv« +r> " .T. y aware oi the
,
, , .
UXU J-LKe to blame the school's failure nn
personnel diffWties
163
’ j
nadequacies
>
xxssv- ss^stjs-
the
ATrican society would complicate
itv Tho
d
?
idea of hls humanity and moral superior-
ll: +? middle -class liberal is committed to viewing SeUo
more
ati
One
aS
l+
fd±
^
e to jjnPlement his liberalism and nothing
b \
alternative he fails to consider is that the ohP t.t.n
° ^ thg SGrvice not °
"
his morality but of his
~
soci^and economic interest s. He Rann nt~aff^ ^ thV
the Rhett° SCh °o1 ha3~not failed...
1ower-cTa
6
n
^r\Can SOCiety is unPrepared to absorb its
^e^mLyse^^h the middle “clas^ ghetto school
Sr ^ n ^ 6 ^ose of not training its childrenfor middle-class life, (emphasis added.) (p.173.)
The Clinic for Learning clashed with the most basic fact of
educational life suggested by each of the authors above: education
reflects, it does not manipulate American society. In a ghetto, one
finds "ghetto education": in a prosperous suburb, public schools pro-
duce prosperous offspring; the wealthy enroll their children in private
schools; a depressed rural community breeds educational depression. JHS
$7 reflects the "reality" of Bedford-Stuyvesant: it reflects a "black
ghetto," with over 450,000 residents, decayed housing, astronomical (or
non-existent) insurance premiums, few job openings, exorbitant borrow-
ing rates, prefunctory sanitation services, costly and lax public trans-
portation, absentee landlords, absentee retailers, political disenfranch-
isement, economic isolation, welfare, drugs and crime; across one river
is located the most gargantuan hoard of wealth known to the world, else-
where on all sides are property owners, who hold jobs, have elected
representatives and friends in higher places, whose children will become
wealthy, and because of this whose children will succeed in school. Bed-
ford-Stuyvesant is not a pleasant reality, but it is reality, and it is
ito
underpinned not by inadvertence or '’mindlessness" or by accident but by
closely guarded economic and political interests. "Dropouts," a term
uhich was not coined until the late 191,0's, are stigmatized as "fail-
'
ures" and often never av«n enter the job market. Semi-skilled and unskilled
jobs decrease daily and those who hold the jobs blacks and Puerto Ricans
would aspire to, primarily union members,have conspired to exclude them.
(Houghton, 1970.) The disenfranchisement of black and Puerto Rican
parents over such matters as hiring and curriculum in the schools only
reflects their isolation in the broader
v
political arenas. Until 1968,
Bedford
-Stuyvesant was gerrymandered into five separate Congressional
districts in which blacks and Puerto Ricans were in the minority, hence
no one represented them on the national level. State legislative dis-
tricts on the fringes of Bedford-Stuyvesant were drawn by the Republican
controlled state legislatures to minimize the political impact of the
black voters. The public schools add another solidifying dimension to
the overall malaise: they guard it for future generations. Public
schools have become selecting devices which stamp unmistakable brands
of poverty and deprivation to insure that at least most of those who are
poor and deprived stay that way. And as Levy and others have pointed
out, the schools have not failed in this task. (See, for example, J.
Kozol, 1971.)
These realities confronted and defeated the Clinic for Learning;
though the staff was resourceful it never so much as dented the armor of
the status quo. Though they believed that educational change would, in
some small way, lead to social change, they were misguided. For the
public school was an unwilling tool of broad social reform; an intractable
ally of social reformers. There were four basic reasons why this occur-
red: 1) the attitudes and political interests of the regular JHS 57
staff made it unapproachable to outsiders; 2) the attitudes and econo-
mic interests of the Clinic planners and staff rendered their missionary
zeal hollow and defenseless; 3) the total powerlessness of the community
to affect the school made meaningful change impossible; and U) the total
-powerlessness of the Clinic to affect the school cast the entire effort
into an absurd and irresponsible position. As these reasons should make
clear, we are now expanding the boundaries of social science to include
the all-encompassing fields of social, economic and politcal organiza-
tion.
1) There is little reason to doubt that the attitudes of regu-
lar JHS 57 teachers matched those in the Leacock and Levy studies re-
ferred to above, both of which were based in New York City. The small
percentage of teachers who arrived at the school with idealistic or
humanistic notions about teaching were quickly forced to adapt their
behavior to the chaotic school milieu. For most, teaching became sole-
ly a process of controlling the students, and in many cases this was
not an easy task. For the children knew better than their parents or
the teachers or the administrators that they were the ones who would
bear the heaviest burden of the school’s failure. A most common inter-
change between students and teachers went like this: Student: You never
teach us anything. Teacher: Go ahead and misbehave, I get my paycheck
even if you don't learn anything . The students heard this retort from
the first grade through the twelfth, if they last that long, and most
don't. Students knew that teachers live in Queens or Flatbush or Man-
hattan, the few who live in Bedford- Stuyvesant are usually home econo-
mics or typing teachers. The yearly bludgeoning most students received
at the hands of standardized reading tests left them with no conclusion
but that they were marginal, their success was not important, and their
goals, therefore, should be uniformly lowered. Teachers felt compelled
to participate in this human sacrifice, which left them in a precarious
moral position. In one sense, they did "the best they can," and were
imprisoned by the system which provided them their livlihood. On the
other hand, most teachers recognized that for most of their students,
public schooling is a lost cause. As one teacher blurted out in the
final staff meeting between Clinic and school, "The best thing we could
do would be to close this school down and put the kids in the street.
They would be better off." To willingly continue to teach required one
to compromise or obliterate any notions of sincerity or dedication or
selflessness. One of the more secure, pro-Clinic teachers reflected:
"In the beginning, I thought it would work. But I wasn't aware of the
limitations of (the teachers) I was working with." A Cluster Coordina-
tor commented on the teachers' position:
When you try to find out why people don't like the Clinic,
it's very hard to put your finger on it; they come up with all
sorts of reasons that you know and I know are phony, because
they don't hold water. One of the basic reasons for this is
that we put them into a position unwittingly where the faults
of the system and the phoniness of what is going on is brought
to light, and they had to admit it . (emphasis added.
Teachers struggled to maintain their self-respect. One teacher violent-
ly insisted that "the Clinic was really a case of non-professionals
coming in telling professionals what to do." Another "knew it wasn t
going to work right from the start."
3
In large numbers they sought refuge
in the Teachers 1 Union, whloh in ioa< , »
,
,
ic in 1966 was at its apex in JHS $7. The
union became their tool to drive out the intruders, to assure them that
they vere doing an adequate job and that no charges of incompetence from
New York University people would influence their retention in the school.
Union representatives confidently explained that legally, constitution-
ally they were protected from all attackers, Clinic staff, parents, news
media, disruptive students. They were secure, safe, and invulnerable;
they had only to punch in at 8:U0 a.m. and punch out at 3:00 p.m. to re-
ceive their paychecks. Their position of political and legal strength
left them impervious to the reformers from N.Y.U.
2) The reflections of the Project Director fully three years
after the closing of the Clinic speak unmistakably of its benevolent
missionary flavor:
^
6n We ^ook °ut, it always worked.
. . everytime
the kids went back to the school they entered the same mael-
strom. We weren't smart enough to understand and keep them
out.... You We got 1,500 kids who have been brutalized and
hurt and denied.... Obviously they don't have basic skills.
The reason why is because of what we've done to them. It's
so clear, you don't have to fight that one.^
“There was a mild benevolence in some of my staff," said the Project
Director, "but no blatant racism." Yet the early insistence on branding
Bedford-Stuyvesant a "culture of poverty" set the Clinic staff up as
8elfappointed saviors. There was an implicit but ever-present assump-
tion that the community of Bedford-Stuyvesant needed "help," could not
in fact help itself without outside intervention. The Clinic staff did
not hide their intention to uplift the indigent subculture; "The parents
of disadvantaged children asserts the original project proposal,"....
clearly need more attention from the school than they now receive."
1U7
The "outsiders" were white, the "helpless" were black; what may have
appeared in 1966 to be undertones of mild benevolence become blaring
indictments of racism in 1972. As we have seen,, this missionary pre-
disposition was most crystalized in the film, "The Way It Is," and the
parents and community of JHS 57 responded bitterly.
To the teachers as practitioners this kind of moralistic,
noblesse oblige posture, whether called racism or liberalism or human-
ism, has always been anathema; those who confront noisy, irascible
students daily are not easily swayed by the idealogies of humanistic
educators who ruminate in university corridors. To be vigilantly "under-
standing" and "responsive" to student needs, always the nostrum of the
evangelists from N.Y.U., appeared to teachers in JHS 57 to be a super-
human feat. It is not surprising, therefore, that the regular staff of
the school came to view the Clinic as an ivory tower hybrid with little
to offer. It is also not surprising that the Clinic staff came to view
itself as morally superior to the "narrow," "self-serving" teachers, and
to view its own educational scheme as better than that which existed.
But it seems likely that the regular teachers understood the power
arrangements that undergird ghetto education far more than the univer-
sity zealots; and moral rectitude seldom triumphs over bitter self-
interest. What the Clinic staff was saying about irrelevant curriculums
and unresponsive institutions may have been right, but it was also threat-
ening and alarmist and quite plainly not useful on a day to day basis.
The teachers' reality included forty minute periods and thirty-five stu-
dents per class and lesson plans and reading tests and periodic observa-
tions by department chairmen; maintaining their equilibrium in the system
ir\
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was enough, "reforming" the system was beyond hope. The Clinic failed
to comprehend that the practitioners disposition is not an open and re-
ceptive one; and like many who fancy themselves to be on higher moral
ground than their clients, they never considered that those whom they
were helping might know more than they did.
The Clinic staff was vulnerable as well because their moral
stance was subverted by certain economic truths which became widely
known to the regular staff at JHS £7. One Cluster Coordinator mentioned
that "it's always hard to hire good people, because peoole don't leave
their jobs for one or two years. So you're stuck with hiring rebound
people from other projects." Not unexpectedly, this Coordinator was
the only one who had a full time job before the Clinic. Most of the
• others were graduate students with instructors' stipends, or simply look-
ing for work, or recently arrived in town. To admit that they too were
"just working for the buck" took some of the edge off their implicit
claim to moral superiority. Teachers felt that the Clinic staff, be-
cause of its credibility with powerful financial interests, that is,
because of its "grantmanship" ability, was simply living comfortably
off the largess of the educational establishment, undergoing little of
the rigors of actual teaching yet glibly promulgating the "wisdom" of
the profession. Further, teachers realistically surmised that "Staff,
i
Clinic for Learning" would make an attractive resume entry, and that
the Clinic experience was a useful stepping stone up the professional
ladder. When the first Cluster Coordinator left after four months to
accept a college teaching position in a school of education, their worst
suspicions were confirmed. Of seven Cluster Coordinators, six went on
In a very
to hold teaching positions in various schools of education,
real sense, then, the Clinic staff was motivated by self-interest at
least as much as the teachers whom they supposedly served.
3) Clinic planners suspected they would have to ally with the
community in their attempt to reform the school. The Director the
second year had a solid grasp of this tenet. But not only did the Clinic
.fail to enlist the community in support, it failed to see that the com-
munity, like the Clinic, was operating from an essentially powerless
position. The Community Advisory Board was formed to oversee the Clinic
for Learning, but it had no formal or informal power of its own in rela-
tion to the school. Even at its height of influence in 1968, the Ad-
visory Board had only enough authority to throw the Clinic out. The
Local School Board as well had only advisory powers. The administration
of the school, vulnerable on all sides, found itself in an enviable
haven; outside, the parents blamed the Clinic for what was most certainly
the school administration's fault; the Clinic was forced into confronta-
tion with the community, seen originally as its most radical ally. The
Clinic and the community battled openly while the administration, being
under no real pressure to reform, simply ducked. Had the Clinic planners
understood basic economic and political facts, they would have known
that spreading good will in the community, visiting parents and encour-
aging them to get involved would not have the slightest impact on the
fundamental operations of the school. Although as we have suggested,
enticing the community may have had an eventual payoff in demands for
community control, there is nothing to indicate that the Clinic saw its
role as community whipping boy. Rather, their relations with the com-
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munity seem to represent another gross misuse of their humanitarian zeal.
Given the scanty experience that most Clinic staff had living and work-
ing in a black community, their misguided behavior is not surprising.
U) At the summer camp in 1966, Clinic planners succeeded in
erecting a model utopian community that exemplified perfectly their ulti-
mate goals. The camp appeared as undeniable proof that the humanitarian
-dream of peace and brotherhood for all was still possible. For a brief
time they had changed the total environment of the child, and the child
had responded vigorously. Now the task was to extend this environment
into the school, into the ghetto, and into the society; as long as they
persevered, they "could not be defeated." Yet the camp's end also marked
the end of the dream, and the camp lingered at best as an unreal, undup-
licatable event. Long on humanism but short on realistic understanding,
the Clinic staff spent two fruitless years trying to make the school
more like the camp.
After the first year of operation, the Project Director had no
illusions about the outcome of this struggle. "We got the hell kicked
out of us by the situation," he told a newspaper reporter in the fall
of the second year. "It's a defeat for the university and the school
system."'* But he was not easily repressed, and he embarked with one
of the original community agents on a new series of proposals to reorient
the Clinic for Learning. In an evaluation paper submitted to the Ford
Foundation entitled "It Just Didn't Happen," written in the fall of
1967, the Project Director shows formidable insight in analyzing the
situation:
The perspective of priorities at the time of Initial
£
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Implementation of this project was centered around the
notion that the school could be a springboard into the
major problems presented to the country as a whole by
the socio-economic unit called the "urban ghetto." In
the first few months of trying to pin down the specific
sociological and psychological attitudes concerning
school as the agent of social change we saw that this
notion is not viable in Bedford-Stuyvesant and at most
is used as an issue dramatizing the physical manifesta-
tion of alienation. As our thinking and experiences
developed we clearly saw little sense or rational be-
havior coming out of additional inputs of resources
into a situation that to begin with is non-rational and
non-responsive.
. . . This type of thinking led us to
shifting from a school-education orientation to a socio-
economic
-education-community orientation Along
with the shift away from associational ties with a
bankrupt socio-economic system in terms of the "ghetto,"
we came into a direct creative conflict situation with
a small group in the community £at the weekend retreat
with community leaders^ who saw us as a reinforcement of
that bankrupt system. The resolution of this conflict
and the knowledge of what social change means, resulted
in the present perspective on priorities.
^
He goes on to outline some of the fruits of this new orientation: an
economic development plan between Bedford-Stuyvesant small businessmen
and the N.Y.U. Graduate School of Business, a businessman's internship
project with private industry, a program training youth to become movie
producers, and a program to pay and train community residents as para-
professio nals. Little ever came of these proposals, but the fact that
they were made and some submitted in proposal form to funding sources
speaks well of the adaptability and resourcefulness of the Project Dir-
ector. Yet by any measure these efforts came too late. The Clinic had
chosen to associate with the school and it had fallen into community
disrepute; there was little hope that renewed struggle would resurrect
the loss and bring the community and the reformers from N.Y.U. into
alliance. And even if they had allied, there was little hope that they,
two powerless entities, could have changed the school. The Project
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Director "kept trying," but the enemy was too fierce.
In short, the Clinic for Learning was facing a brutally entrench-
ed manifestation of American society: with but few exceptions, public
schools have acted to perpetuate, not assuage, the lower classes. By
tinkering with the manifestation, the Clinic sought to eradicate its
source. By trying to "make schools work," they simply overlooked the fact
f
that schools do work — to select, and certify, and eliminate, and to
prepare the losers to play a marginal role in the society. By surround-
ing the child with "caring and supportive adults," by "saturating" the
school, they hoped to alter the basic life reality which faced the school
children of JHS 57 . By showing that they cared, they sought to impress
upon the community that the segment of society from which they came —
white, middle-class, educated, powerful -- also cared. But this was fan-
tasy. The odds against which they were dealing were insurmountable, and
this was their most fundamental and debilitating oversight.
Implications
What then is to become of educational reform? If it is true that
ghetto education represents the firmly entrenched reality of second citi-
zenship, what is to become of the humane, egalitarian men and women who,
like the Clinic staff, struggle for change? There are no simple answers,
indeed, there may be no "answers." But, hopefully, this study will lead
educational reformers to new insights about the tasks confronting them.
In addition to the two provisoes of the second year Director — that ex-
pectations be small, and that the behavior and needs of children be
understood — there is one basic perception that must guide reform efforts
in the future, that is, that public schools are not solely institutions
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of education. Instead, public schools serve social functions, by teach-
ing obedience and conformity, by keeping children off the street, by
certifying some and eliminating others thus keeping labor markets free
fl*om inundation by millions of "qualified” but unemployable persons, by
inculcating a belief that high reading scores will lead to success, and
that more, ever more education will solve social problems. The public
schools serve a political function, by providing a power base for millions
of teachers, administrators, boards of education, central school bureau-
cracies, and local politicians. To be sure, the public still views its
schools as seedbeds of Learning, purveyors of Education, the first plat-
eau of the American Dream. But educators have argued for years that the
knowledge and communication explosions have rendered the old curriculum
of basic skills archaic, and sociologists have long known that with the
exception of the Jews no American immigrant group has successfully used
the public schools to move up the social and economic ladders of the so-
ciety. (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963 .) On the one hand, the thousands
of hours of television "instruction" has left the teacher in a secondary
position; on the other, the academic skills taught in school are not and
never have been useful "on the job." Today's urban poor, in short, are
being asked to do what almost no immigrant group has done before it; that
is, advance in the society by succeeding in the schools, precisely at a
time in which schools are becoming relatively less important in educat-
ing the young. The most recent chorus of educational reform — to make
school a place where kids "learn how to learn" — is testimony to these
contradictions. For in the inner city, "learn how to learn" reflects
the humane intent to relax some of the pressure on poor children
to
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achieve academically, and to make success in school a little less depen-
dent on reading scores and a little more dependent on a child's ability
to cope with his environment. But "learn how to learn" is not something
that one learrshow to do in school; one learns it in life, if at all.
And so, "learn how to learn" becomes just another euphimism for "good
citizenship" or the "well-adjusted" student. Meanwhile, the tests and
qualifying scores and state requirements continue to select and certify
some while eliminating and rejecting others. The problem with this lat-
est reform, and with all new curriculums and techniques and resources,
is that they have no impact on the society, and if social change is one's
goal
,
the public schools are weightless levers. The furor surrounding
educational fads clouds the basic issue of educational inequality: ghetto
children are not succeeding in the society. Just as Katz has charged,
educational reformers by advancing the notion that their ideas, their
"liberalism," will allay the impact of unequal education, have obscured
the reality of the ghetto. The real target of those who abhor the ghetto
school must be the ghetto itself.
Seen in this light, the ghetto school becomes a social and politi-
cal tool for societal change, not an educational front. As a social in-
stitution, the school can play a critical part in raising the awareness
of the community, it can become a seedbed for community interaction, a
platform for budding reform. Children can be taught the "truth" about
their American heritage, a heritage so brutal and maligned that it can
scarcely fail to erupt in radical consciousness. They can learn that
"poor reading scores"are not keeping them impoverished, for if miracu-
lously all poor readers became excellent readers, they would remain isolated
v
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from the mainstream of society. The school as social institution can
provide a haven of strength for children who know by the age of five that
their black skin marks them different, subtly inferior in a white man's
country. James Baldwin ( 1 970) has written eloquently about the poten-
tialities of the public school as a social institution:
Now if I were a teacher in this school, or any Negro
school, and I was dealing with Negro children, who were in
my care only a few hours of every day and would then return
to their homes and to the streets, children who have an
apprehension of their future which with every hour grows
grimmer and darker, I would try to teach them, I would try
to make them know — that those streets, those houses, those
dangers, those agonies by which they are surrounded, are
criminal. I would try to make each child know that these
things are the results of a criminal conspiracy to destroy
him. I would teach him that if he intends to get to be a
man, he must at once decide that he is stronger than this
conspiracy and that he must never make his peace with it.
And that one of his weapons for refusing to make his peace
with it and for destroying it depends on what he decides he
is worth. I would teach him that there are currently very
few standards in this country which are worth a man's re-
spect. That it is up to him to begin to change these stand-
ards for the sake of the life and health of the country .
(pp.290-1 .)
/
This is not revolutionary rhetoric, and to any educated adult who knows
the facts of African-American history, who has any sense of what has
happened, this is the truth, decisively. Nor are Baldwins words anti-
white, or anti-change agent, or anti-professional educator. There is
wide latitude here for outside reformers to raise the social conscious-
ness of black children; but not reformers who insist educational inequal-
ity is the fault of teachers , or of principals , or of "middle -class"
curriculums, or of insufficient funds or bureaucratic mismanagement. Be-
cause many middle-class white, and black, professional educators
have
vested economic, interests in Baldwin's "conspiracy," it is
not likely
that they could or would participate in basic reform.
Like the staff of
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the Clinic for Learning, most professional educators are moving up the
career ladder, away from the schools, away from the societal malaise,
away from the contradictions that highlight hypocrisy. For those who can
accept Baldwin's truth, who can participate in its dissemination, there
is ample room for school reform
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the public schools are
latent political institutions awaiting the force of inner city communities
to wrench them free. Social awareness and political control must go hand
in hand. Political control of the schools by black and Puerto Rican
parents can have far reaching implications for social change. With power
to hire and fire teachers and administrators, communities can guarantee
that children are not led to believe blindly in the power of the school
to grant them upward mobility. They can introduce a curriculum which de-
mands social change. They can set standards which will reflect their
cultural values. With power to spend money, they can contract with black
.
o
construction companies, black textbook manufacturers, black desk makers.
They can consult with black psychologists, black social workers, black
doctors. Nor would they need to be all black, for again, the black
struggle is waged "for the sake of the life and health of the country"
and is far from being separatist. Eventually, communities could control
mandatory attendance laws, the distribution of reading tests, the certi-
fication of teachers. The task is not small, and the resistance from
powerful teachers unions and administrators unions and Boards of Educa-
tion would be immense, but for educational reformers with serious intent
there are ways to proceed.
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Interview, Cluster Coordinator 3, August IS
Interview, JHS 57 teacher 7, June 5, 1971.
3
Interview, JHS Si teacher 8, June 17, 1971.
h
interview, Project Director, July 16
,
1971.
'’New York Times
. November 26, 1971, p.l.
Clinic paper, "It Just HLdn't Happen," pp.1
1971.
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Chapter 8
REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM
The reform objectives pressed by the Clinic for Learning span
a broad range; we have considered them on three levels. First, the
project planners aimed at improving the quality of life in the school.
They reasoned that through their efforts the level of teaching could be
improved, the relevancy of the curriculum could be raised, teachers and
administrators could grow more confident and gratified, and more stu-
dents couldreap the benefits of individualized instruction. Based on
theorems of organizational change, we have tried to pinpoint the rea-
sons why they failed in these attempts. We have argued that the Clinic
staff failed to implement reform because of their failure to involve
teachers in the single most far reaching decision they made — to
adopt Clusters, because they were ineffective at capital^^s^.P^the
substantial decision making capabilities of • the Clusters, and because
their leadership was inappropriate, inconsistent, and contradictory.
The case study approach has allowed us to test two organizational
change theorems in an actual situation and we have used this forum to
suggest some new theoretical extensions. Specifically, we have pointed
to the situational variables and advanced a theory which accounts for
differing subordinate maturity levels, specific subordinate value
systems, and uniaue organizational climates. In short, we have reached
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conclusions that bear hope for this kind of reform in the future:
proper involvement of teachers and adaptive use of leadership skills,
as well as more careful planning and diagnosis, can result in the
improved operation of the school, for students, teachers, and admini-
strators.
Secondly, the project sought to make participation in school
affairs by parents and community persons a reality. In evaluation, we
have cited reasons for failure that both include and go beyond the
theories of organizational change. Focusing on the polarities of re-
sponse represented by two community agents, we have pointed to the
dynamic interplay of school, community, and societal variables which
caused most parents to rush to the defense of the school, but which
later resulted in a perceptible movemont among parents toward assert-
ing their right to decision making responsibility. We have argued
that the film, "The Way It Is," still widely recognized and disseminat-
ed in 1972
,
crystallized much of the interaction between the community
and the Clinic first, by reflecting the subtle racism that char-
acterized the school as a "battleground" and which led the Clinic staff
to exalt in its self appointed mission as saviors of the school; second,
by forcing the community into a defensive posture, rejecting the film,
and the Clinic, as an affront to its dignity; thirdly, by illuminating
the resourcefulness of the school administration in eluding the well
deserved finger of blame; and finally, by forcing the community, how-
ever incensed, to deal with the obvious and shocking realities which
the film exposed. In seeking to isolate reasons for failure, we are
impressed at least as much by the intractability of the school and the
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fundamental powerlessness of the community as we are by the naivete or
inabilities of the Clinic staff. No doubt skillful application of all
relevant organizational change theorems — e.g. involving the community
in planning, leadership and decision making strategies adapted to the
situation, in depth diagnosis — would have served the Clinic effort far
better. Yet the larger lessons emerging here point to more caution by
future reformers, not more organizational competencies. Based on the
struggles of the Clinic for Learning, it appears that the intent at
community involvement in the schools is a political conflict, having
less to do with the educational life in the classroom than with who holds
the positions of leadership, who gets the contracts for services, and
who makes final policy decisions. The Clinic played an almost unwitting
role in sparking this political consciousness; but, reviewing the evi-
dence, one wonders if the rubric "educational reform" even applies.
As we argued in Chapter 6, there is serious doubt whether the Clinic
under any circumstances could have made more than a marginal impact on
the extent of parent and community involvement in JHS 57.
Thirdly, the Clinic sought to use the schools to build a more
socially just and humane society, eventually leading to the "eradication
of the ghetto." We have argued that these intentions
were utopian and
groundless. We have stressed rudimentary political and
economic reali-
ties as a basis for asserting that the Clinic for
Learning plan was
really not an educational reform, nor even a reform
that failed. Point-
ing to the political strength of the teachers
and administrators, the
economic dependency and moral duplicity of the
Clinic, and the funda-
mental powerlessness of both the community
and the Clinic, we have
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attempted to highlight the seemingly infinite shortcomings of the Clinic
design. To know the society, we have asserted, is to see not that the
Clinic failed but that in a very real sense it never even existed.
This part of the Clinic was never more than a paper dream, never more
than an extension of the messianic zeal of the Project Director. In
short, we concluded that as an educational venture there was no way for
the Clinic to succeed in this objective. There were no organizational
skills, leadership techniques, or participation strategies which could
have helped, or which future educational reformers might have access to.
We are talking here about societal change, not educational change, and
the means of the educational profession, utilizing the theorems of organ-
izational change, do not nearly match the demands of the political, eco-
nomic, and social biases of the society.
Still, we have not reached a wholely pessimistic conclusion, and
have suggested that the public schools can be diverted to serve non-
educational ends which can have a broader social impact. Specifically,
the public schools as social and political institutions may have con-
siderable potential for furthering societal reform.
We have stressed the separateness of the three levels of change
on the basis of a single belief: the overarching failure of educational
reform in inner city schools in the past decade rests in the inability
of professional educators to recognize both the implications
and the
limitations of their reforms. Compensatory education, curriculum
reform,
and teacher retraining, administered on behalf of "culturally
disadvant-
aged" children, were not simply valueless educational
techniques de-
signed to make life a little better for children;
they were net consen-
sual innovations mandated by the society at large
to improve teaching
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and learning. On the contrary, they were conceived as the antidote for
social oppression, and were pitted against the effects of centuries of
economic and cultural isolation ;as was the Clinic for Learning. Viewed
in terms of classroom health, or of reading and math scores, these are
legitimate educational reforms with legitimate hope for success. Viewed
in terms of social inequality, they are nearly meaningless, the inflated
premises of would-be social saviors. For, as we have argued, public
schools reflect societal reality, they do not challenge it; schools
act more to stabilize than to upset the status quo. To be sure, improved
life in the classroom is a bona fide objective of educational reform,
and for children on a day to day basis it is often the only meaningful
objective. But when educational reforms of this kind conceal social,
economic, or political value orientations which conflict with dominant
convential values, they fail, almost inevitably. The difficulty arises
because many reformers, like the planners of the Clinic, never realize
the full implications of their innovations and never accurately antici-
pate the ferocity of the resistance.
This dynamic, of educational reforms that supersede by implica-
tion the boundaries of education, is best illustrated on the classroom
level. Allowing children, for example, to leave a classroom at will to
go to Room 103 suggests the intention of allowing children to have more
responsibility in determining their own activities in school; which in
turn suggests that professional educators are not totally capable of
making those determinations; which impugns the professionalism of the
educational profession; and, if carried to its logical extreme, runs
directly into conflict with the ideas of teachers' authority, training
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of teachers, necessity of administrators, etc.; and finally forces the
question, Why should students go to school at all, if they don't want
to? The political and economic ramifications of that inquiry are of
tremendous proportions. Another example: arguing as did the Clinic
j
that tests should not be the primary measure of evaluation suggests the
belief in the importance of non-academic skills, affective skills, human
^ relations skills, etc. That these skills are not measurable in any
precise way suggests the lowering in importance of grades; which in
turn places less emphasis on diplomas and certification standards;
which challenges the use by employers of diplomas as preliminary selec-
tion devices; which in turn undermines the importance of striving hard
and competing to get good grades to get a good job; which flies squarely
in the face of the capitalist ethnic, which underpins the entire fabric
of the soceity.
Innovations of this type can be implemented and theorems of
organizational change can be eminently useful. Yet success is predicated
on at least two important factors -- first, that the innovator under-
stands the potentially threatening ramifications of his reform, and
I
second, that the innovator presents his case in cautious, modest, and ap-
parently value free terms. For if there is a failure in understanding,
there will be no preparation for the bitter resistance that is oound to
come; recall the Clinic' 3 Director of Evaluation speaking of the
"ruth-
less undermining'' of their efforts, their "unsophisticated"
and "quite
defenseless" posture, and that they "were all but wiped out"
In the
first U-6 weeks. And if inflated expectations
give rise to rhetorical
arrogance, if for example, humanistic educators
dwell on the importance
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of community over competition, the resistance will emerge in response
not to the substance of the innovation but to the "style" of the inno-
vator. Thus did a number of regular JHS 57 teachers argue that the
Clinic was simply a case of "non-professionals" telling professionals
what to do. For these teachers the real substance of the Clinic plans
for reform was almost never the real issue.
I should like to further illumine the hidden and undermining
ramifications of certain educational reforms, and the lack of perception
of certain educational reformers, by focusing on another educational
change project, reported by Gross et al in Implementing Organizational
Innovations ( 1971 ). In this case study, the authors rely on organiza-
tional change theory in citing five reasons why an innovation purportedly
on the classroom level "to redefine the role of the classroom
teacher" in an inner city elementary school was not successfully
implemented: 1) teachers' lack of clarity about the innovation, a fail-
ure in involving teachers in planning; 2 ) teachers' lack of necessary
skills and knowledge, a failure in diagnosis; 3) the unavail_ability of
needed materials, a failure in planning; U) the incompatibility of or-
ganizational arrangements, a failure in diagnosis; and 5) lack of staff
motivation to implement the innovation, a failure in leadership. But a
cursory reading of the appendices of the book, which contain all perti-
nent documents, shows that the innovation to be implemented was not
simply "redefine the role of the classroom teacher," it was something
closer to redefining societal values.
Consider: 1) part of the innovation was that teachers
not be in-
terested in "test scores" and getting students "prepared
for Classical
I • *
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High.” I submit, that all parents and most teachers, no matter how in-
volved they were, would view this as regression, not innovation. 2)
Gross admits that to carry out this innovation teachers needed not
simply new knowledge and skills but a "set of new educational attitudes
and values and a new way of viewing the phenomenon of schooling." This
sounds more like organizational psychotherapy than organizational change,
not to mention the problem of changing the "educational attitudes and
values" of the society at large. 3) Not only were necessary materials
unavailable, Gross found, they were largely non-existent. To what ex-
tent is an innovation that relies on materials that don't exist really
an innovation? 1*) The organizational arrangements cited here were the
continuation of report cards and bells, there was no mention of super-
intendents, school boards, budgets, the certifying and selecting func-
tions of schools. 5) Most teachers decided that the innovation did not
represent the best way to teach students to read, write, figure, etc.,
so they decided to resist its implementation. The failure here was in
ideology, not leadership. Innovators, and evaluators, in this case
failed to recognize the obvious social, economic and political impli-
cations of the innovation which finally brought it to its knees. For
evaluators to cite the five reasons above as the definitive explanation
for failure is to exhibit the same gross lack of understanding as was
exhibited by the planners of the Clinic for Learning.
The more explicitly an innovation challenges a fundamental socie
tal value the less likely it is to succeed. The implications
of the
Clinic's design to effect change on the second level of reform,
the
community level, are less obscure and more clearly radical
in nat-ure.
%• *
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The promise of building a ’'community school" immediately confronts the
central power arrangements of the public schools, whereby the decisions
which affect the lives of children for six hours per day for twelve years
are made by the traditional interests — i.e., the state legislature,
the Board of Education, the teachers, administrators, etc. -— but not
by parents and students. "Community control" by parents presents a
radical and fundamental departure from the conventional view of public
education, in which schools are viewed as surrogate parents, instilling
the values of hard work and conformity and compensating for the perceived
deficiencies of the home. It is not surprising that such efforts illicit
strong resistance.
Finally, when educational reformers overtly challenge societal
norms their liklihood of success approaches zero. The debilitating impli-
cations of the third level of reform advanced by the Clinic with neither
understanding nor tact need no explication. Clinic planners asserted
that their efforts would result in the beginnings of a basic restructur-
ing of the political and economic foundations of our society. But that
was folly. Their sincerity and dedication, no matter how great, were
incapable of dealing with the proverbial "system."
It is to the credit of the Project Director that he came to
understand fundamental conflicts inherent in the project and began
"shifting from a school-education orientation to a socio-economic -education
community orientation." He began to view the public school not simply as
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the purveyor of academic skills but as a power base for economic and
political action. Yet he had little strength with which to bring the
reorientation about. The entire project was founded on vague misunder-
standings, and the entire project failed on this account. Had project
planners understood earlier, they would not have aimed at eradicating
the ghetto, in any terms; they would have mustered more than good will
and communications links in bringing the community into a position of
power in the school; and finally, they would have sensed the overall
ramifications of their proposed classroom innovations and focused all of
their professional competencies on this task, which had the greatest
possibility of fulfillment.
We have argued that the theorems of the science of organizational
change could have been useful primarily in implementing, and explaining,
this latter category of reform. In this light we have argued that or-
ganizational change theorems aid in explaining the failure of the Clus-
o
ters; Our research verifies the critical nature of proper teacher in-
volvement and situationally defined leadership skills. And though we
have clearly not suggested that poor teacher involvement and unskilled
leadership were the only Clinic shortcomings, this approach has lent a
measure of scientific credibility to our inquiry. At the same time, on
the other two levels of change, we have essentially bypassed the organi-
zational change approach. Admittedly, if we could point, as did the
Gross study, to a number of concrete and ostensibly scientific reasons
why the Clinic failed, our conclusions might carry more weight.
It
would be convenient, for example, to argue that the Clinic
for Learning
failed to achieve community involvment solely because the
community was
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not included in designing the project, or because the original community
agents were not recognized community leaders. It would leave us more
sanguine if we could conclude that reform at JHS
.57 could have had some-
tiny impact on the eradication of the ghetto if the planners had only
diagnosed the situation better, or had clarified their goals, or had
really delivered the services of New York University. No doubt these are
•important observations for evaluators to make, no doubt their rectifica-
tion will aid future projects, but they are far from explaining why the
Clinic for Learning failed on these latter two levels of reform. The
Clinic failed, very simply, because it cut too roughly across society's
grain: it threatened the jobs and political security of too many people;
it questioned too specifically the value orientations of too many power-
ful groups of people.
In short, we have found organizational change theorems to be of
little use in explaining the interaction between organizations — i.e.
JHS 57 and the political and economic environments in which they
exist. We recall that Bennis and Argyris and Likert developed their
strategies in industrial settings, they made it their goal to "humanize"
individuals in private enterprise, but their writings evidence little
doubt about the wisdom of the ends of private enterprise. Increased
production and profits are as much a goal of the "change agents" as they
are of the Boards of Directors whom they serve. They offer only a betx-er,
still productive way to reach the same end. The goals of public
educa-
tion traditionally have been to transmit a cultural heritage,
teach
fundamental skills of reading and writing, socialize for
adjustment to
society’s norms, and produce students who will become
law abiding and
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industrious contributors to the economy. * For those who seek a better way
to reach those goals the strategies of organizational change are crucial.
For those who want the schools to perform a different function, putting
them into a fundamentally different relation with basic economic and
political institutions, organizational change theory loses all its vitali-
ty. For the Cluster Coordinator who said, "We told them we wanted to
help them do better what they were already doing, but that was not why
we were there, at least not why I was there," organizational change
strategies might have forestalled his eventual clash with the school,
but they would not have fulfilled his goal. Leadership and decision
making and diagnosis and linkages and goal setting in a non-coercive en-
vironment would have "greased the machine," as another Coordinator said,
but they would have done little to affect the final product of ghetto
education. Predictably, our discussion of the latter two levels of re-
form becomes less precise, less verifiable, more sociological, and as a
result, our conclusions are less prescriptive. The measure of success
in these broader areas will be not only in the knowledge that we promul-
gate but in the questions that we have raised.
In Conclusion
Education is an important and valuable process in the life of a
child. That we equate "schooling" with "education" is only a measure
of
how deeply mired we are in the myths of Horace Mann that
universal
public education is necessary to assuage man's thirst for
knowledge. In
1972, it is essentially absurd to equate the two;
electronic communica-
tions media are in never ending competition with the
knowledge trans-
mitting capabilities of public schools. And yet, as
a nation, we are
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decades if not centuries away from dismantling the system of compulsory
public schooling which moulds the lives of future generations. Until
this occurs, we bear a heavy responsibility to those children, who
through no choice of their own find themselves at the mercy of the Insti-
tution of Public Education. Making schools more humane, more individually
fulfilling, and more educational are legitimate hopes for educational
.reform.
In this study we have explored a not uncommon phenomenon of
educational reform: professional educators acting on the belief that the
solution to most, if not all, of society's problems resides somewhere
in their chosen field. A common failing to be sure. The wild hopes of
the Clinic for Learning Project Director, who, starting in one school
with a handful of graduate students, could consider as one of his ulti-
mate goals the dimunition of the ghetto, are not nearly so wild when
placed alongside the multitude of reform projects that have succeeded
the Clinic. Educators still talk cavelierly of "compensating for the
disadvantaged," or "providing equal opportunity for all," or "having an
impact" on society. But, on the basis of- both the evidence of the Clinic
debacle and a broader sampling of sociological opinions, we have con-
cluded here that these objectives conceal nearly insurmountable barriers
which far outweigh the traditionally defined competencies of the educa-
tional profession.
Schools and universities have their place in the society, as
mechanisms of socialization and seedbeds for intellectual and
socio-
emotional development. These processes can be facilitated^
teachers
can teach better,' new techniques can heighten the
self-esteem and m-
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terest of the learner, the growth of the mind can be stimulated, and the
socialization process can be made not quite so restrictive. More stu-
dents can learn more things in a more curious way by virtue of the wis-
dom of the educational profession and its pursuit of constructive change.
But educational reform must have its boundaries. Those who remain with-
in this sphere maximize their impact on the intellectual and emotional
• growth of our young, and in so doing they perform a valuable and impor-
tant function for the society. Those who profess to be educators but
with
aspire to be social reformers are sadly out of touch both'the tools of
their profession and the demands of their aspiration.
* l
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